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ABSTRACT
‘A BETTER COUNTRY TO DIE IN’: SELF-DETERMINATION, DRUGS, AND THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL
ASSISTANCE IN DYING IN CANADA
MAY 2019
WENDY PRINGLE, B.A. UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
M.A., MCGILL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Emily West

This dissertation examines Canada’s legalization of medical assistance in dying (MAiD).
Specifically, it focuses on how the debates surrounding the legalization process, the cultural
history of euthanasia drugs, and the ethical dimensions of disability shaped assisted dying
outcomes in the country in the period between the precedent-setting February 2015 Carter v.
Canada Supreme Court case and the legislation, passed in June 2016, that enacted legalized
MAiD. This mixed methods project uses discursive analysis of media texts, pharmacological
history, and rhetorical analysis of first-person testimonies. The first analytic chapter, “SelfDetermination, Euthanasia, and the Right to Die,” considers how the shift toward greater
autonomy from medicine at the end of life took place as a discursive event in Canada. The second
chapter, “‘Cito, Tuto et Jucunde’: The Many Lives of the Drugs Used to Kill Quickly, Safely and
Pleasantly,” scrutinizes the relationship between the medicalization of death and barbiturates,
the drugs used in medically assisted deaths. The final chapter, “Disability and the Right to Die in
Canada,” examines the rhetorical strategies used to justify the expansion of MAiD eligibility

vii

criteria in Canada. I argue that case of MAiD illustrates how the ideology of ability limits the scope
of our understanding of the conditions that make life livable. The recasting of health as an
individual right and responsibility has crept into the changing conversation about death and
dying. This individualist view is in part an ideological by-product of a culture of health based on
privatized care and a politics of deservingness that links good health care to employment and
hard work.
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Advance directive — A statement that details how a person wishes to be treated by doctors and
care professionals at the end of life. This could include a Do Not Resuscitate
order, as well as a decision about assisted suicide made by a person with
dementia while they are still competent to do so.
ALS — Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, a degenerative neuromuscular disease.
Assisted Suicide — In assisted suicide, “an individual performs the final act to end their life. This
often involves ingesting a lethal substance prescribed or provided by the
physician.”1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) — Guarantees: freedom of religion, of
thought, of expression, of the press and of peaceful assembly the right to
participate in political activities and the right to a democratic government the
freedom to move around and live within Canada, and to leave Canada legal rights
such as the right to life, liberty and security equality rights language rights.2
Consultation Report — Consultations on Physician-Assisted Dying Summary of Key Findings
Final Report.
CBC — The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCC — Criminal Code of Canada
Euthanasia — From Greek, meaning “good death,” this has been the blanket term for medical
or professional help in dying. Euthanasia is distinct from assisted dying in that it is
the doctor, and not the patient who administers the procedure.
External Panel — The External Panel on Options for a Legislative Response to Carter v. Canada
Grievous and irremediable medical condition — A person has a grievous and irremediable
medical condition only if they meet all of the following criteria: (a) they have a
serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; (b) they are in an advanced
state of irreversible decline in capability; (c) that illness, disease or disability or
that state of decline causes them enduring physical or psychological suffering that
is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under conditions that they
consider acceptable; and (d) their natural death has become reasonably
foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical circumstances, without a

1

Chochinov, Frazee, and Pelletier, “Consultations on Physician-Assisted Dying - Summary of
Results and Key Findings,” 44.
2 Parliament of Canada, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
xii

prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length of time that they
have remaining.3
MAiD — Medical Assistance in Dying, refers to:
•
•

administration of a substance by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner at the
request of a person that causes that person’s death (also known as voluntary
euthanasia); or
a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner prescribing or providing a substance to a
person, at that person’s request, that can be self-administered and that will cause the
person’s own death (also known as medically- or physician-assisted suicide).4

Permissive System — Refers to a medical and legal system that permits some form of assistance
in dying.
SCC — Supreme Court of Canada
SMA — Spinal Muscular Atrophy, a degenerative neuromuscular disease

3

Wilson-Raybould, Bill C-14.
Nicol and Tiedemann, “Legislative Summary of Bill C-14: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code
and to Make Related Amendments to Other Acts (Medical Assistance in Dying).”
4
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TIMELINE OF MAID-RELATED EVENTS IN CANADA
Date
September 1993

November 1994 - December
2010

Name
Rodriguez v. British Columbia

Robert Latimer case

January 1995

The Special Senate
Committee on Euthanasia
and Assisted Suicide
published

January 2012

Physicians’ Alliance against
Euthanasia founded

Significance
The courts (BC and the SCC) ruled
against Sue Rodriguez, who had
ALS, and was seeking assisted
death. She died with assistance in
secret anyway.
Robert Latimer, convicted of killing
his severely disabled daughter
Tracy, loses his case (and
subsequent appeals) for
“compassionate homicide,” and
serves 16 years in prison.
Following a consultation with the
public, the Senate publishes a
report affirming the continued
prohibition of euthanasia and
assisted suicide.
Founding of a group of Quebec
doctors opposed to practicing
MAiD.

Bill n°52: “An Act respecting
end-of-life care” passed

Quebec’s legalisation of MAiD,
which bypassed the criminalisation
of assisted dying, by redefining
MAiD as care, which falls under the
provincial mandate.

February 2015

Carter v. Canada
Supreme Court ruling

The court ruled in favor of Kay
Carter’s pursuit of legal MAiD.
Carter, who had spinal stenosis,
died with assistance in Switzerland
in 2010 before the case was
settled.

December 2015

The External Panel on
Options for a Legislative
Response to Carter v.
Canada’s “Consultations on
Physician-Assisted Dying Final
Report” published

400-page report published by an
external panel on assisted dying,
with legislative recommendations,
following the Carter ruling.

June 2014

June 2016

Bill C-14, “An Act to amend
the Criminal Code” passed

June 2016

Lamb V. Canada court
challenged launched

Figure 1 Timeline of MAiD-Related Events

xiv

The official bill legalizing MAiD, and
detailing the eligibility
requirements, procedures.
Julia Lamb and the BCCLA file a
court challenge to C-14, on the
basis that it discriminates against
Lamb and others whose deaths are
not “reasonably foreseeable.”

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years, there has been an uptick in the number of jurisdictions
debating the right to die worldwide. With the passage of legalization legislation in 2016, Canada
joined Belgium, Colombia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, as well as six states in
the United States (Oregon, California, Colorado, Montana, Vermont, and Washington) which
now all have some form of legal assisted dying protocol.5 What is most compelling about
studying such legal changes is that, more than reclassifying voluntary assisted dying from crime
to care, they catalyzed frank and open discussions about what makes life liveable. Couched in
these deliberations are much deeper concerns; actors in the debate have had to examine
whether legalizing forms of suicide or euthanasia will reshape the fabric of social life altogether.
Whether framed as assisted suicide, or medical assistance in dying, an increasing number of
people at the end of life are making new demands of clinical care systems and the legal
jurisdictions governing them. While the end of life is still broadly understood as a private affair,
to be attended only by close family and health care workers, it is increasingly common for the
dying to speak openly about their experiences.6 Patients are no longer kept in the dark about a
terminal prognosis, as was the norm in past decades, and are now encouraged to participate in
the decision-making processes at the end of life.7 While the precise implications of such

5

Emanuel et al., “Attitudes and Practices of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the
United States, Canada, and Europe.”
6 Van Brussel, “A Discourse-Theoretical Approach to Death and Dying”; West, “Invitation to
Witness.”
7 Walter, The Revival of Death.
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changes are beyond the scope of this project, they signal broader shifts in the rituals
surrounding death in the era of medicalization. MAiD counts among these other changes,
because it provides an alternative option among the “increasingly flexible cultural scripts”8 at
the end of life.
The cultural contexts shaping the problem of assisted dying can vary dramatically from
one jurisdiction to the next. In the U.S. and Canada, many on the side of moving forward with a
system that permits assisted dying in some instances are looking to European states such as the
Netherlands and Switzerland, where support for assisted dying was established years ago, for
guidance. We hear more stories about the changing domestic rituals surrounding death,9 the
challenges that status quo healthcare poses to the dying and elderly,10 and the predicament of
doctors and care workers who are caught between the wishes of their patients and present
medical conventions.11 Medical sociology has challenged practices surrounding death and dying
in the medicalized setting, observing in the 1960s that practitioners based decisions on whether
to resuscitate a patient on their “presumed social value.”12 Nicholas A. Christakis’ book Death
Foretold: Prophecy and Prognosis in Medical Care drew public attention to doctors’ tendency to
overestimate good prognoses at the end of life, overestimating survival by a factor of 5.3. 13 The
stories of those who wish to end their lives, and prevent prolonged suffering “openly and

8

Timmermans, “Death Brokering,” 993.
Macsweeney, “Why Death Cleaning Isn’t as Scary as It Sounds.”
10 Kalanithi, When Breath Becomes Air.
11 Gawande, Being Mortal.
12 Timmermans and Sudnow, “Social Death as Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” 453; Sudnow, Passing
On.
13 Christakis, Death Foretold; Kolata, “Conversation with: Nicholas Christakis.”
9
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without fear,”14 have been making their way into popular discursive arenas. Regardless of the
highly variable legal situations governing the right to die and assisted dying in different
jurisdictions, it is evident that a marked change is underway in the terms by which we engage in
discussions about dying.
Lobbyists for a permissive system, such as the international Dying With Dignity group,
have pushed the topic of assisted dying into the public eye for approximately forty years.15
However, even defining the moment at which death occurs has been highly contested, with
stages of development and recursion throughout the history of medicine.16 Supporters and
detractors of MAiD alike are rushing to identify the precise social values that should govern
restrictions and the decision-making process. In this chapter, ‘permissive system’ refers to a
medico-juridical arrangement permitting some form of euthanasia or assisted dying. The stakes
are high on either side of the fence; for those who directly oppose it, assisted dying protocols
open a gate that can never be closed, putting the most vulnerable at risk. Meanwhile
supporters argue that restrictive laws are causing immense suffering, and prolonging expensive
and unwanted medical treatment. Further complicating the debate are the myriad case-by-case
differences in the patients considered eligible, their unique medical circumstances, and the
types of treatments and palliative care resources available.17 Additionally, even among those
North Americans supportive of a permissive system, coming to agreement about the near

14

Porter, “At His Own Wake, Celebrating Life and the Gift of Death.”
Humphry, “Chronology of Right-to-Die Events.”
16 Bishop, The Anticipatory Corpse.
17 Bryant, “Aid in Dying”; Sneiderman, “Decision Making at the End of Life.”
15
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infinite combinations of eligibility criteria, request protocols, and lethal drugs is an enormous
challenge. Nevertheless, the demand for legal MAiD has been steady.
If there is a cultural counterpoint to the international right-to-die movement, it is perhaps
found in Silicon Valley. Barbara Ehrenreich writes that the tech industry symbolizes a fixation
with immortality, centred on the idea that technological advances will make us live longer and
longer lives.18 The technological hubris that permeates the Valley, she argues, seeks to
transcend even the mere pursuit of health that occupies so much of American consumer
culture, in favor of immortality. Ehrenreich writes:
Peter Thiel, the billionaire co-founder of PayPal, plans to live to be 120. Compared with
some other tech billionaires, he doesn’t seem particularly ambitious. Dmitry Itskov, the
“godfather” of the Russian Internet, says his goal is to live to 10,000; Larry Ellison, cofounder of Oracle, finds the notion of accepting mortality “incomprehensible,” and Sergey
Brin, co-founder of Google, hopes to someday “cure death.”19
Such audacious bids for immortality might seem shocking, but they are very much on par with
the direction that discourses of health have taken for the better part of the last century. In
other words, these statements follow the same pattern that messages about health have
repeated for years; that each of us is personally responsible for our own wellbeing, that only
rigorous exercise, daily rituals of health, and faith in the technologies of modern medicine will
stave off illness and the degenerating effects of old age. The discourses surrounding MAiD
paradoxically extend such individualist views, with MAiD constructed as an individual choice,

18
19

Ehrenreich, Natural Causes, 75.
Isaacson, “Next Up for Silicon Valley.” Cited in Ehrenreich.
4

not unlike the other healthy, responsible, reasonable choices healthy subjects are called upon
to make throughout their lives.
In the following sections of this chapter, I introduce the project and provide an overview
of the relevant context for it. I situate the research within the field of communication studies
and explain what is unique about understanding health in the Canadian context. I outline my
methodological approach to the research and design of the study and present the research
questions that guided each of the following chapters. This Introduction also offers a review of
scholarly literature relevant to the dissertation as a whole.

1.1 Dignity and the Problem of Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada
In Canada, the debate about how to end life in the contemporary era of medicalization
has been centered on the issue of dignity. The question of legalizing MAiD and integrating it
into broader social practice provides a unique intersection of social concerns. It demands a
specific articulation of the limits of medicine, such as, how far into the outer limits, or final
weeks and days, of life should medical intervention go? It explicitly insists on hierarchizing the
kinds of lives affected, for example, who is permitted to access such a procedure? But perhaps
most importantly, it demands new ways of imagining what the end of life should look like
instead. If, as some argued, a juridico-medical system20 that forbids MAiD leads to indignity,
then what exactly is meant by dignity? Furthermore, if MAiD promises to restore dignity to
some, what is implied about those for whom life is made unliveable by other forces? With this

20

Foucault and Lotringer, “The Social Extension of the Norm,” 197. Cited in Tierney.
5

research, I aim to better understand how the shift toward a permissive system reflects cultural
beliefs about good living and dying. In my analysis of autonomy in dying discourse, I argue that
the permission to access MAiD has been established through a particular set of rhetorical
gestures. These gestures might be understood as a reworking of the conventional ‘make live’ or
‘let die’ division that Foucault identified in contemporary biopolitics.
The cultural impact of the shift to a permissive system is difficult to trace holistically, but
some tangible changes are emerging. Educators, for example, are considering how to integrate
discussions of death, dying and MAiD into classroom discussions, asking how children deal with
death cognitively and emotionally, and integrating the topic of MAiD into classroom discussions
to promote open dialogue on death and bereavement.21 Scholars have been addressing the
implications of voluntary active euthanasia with greater frequency, particularly since the
beginning of the Lee Carter vs. Attorney General of Canada court case made national news in
Canada, beginning in 2013. Given the nature of MAiD, the question of legalization and
implementation has cast a wide net of influence on intellectual practice. In Psychiatry, Schafer
argues that the potential harm to society does not outweigh the benefits of granting the right
to MAID for competent adults.22 In 2015, after the SCC ruling, but before the ensuing legislation
Bill C-14, health policy scholars examined MAiD from an ethical perspective, delineating the
range of ethical concerns that the as-yet-unreleased legislation should consider.23 In
Washington State, the legalization of MAID prompted medical ethicists to interrogate the

21

Donlevy, Schroeder, and Wilcox, “Medical Assistance in Dying.”
Schafer, “Physician Assisted Suicide.”
23 Landry, Foreman, and Kekewich, “Ethical Considerations in the Regulation of Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Death in Canada.”
22
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implications of implementing assisted dying procedures with regard to the complex and
sometimes incompatible patient and care provider values.24 Such studies provide insight into
the breadth of the cultural impact of introducing MAiD into society, demonstrating that more
than providing a new clinical option in end-of-life care, MAiD signals a sea change in how we
think and talk about death more generally.

1.2 Research Design
1.2.1 Using Critical Discourse Analysis
In the discursive and textual analysis undertaken here, I have attempted to weave
together a set of narrative patterns that tell a story about the way Canadians understand the
end of life in this period of upheaval of traditional practices. Because I am invested in rendering
a diverse and contradictory assortment of documents, statements and media texts, it has been
critical for me as a researcher to recognize my own motivations to render complexity simple
and the ambiguous affirmative. In many ways, there is no simple or streamlined story to tell
about discourses of dignity in dying in Canada, since there is no coherent, easily identifiable or
distinctly ‘Canadian’ subject to whom I can ascribe cultural patterns. Indeed, to reflect on the
dialectical and shifting nature of the ‘culturally appropriate’ as I do here with reference to the
discursive practices rendering MAiD admissible to society, is, in turn, simultaneously a way of
reifying a version of Canadian subjectivity. Because of this, I have been committed to leaving

24

Campbell and Black, “Dignity, Death, and Dilemmas.”
7

the complex and contradictory nature of discourses of health and bodies detailed here intact.
Given its legacy as a settler colonial state, the influence of subsequent generations of
immigration, and its positioning as always proximate to, and yet distinct from the United States,
the nature of health and subjectivity in Canada has always been structured by multiple cultural
determinations. As such, I have drawn from a diverse range of influences in order to reflect the
complex and contradictory nature of what is considered healthy subjectivity in Canada.
The method best suited to analyzing the diverse texts that I have assembled for this study is
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). I offer a brief overview of relevant central tenets of CDA that
inform this study. The critical vein of discourse analysis operates as a corrective to modes of
discourse analysis understood by some to be too blind to the structures of power operating
through it. In CDA, discourse is always laden with social values, and is reflective of the power
relations that shape society. In being attentive to the reification of the social stratification or
hierarchies through the exercise of “rhetorical power,”25 researchers using CDA seek to enact
social change through the deconstruction of discursive texts. This is distinct from other
mandates guiding the interpretation or dissection of texts that are limited to description. In
drawing attention to the broader forces of social power that inform modes of discursive
interaction, for example, CDA can help us to understand how texts function to reinforce cultural
and political capital held by the speakers in question.26 Providing eight concise descriptions of
the function of discourse in society, Fairclough, Wodak and Mulderrig’s chapter, “Critical

25
26

Fairclough, Wodak, and Mulderrig, “Critical Discourse Analysis,” 12.
Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power.
8

Discourse Analysis” has become a common methodological touchstone in reflecting on the
objectives of CDA. The following list iterates these key attributes.
•

CDA addresses social problems;

•

Power relations are discursive;

•

Discourse constitutes society and culture;

•

Discourse does ideological work;

•

Discourse is historical;

•

A socio-cognitive approach is needed to understand how relations between text and
society is mediated;

•

CDA is interpretative and explanatory and uses systematic methodology

•

CDA is a socially committed scientific paradigm.

Taking such a multifaceted approach makes possible the project of addressing social problems
through attention to language. Orienting the nature of research toward action in the way that
CDA can do is key to my study, since I focus on problems with discursive practices of
normativity. Attention to ideology and history are crucial to such work.
Meyer describes the key qualities of critical discourse analysis that set it apart from other
modes of discourse analysis.27 CDA recognizes the absolute historical contingency of all
discourse. CDA likewise seeks to expose hidden power relationships that are manifest in
discourse. The task, as Meyer further explains, of unpacking relationships of power that are
present in texts requires an attentiveness to “the broadest range of factors that exert an

27

Meyer, “Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA,” 15.
9

influence on texts,” in order to understand how extralinguistic factors such as culture, society
and ideology shape and are shaped by discourse.28 CDA encourages seeking discursive data
from unconventional sources, such as discarded promotional materials, pamphlets, and
independent and self-published texts. Tracing the circulation of ideas and influences across
these diffuse discursive arenas facilitates producing a thorough representation of the discursive
status quo.
Health is a notoriously slippery category,29 which makes it a good candidate for the
kinds of insights that CDA enables. CDA is particularly well-attuned to addressing matters of
health because it functions to isolate and identify utterances that announce one goal, while
cloaking another. Van Dijk calls attention to the importance of analyzing discursive content
without needing to veil any political stance. He argues that researchers using CDA should “spell
out their point of view, perspective, principles and aims, both within their discipline and within
society at large,” with the goal of taking the perspective of those “who suffer the most from
dominance and inequality.”30 This approach controverts the assumption or pursuit of
objectivity, grounding the researcher, and their politics into the research process itself.
Ultimately, in challenging and interrogating the language of dignity and autonomy with this
research, my aim is to contribute to a broader project of fighting inequality in social institutions.
Gaining a better understanding of how these discursive categories shape our definitions of life
and death is one way of better understanding shared valuations of life in contemporary
Canadian society.
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CDA aligns well with the existing body of critical research on health and wellness in
Communication Studies. Zoller and Kline’s “Theoretical Contributions of Interpretive and Critical
Research in Health Communication” is particularly instructive to my project, since they offer
concrete prescriptions for improving communication research related to health. Following their
guidelines, I enhance and contribute to critical discussions of public health by drawing from
broadly interdisciplinary critical theoretical frameworks, and by focusing on incorporating
rhetorical and discursive interpretation into my analysis.31 Likewise, I explore how the socially
constructed category of health and illness “relates to issues of power, politics, and resistance
and how those relate to individual and cultural identity.”32 This approach has the benefit of
making an important contribution to the more critical and interpretive facet of health
communication research, where such research can continue to add complexity to our
understanding of “human agency among patients, clients, media audiences, research
participants, and campaign targets.”33 As the diffuse and nebulous assemblage of forces
shaping health, medicine, and the discipline of bodies continue to evolve, CDA provides the
tools critical to thinking across boundaries, and investigating key relationships as the concept of
health develops alongside the massive social upheavals wrought by economic and cultural
globalization.
This research is also indebted both conceptually and methodologically to the way critical
discursive studies of health and wellness have established the radical contingency of our
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understanding of health and good living. Studies such as Lupton’s Imperative of Health, Martin’s
Flexible Bodies, Mol’s Logic of Care, and Clarke et al.’s Biomedicalization demonstrate how
cultural context shapes medical knowledge and practice.34 These scholars uproot assumptions
about the possibility of objectivity in medical research and practice, suggesting that the pursuit
of objectivity itself can function, to borrow from Solomon, as a “perceptual blinder” 35 to the
realities of practicing medicine, and thinking about illness, health and the structuring of
socialized medical care programs. Objectivity and neutrality are not boundaries to police. Nor is
the goal of research critical of health practices to merely point out ideological bias in the
decisions made by individuals and institutions. Instead, I analyse texts to look for patterns of
normalization, asking as Lupton does, what stakes any public health effort has in shaping
society. In my work, I therefore also challenge and interrogate
…public health’s role, as a powerful social institution, in the processes of rationalization,
normalization and social ordering, or the ways in which the discourses and practices of
public health serve the post-Enlightenment ideal of control over the destiny of
humanity.36
Given that the outcome of shifting Canada to a permissive system has been framed as a rational
remedy to suffering and indignity, I have focused on dissecting the unseen processes by which
the decision comes to be understood as such, and on the means by which the terms of
discourse are made intelligible in the first place.
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The CDA and the critical health scholarship that influence my research are themselves
indebted to the traditions of historiography and Foucauldian genealogy. In addition to the focus
on a flexible definition of discourse and its power to shape social realities, this engenders a
respect for history’s inconsistencies. “Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore
an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten things,” writes
Foucault, “its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, having
imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes.”37 Following this, I instead look for
patterns, without the goal of tracing easy narratives. In challenging historical work’s allegiance
to scientific objectivity, or to the tracing of evolutionary processes, the historian can observe
the “appearance of regular, coherent transformations”38 that are beholden neither to political
mythology, nor to the telling of easy progress narratives. Ultimately, taking a critical orientation
towards the object of research, and to the meaning-making influences of linguistic practices, as
the aforementioned authors encourage, expands the possibilities for intervening on social
praxis and destabilizing oppressive forces of normalization.

1.2.2 Research Questions and Procedures
The dissertation is organized into three analytical chapters, each of which is guided by a
distinct research question. Chapter 2 is entitled “Self-Determination, Euthanasia and the Right
to Die,” and asks: how is the shift toward greater autonomy from medicine at the end of life
taking place as a discursive event in Canada? Because changes to euthanasia laws are taking
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place in public debate and mass mediation, studying their development in public fora provides
insight into whether and how opinions have shifted alongside significant events, such as
Supreme Court cases in the US and Canada. The focus of this chapter began as a means of
getting the landscape view of the situation, of understanding what, in general, was being said
about MAiD. For this chapter, I selected statements drawn from popular media outlets, both
local and national, on the basis of their addressing the problems of euthanasia and medically
assisted dying in Canada. I also examined legal decrees, publicly funded opinion census data
and bioethical inquiries. Data collection consisted of full-text searches of 190 Canadian
newspapers indexed in the Canadian Newsstream database. The search terms “physician
assisted suicide,” “medical assistance in dying,” and “physician assisted dying” were used, while
excluding the many articles that address other facets of MAiD. Overall, I analyzed
approximately 75 of the documents the search produced. In addition to opinion pieces and
letters to the editor, news articles were also included, since these provided valuable insights
into the framing of autonomy in pro-MAiD discourse. Additionally, some data were drawn from
a report published in December 2015 by a federally mandated external panel, which served as a
public consultation in the period between the Carter v. Canada Supreme Court ruling which set
the precedent to legalize assisted suicide, and the formal legislation legalizing some forms of
assisted dying which passed in June 2016. This 400-page report, entitled “Consultations on
Physician-Assisted Dying: Summary of Results and Key Findings” (hereafter “Consultation
Report”), for which the authors consulted medical professionals and the Canadian public, as
well as experts from countries that have already enacted a permissive system, served as an
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index of some of the relevant media coverage of public debate about the issue. Wherever
possible, the original press documents discovered through this report were consulted directly.
The goal of this chapter is to understand how MAiD became legible as a desirable legal
right in the country. I examine how a particular mode of discursive framing constructed MAiD
as a culturally appropriate end-of-life ritual, charting the arguments about the procedure in
order of least in favor (including outright rejection on a moral basis, and rejection on the basis
of medical ethics) to most in favor (including those wishing to revise medical ethics and
procedures to accommodate the practice, and those who embrace MAiD as a social good in and
of itself). This last position, which I term autonomy in dying discourse, ultimately proved
successful in pushing for a permissive system. I situate autonomy in dying discourse within the
broader processes of individualization that have shared conceptions of the body under the
medical gaze, arguing that it is naturalized as an extension of liberal subjectivity.
Chapter 3, entitled “‘Cito, Tuto et Jucunde’: The Many Lives of the Drugs Used to Kill
Quickly, Safely and Pleasantly” examines the relationship between barbiturates and the
medicalization of death. In the planning of this research, I wanted to engage a concrete,
material facet of the issue, but during the proposal stage no clear material object had emerged.
As the research developed, it became clear that there was something of a taboo in mentioning
the drugs used in the process. Beyond seeking to fill in a less understood facet of assisted dying,
looking at the drugs and how they worked on the body promised to offer a concrete aspect to
the story. As it turned out, the precise mechanism by which barbiturates act on the body
remains unknown. Instead of illuminating a material, embodied component, the story of the
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drugs turned out to be a social one. Even the most finite dimension of assisted death—the
killing itself—proved to be largely a matter of social construction.
The focus of this chapter developed as a result of an unexpected link between capital
punishment and MAiD. The drugs are not only used to induce death in both MAiD and punitive
lethal injection, but historically had a wildly popular therapeutic and recreational career as well.
So, while in their therapeutic phase, they were knitted into discourses of a ‘good life,’ they are
now linked to death. Besides serving as an opportunity to clarify how exactly the MAiD
procedure works—a detail that was often downplayed or omitted in much of the existing
discourse—examining the drugs themselves provided an entryway into the biopolitical
construction of a ‘good death.’
In researching this chapter, I gathered press coverage of ‘botched’ executions, legal
scholarship surrounding barbiturates, pharmacological studies of barbiturates and
benzodiazepines, and sociological and anthropological drug histories. I examined these sources,
putting them into conversation with key arguments in social studies of medicine, and
contemporary critical and disability theory. I examine arguments about suicide from early
liberal political doctrine and juxtapose them with contemporary critical biopolitical arguments
about health and access to care. I make strategic use of scientific knowledge about the drugs
used in both MAiD and lethal injections as a way of interrogating the medicalization of the end
of life. Fostering certain kinds of life over others is a technique of biopolitical regulation in
which the pharmaceutical industry is complicit, but we understand less about how this
regulation functions at the end of life than during other stages. By examining the different uses
of barbiturates, I explore how they facilitate different outcomes for the dying. This chapter
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demonstrates how the drugs function as a boundary between two opposite extremes in the
spectrum of end-of-life scenarios. I argue that the procedures surrounding both lethal injection
and MAiD are focused on the same goal of modernizing and sanitizing death and dying for the
benefit of those who must bear witness to it.
Chapter 4, “Disability and the Right to Die in Canada,” scrutinizes the rhetorical
strategies for justifying the expansion of MAiD eligibility criteria. Research for this chapter
focused on case studies of disabled individuals arguing that they are negatively affected by
restrictive eligibility criteria in Bill C-14. I had originally intended to investigate the colonial
dimension of assisted dying discourse, but the matter of disability was ever-present across
coverage of the issue. Articulating how exactly disability was constructed by those seeking
MAiD became important to the project. Furthermore, as I learned more about the history of
disability studies throughout the research process, it was clear that the work would be
incomplete without attention to the important ways that disability scholarship and activism has
engaged critically with curative medicine. I focused particularly on the Lamb v. Canada court
challenge, in which the restrictions on accessing MAiD in the present legislation are being
challenged on the basis of its exclusions of people with disabilities. For context, I also looked at
anti-MAiD disability activism discourse, although to a lesser extent. I selected statements drawn
from popular media outlets, provincial and federal legal documentation, lobby group web
resources, and personal blog websites. Data collection for chapter 4 consisted of full-text
searches of the 190 Canadian newspapers indexed in the Canadian Newsstream database.
Search terms centered on the legal cases in question, and the names of the four individuals
who serve as representative cases. Lamb, Moro, Brault, and Nadeau-Whissell were among the
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most vocal in expressing discontent with the impugned laws in public fora. I treat them as
representative of individuals negatively affected by caveats of the transition to legal MAiD
because they provided the most thorough accounts of their experiences, and because their
diverse experiences—some dealing with life-long conditions, others with late-onset illnesses—
show the range of people negatively affected by the law’s restrictions. Perhaps more than any
other facet of the MAiD issue in Canada, the deliberation and debate that surrounds the Lamb
court challenge offers a unique opportunity to focus on those subjugated by the hierarchizing
effects of the biopolitical order. I analyzed data for its ability to indicate what rhetorical
strategies were used in justifying the expansion of MAiD eligibility criteria in Canada. I grouped
and coded the data according to similarities in their framing of the problem and commonalities
in the detailing of experiences living with illness and disability. I examined the statements here
with the goal of better understanding how the category of disability influences and is
influenced by pro-MAiD discourse.
Since the autonomy of the medicalized body is complicated by a number of factors,
including race, gender, class, and ability, then it is necessary to articulate how these processes
may be shaping discourses of ‘good’ life and ‘dignified’ death today. As such, the aim of this
chapter is to better understand how Canada’s transition to a permissive system is shaped by
the context of ableism. I examined the discursive statements selected here, attempting to take
the perspective of those “who suffer the most from dominance and inequality.” 39 Ableist
framing and language were present in the discourse of people on both sides of this facet of the
debate, even among those who argued from the position of disability rights. Rather than
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treating the words of pro-MAiD actors as self-evident, I trace the ways that the statements
produce meaning and pay attention to their intended effect.40 By ‘tracing’ the meaning-making
effects of discourse, I mean examining the ways that speakers draw on shared understandings
of, for example, health and ability, to signal positive or negative associations with the concept
of MAiD. Isolating the threads of reason which hold together such arguments illuminates the
ways that beliefs about healthy bodies are perpetuated. This approach facilitates consideration
of the wider social context in which these discursive exchanges take place. From this
perspective, I share a commitment from feminist research to examine the “...historically
contingent social, economic, and political processes that materially contour the terrain on
which structural inequalities are built.”41 In attending to the experiences of ill and disabled
people with regard to MAiD, I aim to challenge the prioritization of medical control over the
lived experiences of ill and disabled people. Furthermore, I seek to dispute the view that “the
patients who cannot be ‘repaired’—the chronically ill, the disabled, and the dying… symbolize
the ‘failure’ of medicine, and more, the failure of the Western scientific project to control
nature.”42 In this sense, my approach draws on feminist perspectives on health and disability. I
draw on disability and queer theory to theorize the modes of temporality that such rhetorical
framing constructs. The purpose of this chapter is to address the concern for vulnerable people
that many worried would be harmed by the transition to a system permitting MAiD, from the
perspective of the so-called vulnerable themselves.
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Finally, the main objective of the concluding chapter is to summarize the findings of my
study and expand on the significant contributions to theories of health in the field of
Communication. I highlight the importance of engaging texts across multiple discursive arenas
and synthesize my findings with the broader issues in social studies of medicine, health and
society. I offer suggestions for additional ways in which scholars of communication may
continue to engage the matter of assisted dying through a critical lens, as it gains traction as a
social phenomenon in a growing number of jurisdictions.
The thread linking together the following chapters is the discourse of a ‘good death.’ In
chapter 2, delineating between the different modes of discourse allowed me to isolate the
relationship between the individualism of conventional health discourse, and the push for
improving end-of-life procedures made by MAiD proponents. Chapter 3 investigates the
accessibility of a ‘good’ drug-assisted death across social boundaries. Although the same drugs,
barbiturates, are believed to be the best option for inducing a quick and painless death in both
assisted dying and capital punishment contexts, their effectiveness is complicated by a number
of social and institutional factors. In exploring the ways that the drugs serve as a boundary
object between social worlds, I complicate the view that drugs can offer a “quick, easy and
painless,” ‘good death’ to anyone. By examining the temporal dimension of the discourse of a
‘good death,’ chapter 4 addresses the problem of those who are presently excluded from
access. Since there has been a tendency for pro-MAiD discourse to collapse the space between
‘living the good life’ and a good death, this phase of the research explores how curative
medicine can prolong suffering for sick or differently abled individuals.
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1.2.3 Ethics, Representation, and Positionality
My approach to this research is informed by Wahab’s overview of the strata of social
power: institutional, cultural, disciplinary, and discursive. Wahab’s reflections on the
positionality of the researcher in the context of anti-racist research illustrate the challenges in
reconciling the irreducible difference between researcher and subject, self and other. His focus
is on race, but the principle or irreducible difference holds true in other contexts.
Deconstructing the ‘neutral’ position of whiteness and naturalized discursive authority exposes
how power and authority are manifested in medical discourse and in culturally situated debates
about dignity and autonomy at the end of life. Following Wahab, the researcher “is not only
called upon to be reflexive, but critical of his/her own positioning, politics, interests, and
desires, and therefore to deconstruct racialized currents in the process of textual
negotiation/entanglements.”43 For this project, in which the texts I analyse rarely address issues
of race directly, I am therefore responsible to negotiate with an unwritten and unspoken other
who is not present in the texts. In the context of studying media discourse, this means asking
whose account is missing from the feature article, lobby action, or report? Wahab argues that
“discourse affords multiple sites to contest and question the embodied (white researcher) and
historical (colonial/liberal) constructedness of authority.”44 Drawing on this challenge to the
normalization of authority, I ask how matters of race, ability and privilege structure the
presence and coverage of whose lives, and in turn whose deaths matter in Canada.
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While the matter of MAID is rife with ethical challenges and dilemmas, I do not locate
this project in the field of biomedical ethics. Rather the forms of medical knowledge and
discursive framing that I explore in this research serve as a means of reflecting on the
structuring logics of society. In this project, I work to position myself as a researcher between
the legal, civil and medical interlocutors among whom the conversations about assisted dying
have taken place. While on the one hand medicine has long offered a familiar and fruitful locus
for theorizing the disciplining of the body,45 I rely on the recent critical interrogations of health
and medicine detailed here for guidance in articulating the complex intersecting relationships
between the forces of late capitalist global capital, the development of drug technologies and
other tools of medicine, the legacy of liberal regimes of governmentality and their effect in
reshaping the rites and rituals of the medicalized subject.
Since this research is concerned with the role of medicine in society, I take a critical
perspective on scientific knowledge production and the positioning of medical science as an
authority that governs our practices and standards of good living. Throughout this research, the
question of the medicalization of everyday life looms large. As a researcher, I am concerned
with challenging this process, and also with attempting to trace the cultural processes that
made such a process possible. Taking a critical look at the position of the researcher, as
Haraway argues, is not only a question of ethics, but also, in reorienting us to the object of
study, a question of epistemology. As Haraway is well-positioned to remind us, social studies of
science can and should do more than point out the flaws and blind spots of scientific reasoning
but can take up the work of remaking the goals of scientific practice in its own right. “We need
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the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to
deny meanings and bodies, but in order to build meanings and bodies that have a chance for
life.”46 For my approach to research this contention from Haraway means taking stock of the
ways that medical reason intersects with social practice and public discourse, and making sense
of how they work in concert to reshape bodies and the meanings ascribed to them.
This research is feminist because it has stakes in identifying the structures of power that
shape social practice, with the goal of promoting equality. Where the functions of science and
medicine are concerned, there is no guarantee that the procedures, technologies, policies and
practices involved will benefit everyone equally. Good research takes into consideration those
subjects who are conventionally left out of the discussion in question. Critical engagement with
science, argues Haraway, works toward offering a more thorough account of who is affected
and how. “Feminists have stakes in a successor science project that offers a more adequate,
richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well and in critical, reflexive relation to
our own as well as others’ practices of domination and the unequal parts of privilege and
oppression that make up all positions.”47 My aim with Chapter 4 in particular is to attend to
those who have argued that they are excluded from the dominant discourse. While there are
many more perspectives that I might have considered with this study, I believe it is done in such
a way as to amplify and incorporate the perspectives of those who have those most to lose
when the social institutions that govern MAiD are restructured.
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1.3 Understanding the Canadian Context
1.3.1 The Settler State
Canada champions its celebration of difference and multicultural diversity as its primary
identifying characteristic, but both historical studies and contemporary examples demonstrate
that racial difference is used to bolster a higher valuation of unmarked white embodied
subjectivity more often than it celebrates or protects racialized or colonized people. In
interrogating the institutions of medicine and public health initiatives both in Canada and
abroad, it is clear that they have been constructed at the expense of, and as a way of
controlling, racialized bodies. If the health of the national body is at stake in the debates about
whether and how to die with dignity in Canada, then we need to get a clearer picture of how
the mutually constituting forces of biological knowledge and political power are applied
differently to marked and unmarked bodies. Debating what death can or should look like in
Canada depends on a clearer understanding of how the logics of embodied difference are
already stacking the odds against equal political participation in, and access to health in the
nation.
The concept of health and good living in Canada is historically enmeshed with the logics
of white supremacy and settler colonial ideology. Not only does a legacy of colonial violence
overshadow the legacy of health in the nation, but the ongoing neocolonial practices continue
to uphold the primacy of the healthy, white bourgeois body while marginalizing indigenous,
immigrant and refugee people. In addition to settling of first nations lands, these colonial
aftereffects are manifest, for example, in the coerced sterilization of indigenous women, and
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ongoing youth suicide crisis in First Nations communities.48 Indigenous, critical race and
postcolonial scholars in Canada argue for theorizing Canadian national identity in the context of
its history as a settler state, with a history of racist and eugenicist practices. More specifically, I
agree with Morgensen, who argues that “settler colonialism performs biopower in deeply
historical and fully contemporary ways.”49 There can be no robust theorization of the forces of
biopower without direct engagement with the past and present forms of colonialism,
particularly as they are enacted through the vectors of global capitalism and international
neoliberal governance. To think biopolitically, as this research does, without attending to the
facets of ongoing colonization would be to allow settler colonial power to “remain naturalized,”
but furthermore, it would ignore the reality that biopower itself is “the product and process of
a colonial world.”50 The tools of biopolitical thinking are a means of interrogating the status of
bodies subject to power. I engage the colonial facets of biopower in Canada as a means of
exposing and denaturalizing the ways its logics of elimination51 and debilitation52 continue to
privilege and resituate a healthy, white, and able body at the center of society.
Eugenics have shaped the understanding of health itself in the nation. As Karen Stote’s
study of coercive sterilization of aboriginal women in Canada articulates, the history of
targeting women ties the colonial state to the oppression of women. Likewise, as Grekul et al.
detail, eugenic logics in the Alberta Eugenics Board in the prairie province of Alberta
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aggressively targeted so-called ‘feeble-minded,’ and ‘mentally defective’ individuals by
sterilizing them. These efforts were not parallel to, but intersected directly with colonialist
policies, when, for example, aboriginal women who did not consent to the procedure were
deemed mentally deficient to forgo consent. Even where eugenic practices were not aimed at
explicitly racialized bodies, the control and institutionalization of disabled people was likewise
done in the name of safeguarding the purity of the white race.53 Colonial practices are
inextricable from the logics of eugenics. Settler people used eugenicist ideologies to justify
colonization. In turn, explains Stote, the “poor health, poverty, and other conditions
experienced by Aboriginal peoples as a direct result of colonial policy then became indicative of
their lower racial evolution.”54 The pursuit of ‘good health’ was both the justification for the
policing of nonwhite bodies, and, when poor health was observed among indigenous people, it
was held up as evidence of an always already deficient body. The language of medical
documentation unearthed in Stote’s research illustrates how eugenic efforts were guided by
overlapping racism and misogyny, seeking, as one doctor wrote, to erase the “incorrigible, wild,
undisciplined and promiscuous”55 aboriginal body. Sterilization was done in the name of
preventing the proliferation of further generations, whom they believed “might become social
problems”56 because they would carry inherited mental deficiencies or diseases forward.
Beyond the view that these discourses of savagery or primitivism were constructed in
opposition to colonial ideals, we should also understand that these configurations were
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essential to the identity building practices of colonial people. As Bacchi explains, women of this
era were concerned that eugenics “reduced the maternal function to a mere biological
capacity,”57 but took seriously the charge that structural improvements to prevent the negative
effects of environment and “hereditary weakness” propagating the threat of “race suicide” and
the declining birth-rate of white Anglo-Saxons in the nation.58 These examples illustrate how
eugenic paranoia suffused discussions of health in Canadian history, and offer insight into the
legacies of this history that persist today. The disciplining of health is only one facet of this
identity building practice but scrutinizing the history of health in the settler state provides a
powerful tool for examining the mutually intersecting forces of sexism, ableism and settler
colonial practices.
Anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler has offered an enduring amendment to Foucault’s four
figures of Victorian anxieties. So while Foucault theorized around the masturbating child, the
Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult, Stoler counterposes these with a “racially erotic
counterpoint,” that embodies “the savage, the primitive, the colonized.”59 This configuration is
crucial in understanding how the colonial imaginary views racial difference as a threat to the
“healthy, vigorous, bourgeois body.”60 In the settler Canadian context, the same colonial
delineations dictated the regulation of bodies through regimes of health, hygiene and
education. The residential schools and other regulatory tactics, including the reserve system,
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the Indian Act,61 and the registry of Indian Status, which, following Bonita Lawrence, are a form
of “identity regulation,”62 were calculated attempts to erase and amalgamate first nations
peoples. The deliberate removal of indigenous children from their families and communities, to
be adopted by white families or educated in boarding schools run by the church (in a rare
strategic collaboration between the Roman Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian and Methodist
churches) was framed as the only possible solution to the indigenous ways of living that were
seen as threats to the ideals of civility and hygiene in the colony proper. The extent of sexual
abuse, neglect, forced and coerced sterilizations,63 and the erasures of language and cultural
practices are impossible to relate here. In beginning to unpack the atrocities enacted in these
institutions, however, it is important to understand that they were coded as public health
initiatives and conducted in the name of the health of the nation and for the good of the
“Indian.” The popular imagination holds that these practices are features of a troubled but
already faded past. However, the last residential school was not closed until 199664 and settler
politics continue to shape notions of healthy living and ideal bodies in Canada, particularly the
fixation on the healthy, white, hardworking body at the expense of others. The care disparity is
particularly evident in points of access to health care, where instances of colonial racism are
numerous. For example, the 2008 death of Brian Sinclair, a 45-year-old Anishinaabeg man in a
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wheelchair, in a Winnipeg emergency room spurred public outcry.65 Stories like Sinclair’s are
common and, as historians Perry and McCallum argue, countless other instances of such racism
put indigenous people at risk of being “ignored to death”66 in Canadian health care
environments.
Beyond the directly oppressive practices of colonizing indigenous people in the nation,
settler politics also shape Canada’s engagement with immigrant populations. A series of
immigration bans in the 20th century restricted Japanese immigration, and at some points
banned immigration from China and India altogether.67 Throughout the 20th century most
English speaking people believed that Anglo-Saxon, British descendants “were the apex of
biological evolution and that Canada's greatness depended on its Anglo-Saxon heritage.”68 Both
immigration policy and the treatment of immigrant communities living in the country have
been deeply affected by these beliefs. As Reitmanova et al. have demonstrated, the Canadian
press has worked hard to construct the image of racialized immigrants as the carriers of lifethreatening disease for over a hundred years.69 These accounts, which are fuelled by discourses
of fear, construct the racialized body of the other as presenting a number of threats to the
healthy, white Canadian ideal. In this discursive configuration, the “irresponsible racialized
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body”70 brings disease into the country, straining the systems of public health by defrauding it
of resources, and neglecting to adhere to the supposedly higher standards of Canadian care and
treatment. In illustrating the similarities between turn of the century complaints of Vancouver’s
Chinatown as “a reeking mass of filth”71 and contemporary press coverage of refugees and
immigrants as the irresponsible carriers of tuberculosis, the authors make the clear case that
little has changed in regard to the racialization of ideals of health in Canada.

1.3.2 Bodies Under Universal Care
The concept of universal care shapes the ideals of health and embodiment in Canada.
Publicly funded care is delivered through thirteen provincial and territorial health insurance
plans. Health policy decisions are regulated at the federal level and although policies and
practices vary somewhat between provinces, the standard of care is considered a national
concern. Canada began its transition to a single-payer health care system nearly 70 years ago.
In the United States, the Canadian system is frequently upheld as an appealing alternative to
the hybrid system of health insurance by those seeking reform in the American system.
Canadian citizens have had access to public funded essential medical care since 1961, yet it is
difficult to argue that true “universality” of care or health outcomes has been established.
Access to hospital services are an important part of health care, but many other facets of health
and wellbeing are inaccessible for some communities. For example, in 2018, the David Suzuki
Foundation reported that over 100 communities in Canada are without access to clean water.
In 2014, a United Nations envoy found that the “‘well-being gap’ between aboriginal and non-
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aboriginal people in Canada is not improving.”72 Recent immigrants and asylum seekers face
fluctuations in the healthcare available to them. In the last decade, refugee health benefits,
subject to changes in parliament, have been stripped and then restored.73 Such instances
suggest that universality is more ideal than reality for many. In this section, I illustrate how, in
addition to the health gaps between settler and indigenous communities, Canada’s colonial
history also shapes singular ideals of embodiment and identity more generally.74
It is impossible to isolate the notion of the healthy body as located in Canadian culture
from its colonial origins. Bodies and identities in the colonial state, argues Stoler, cohere in
“microsites in which bourgeois identity was rooted in notions of European civility, in which
designations of racial membership were subject to gendered appraisals, and in which
‘character,’ ‘good breeding,’ dispassionate reason, and proper rearing were part of the
changing cultural and epistemic indexing of race.”75 These designations are central to white,
‘Western’ embodied identities not in spite of the colonial order, but because of it. I position
interpretations of health, care and bodies as extending out of these colonial dichotomies, of
self and other. The centrality of the rational, self-determining liberal subject emerges in my
discussion of autonomy in dying discourse in chapter 2. In “Cito, Tuto, et Jucunde” I discuss how
pharmaceuticals have been hailed for their ability to make dying quick easy and painless; it is in
reality not made evenly available to different populations, even when death is inevitable. In the
next chapter, I interrogate the centrality of the able-bodied figure in discourses of dying. My
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findings suggest that markers of ability are closely tied to the white, bourgeois body that
epitomizes healthy living.
The debate about end of life care and euthanasia has frequently focused on ‘dignity,’
and this rhetorical strategy has complex implications. Throughout the chapters that follow, I
work to expose how the infrastructures governing health (such as the pharmaceutical industry
and legal system) are not designed in a way that extends dignity to everyone. Instead, dignity in
death is afforded only to some, much in the same way that hierarchies structure quality of life
at other stages of life.
The histories of medicine and scientific research illustrate how the lived realities of poor
and racialized subjects have often been disparate from the more privileged classes that
medicalization efforts support. It is important to contextualize the liberatory, personal
autonomy rhetoric of the right to die movement with other historical markers of medical
progress. Within the same decade as the birth of the right-to-die movement in the 1960s, for
example, medical researchers were still conducting lethal experiments on black men in
Alabama.76 The experiment, which furthered medical understandings of the progression of
disease and resulting death, exemplifies how medicine has historically upheld the health for
some at the expense of black and brown people.77 The experiment illustrates how scientific
body knowledge (including medical definitions and understanding of illness and death) is
inseparable from hierarchies of differently valued bodies. As Brit Rusert’s study of the
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experiment shows, there are close historical links between the pursuit of “public health” and
discourses of racial hygiene.78 Such historical antecedents in the history of medicine are not
anomalies, but rather characterise its role in reinforcing racial hierarchies under white
supremacy. Within the same decade, some Americans were pursuing release from medicine’s
authority in order to die, while other black Americans were dying from untreated syphilis under
medical supervision. Many medical advances have come at the expense of poor, black and
brown bodies. These disparities in care are not only historical. Although research ethics
practices have improved, the information gathered by such practices as the Tuskegee
experiments remain a part of the corpus of scientific and medical knowledge today.
Canada champions its celebration of difference and multicultural diversity as one of its
primary identifying characteristics, but both historical studies and contemporary examples
demonstrate that racial difference is more often used to bolster a higher valuation of
unmarked, white embodied subjectivity. It is impossible to isolate biological and cultural forms
of racisms, since these ways of talking about difference have always informed one another. In
interrogating the institutions of medicine and public health initiatives both in Canada and
abroad, it is clear that they have been constructed at the expense of, and as a way of
controlling, racialized bodies. If the health of the national body is at stake in the debates about
whether and how to die with dignity in Canada, then we need to get a clearer picture of how
the mutually constituting forces of biological knowledge and political power are applied
differently to marked and unmarked bodies. Debating what death can or should look like in
Canada depends on a clearer understanding of how the logics of embodied difference are
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already stacking the odds against equal political participation in, and access to health in the
nation. This study aims to better understand how culturally grounded ideas of healthy bodies
are manifest in discourses of death and dying.
There is a wide gap between the universality of health and care in political discourse and
government mandates and the daily realities of people living in Canada. While I argue that we
are moving towards the view that the right to die in dignity is a universal right, it also carries a
common central implication about the West as do many other discourses of health. The
suggestion is that “we,” in the developed, Western world, have access to a level of personal
autonomy that “they,” the implied cultural other, do not have. As anthropologist Annemarie
Mol argues, “What counts is that ‘we’ are individualised and autonomous. It is this that makes
‘us’ modern and belong to ‘the West.’”79 In this sense, such beliefs about health and autonomy
do more than shape our ideals of embodiment; they also call up an image of the implied other,
who by virtue of their exclusion comes to signify those who do not have the privilege of
controlling their bodies and futures. The right to die in dignity signifies more than a marker of
ideals of bodily autonomy, but of liberal political rights more generally.
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CHAPTER 2
SELF-DETERMINATION, EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE
In places moving towards a permissive system, establishing common terms by which to
debate and discuss the issue became a primary goal. In Canada, where the passage of Bill C-14
legalized the practice in 2016, identifying language which framed assisted dying as an
acceptable and desirable option was crucial in promoting acceptability of assisted dying,
rendering it “culturally appropriate.”80 Zeroing in on the terms by which this cultural
appropriateness was established in the country offers insight into the ways in which the end of
life is being reimagined. This chapter identifies the discursive framings used in Canada’s assisted
dying debates, by analyzing the rhetorical strategies of proponents of a permissive system. This
articulation of autonomy at the end of life, however, was not without caveats; many patients
who sought access to MAiD had to ‘earn’ their right to die by establishing proof of their having
lived happy and fulfilling lives. I argue that it was by framing medical assistance in dying as an
act of self-determination that advocates of the practice challenged a biopolitics of death
normalized by medicine and the liberal state, rendering MAiD culturally acceptable.
This chapter considers how people advocating for the legalization of MAiD in Canada
rendered it both permissible and culturally meaningful in public discourse. I examine the modes
of discourse by which people responded to the practice for the period between the
decriminalization of the practice with the Carter v. Canada Supreme Court case in 2015 and its
formal legalization in June 2016. The possibility of legalizing MAiD was debated as early as
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1993 during Rodriguez v. British Columbia in which Rodriguez, a woman with ALS, sought legal
recourse to what was at the time called assisted suicide. I begin with the 2015 Supreme Court
case because during this time there was a spike in public interest in the matter, and because
existing scholarly discussions have thoroughly detailed the pre-Carter discourse.81 After the
legislation passed, public interest in MAiD waned. Using the framing of these debates, which
traversed legal, medical, and ethical territory, I trace the discursive construction of the
medicalized body. I argue that the emphasis on the autonomy of patients seeking MAiD proved
crucial to rendering the practice acceptable to Canadians, ultimately making the shift towards a
permissive system possible. As a result of this framing, some individuals whose situations do
not align with the biopolitical ideals of good living are excluded from the ‘dignity in death’
extended to others.
A key challenge of debates about assisted dying is in the overlapping but distinct forms
of the practice. Throughout the media coverage and public debate of the issue in Canada, a
great deal of disagreement transpired as a result of the definitional ambiguity that surrounds
assisted dying. Euthanasia literally means “good death,” but refers specifically to the act of
ending someone else’s life with their consent to alleviate suffering. Assisted suicide implies that
a person has help obtaining the drugs necessary to end their own lives, but they take the final
action themselves. For advocates of a permissive system, there was an imperative to articulate
a category in-between, distinct from both suicide and euthanasia. Suicide suggested an act of
desperation, while euthanasia provoked fears of a “slippery slope,” in which there was a risk of
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elderly, terminally ill, or disabled people being euthanized against their wishes. As the history of
these concepts demonstrates, there have always been concerns about what euthanasia and
suicide signify for the wellbeing of the populace, and about what threat their existence poses to
authority, by exposing or delineating the limits of political power. In stepping away from the
association with suicide, and perhaps also by denoting service and care in its acronymed form,
MAiD serves as an acceptable middle ground term.
By addressing this particular vein of discourse among the many arguments about
assisted dying, as well as in identifying what was unique about the debate unfolding in the
context of Canada, this research expands existing literature on the social contours that govern
our understanding of health, in general, and, more specifically, the challenge that the matter of
“dying with dignity” poses to our existing juridico-medical systems. My analysis furthers the
argument held by many scholars that the concepts of health and wellness are increasingly
bound up in the neoliberal notion that wellbeing is a concern of the individualized subject, 82 a
goal pursued in the technologies and rituals of daily life.83
Within the specific context in Canada, this research adds to the work of others, such as
Karsoho et al.,84 whose insightful analysis of the debates leading up to the Carter v. Canada
decision first established how proponents of MAiD framed the transition to a permissive system
positively. In delving deeper into how patients and advocates in support of the practice framed
their arguments, this chapter demonstrates how health discourses shaped by the logics of self-
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determination are extending into the final stages of life. I first briefly address the history of the
relationship between voluntary and assisted dying and the structures of biopolitical power in
the modern liberal state. Following this, I develop my analysis of the arguments made in favor
of MAiD by Canadians who, during the period of legal deliberations, were supportive of
introducing a permissive system, drawn from court documents, political mandates, advocacy
work, and media coverage. Finally, I present my conclusions, which provide some answers to
the question offered by sociologist Thomas Tierney with regard to the right to die movement:
“how will we become the sorts of subjects who can exercise such a right?”85 I argue that in
Canada the euthanasia debates presented two primary challenges. First, right to die discourse
attempted to recast euthanasia as an act of self-governance in which a timely death serves as a
final ‘healthy choice’ of the autonomous subject. Second, this kind of rhetorical framing
reinforces the exclusionary logics of ableism that govern normalizing regimes in which health is
conceived as an act of self-determination.

2.1 Governmentality, Death, And Public Health
2.1.1 Is ‘Natural’ Death A Matter of Public Health?
As the above question at the heart of the debate illustrates, autonomy and selfdetermination have been the central problem in debating medical assistance in dying.
Organizations such as Dying With Dignity argue that the choice to alleviate suffering at the end
of life especially through medical means of assistance is a human right. The organization is the
Canadian counterpart of the American group called Death With Dignity, founded in 1993
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around the legalization of assisted suicide in Oregon. Canada’s Dying With Dignity is a nonprofit “committed to improving quality of dying, protecting end-of-life rights, and helping
Canadians avoid unwanted suffering.”86 Those arguing against the legalisation of medical
assistance in dying say that legalisation in some cases may lead to abuses of elderly, disabled or
otherwise vulnerable people. Even within those who agree with instituting a permissive system,
disagreement as to how it should be implemented is structured around the degree of
autonomy that both patients and medical professionals should have in the instance of assisted
death. For example, some proponents of legalizing assisted suicide (when a patient selfadministers life ending drugs) vehemently oppose euthanasia (in which a doctor administers
the drugs) on the grounds that it risks abuses. A vast majority of the media coverage and legal
debate has followed along these lines, attempting to chart the exact degree of patient
autonomy desired by the public, and, after each decision, reflecting on the appropriate selfdetermination granted to each party as a consequence.
Medical assistance in dying was first a crime but has been redefined as care. The
passage between these two things precipitated deliberation about the limits of government (in
granting the right to die) and the parameters of medicine (in incorporating death and suicide
into the frame of health care). The discursive processes that attempt to answer the question “Is
death a matter of public health?” also hold clues about the role and objectives of government.
So while the precedents set by previous court cases demonstrated that it was unthinkable for
any person’s life to be lawfully shortened, this has now become thinkable.87 Section 14 of the
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Criminal Code of Canada states that “No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on
them, and such consent does not affect the criminal responsibility of any person who inflicts
death on the person who gave consent.”88 This determination held for over thirty years. It
defined what constituted an ethical end of life, ruling out anything other than a “natural”
death. A definition of what constitutes a “natural” death, however, is much more difficult to
articulate. It is at the very heart of the problems with legalising assisted dying to denaturalize
and interrogate what is meant by a “natural” death.
This reclassification from a legal to a medical jurisdiction is not unique to medical
assistance in dying. Historically speaking, social problems deemed morally problematic having
to do with the body have been reassigned to medical authority in a similar fashion. As Clarke et
al. describe, alcoholism, homosexuality, abortion, and drug use, all once presumed exclusively
criminal matters, have now been adopted into the frame of medical knowledge and praxis.89
These examples are only part of a broader expansion of “medical jurisdiction, authority, and
practices into increasingly broader areas of people’s lives.”90 This process, which took place
roughly between 1890 and 1945, was identified by Zola, who termed it “medicalization.”91
These historical approaches suggest that through this theoretical framework the question of
medicine came to encompass social and cultural matters, and was no longer centred exclusively
on concerns of a “medico-scientific”92 nature. The transition of dying with intention from a
strictly legal category to a matter of medical determination followed a similar pattern.
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Some threads of the debate on assisted dying in Canada have simply been attempts to
situate the matter in its rightful place in civil society. Many medical professionals, for example,
reject the possibility of engaging with medical assistance in dying on the basis that it contradicts
the Hippocratic oath, to “do no harm.”93 Since this forms the very foundation of medical care,
some groups argue, no act that ends a life could be considered a part of medicine. This
rejection is central to the arguments of groups such as the Collectifs de Médecins Contre
l’Euthanasie (Physicians Alliance Against Euthanasia), a group founded in 2012 by 24 Quebec
doctors who oppose assisted suicide and euthanasia. The group’s mandate states: “To provoke
death voluntarily, by lethal injection or any other method, cannot be considered under any
circumstance as “medical care”, and is contrary to medical ethics.”94 As I will discuss, many
Canadians want to reject MAiD because it is seen as rationally at odds with the goals of
medicine. Even some individuals who support a permissive system concede that medical
training is structured around protecting and prolonging life. The process of decriminalization
precipitated a need to place MAiD elsewhere and the struggle to find its rightful place produced
illuminating dialogue on the boundaries of medicine, law and the parameters of health care
that take shape across these discursive categories.
By contrast, when Québec passed assisted dying laws before the Supreme Court
deliberation at the federal level, it had to frame the issue as a health concern first, so as to be
able to retain independence from national authority.95 The matter is complicated by the
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division of federal and provincial powers, with federal courts presiding over criminal law, but
healthcare systems controlled by provincial governments. So, while the provincial deliberation
hinged on the view that medically assisted death constitutes care and is thus a provincial
matter, at the federal level, the Supreme Court case centered on criminal actions, and amended
the Criminal Code. While each of these motions to move toward a permissive system had to
isolate different facets of assisted dying, so as to draw jurisdictional boundaries around the
issue itself, assisted dying, of course, concerns both criminal law and a matter of health.
Regardless of efforts to detach one aspect of assisted dying from another, by its nature the
problem of assisted dying simultaneously occupies several arenas of social life.
Each of the systems involved in the deliberation process, such as medicine and law
discussed here, depends on a different system of knowledge and truth. They intersect but are
not usually exactly equivalent or even compatible in their deliberation on assisted dying. That
the issue of assisted dying cannot find an easy home in either of these is a testament to its
reflection of governmentality’s diffuse and decentralized nature. The determinations made by
legal deliberations on assisted dying are not only a measure of the tenability of new clinical
practices, but of the tenability of governmentality itself. These efforts reinforce
governmentality, making it “thinkable, calculable, and practicable.”96 In enacting its power in
the lived experiences of the dying, the deliberations on assisted deaths reinforce the power of
governmentality itself, a force which “depends on systems of knowledge and truths, both to
constitute and define the object of its activities, and continually to monitor its progress.” 97
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Assisted dying is sometimes the object of medical, or legal activities, and sometimes not,
depending on what is at stake and on who is asking. As the more detailed analyses of the
debates demonstrate below, in the course of the debates, the ‘unnaturalness’ of medically
assisted death was naturalized, divorced from the conceived violence of suicide, and
rearticulated as acceptable and even desirable.
2.1.2 Governmentality
From a political perspective, the federal government’s decision to decriminalize MAiD is
a direct example of state authority over life. Broadly speaking, however, the exercise of power
is not simply enacted as the dominance of state over population in the contemporary
biopolitical order. As such, greater autonomy cannot simply be granted or reclaimed. Foucault’s
concept of governmentality sees power as “diffuse, as emerging not necessarily from the state
but from all areas of social life.” Instead of a unified sovereign power, contemporary
government is enacted in the diffuse networks of professional and expert knowledge that have
emerged in the modern era, including medicine and psychology. Rather than a coherent,
calculating subject or agent, the state is enacted in the “…institutions, procedures, tactics,
calculations, knowledges and technologies”98 that are otherwise understood and the result of
government. These areas of expertise are not extensions of state power, or acting in its proxy,
but are rather the exercise of governmentality in and of itself.
Governmentality, Foucault argues, is a novel capacity of governing that gradually
emerged in Europe from the sixteenth century, in association with the invention,
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operationalization and institutionalization of such knowledges, tactics and technologies.99 The
knowledges and technologies that make up governmentality’s regimes of truth produce the
terms by which its subjects come to understand themselves. The regimes of truth produced in
the sphere of medicine, for example, produce the terms by which we understand what it means
to be healthy and governance of health in the legal sphere. These truth regimes structure the
range of possible topics and conclusions within the arenas of public discourse. They provide the
foundation by which the terms of discourse become intelligible in the first place. In the
tradition of biopolitical scholarship that extends out of Foucault’s approach, knowledge and
governance of the self are understood as inextricably linked to the forces of political power
shaping daily rituals and practice. These forces adhere in the “…institutions, procedures, tactics,
calculations, knowledges and technologies”100 that make up social life. Governmentality’s
regimes of truth produce the terms by which subjects come to understand themselves. Regimes
of truth produced in the sphere of medicine, for example, produce the terms by which we
understand what it means to be healthy subjects, subsequently influencing the right to health
in the sphere of law. Medicine and the judicial system are implicated in defining the terms of
death including when it is appropriate to die, and which types of death are permissible.

2.1.3 Early Definitions of Suicide in Liberal Doctrine
Linking the broader political significance of euthanasia and assisted suicide with the role
of the state provides greater context for interpreting the reframing of the subject as possessing
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the right to self-determination at the end of life. At the heart of the debate is a question of
ownership. “Do people own their own lives (and deaths), or are we as a society responsible for
saving our fellows from their own errors?”101 The stakes for redefining the permissibility of
euthanasia and assisted suicide are not only high for patients and their families. As liberal
political rhetoric has demonstrated historically, suicide frequently serves as a locus for the
articulation of power, in which the rights of the individual are defined in relation to God, the
state, or fellow citizens.
The term suicide emerged in the English language sometime in the mid seventeenth
century.102 Since that time, it has undergone many changes. Historian Edwin Shneidman reflects
on the shifting definitions of the concept we now call suicide. Shneidman’s study of
Encyclopedia Britannica entries encapsulates the dramatic shifts in the meaning of suicide over
the last two hundred years, spanning from the sin of “Self Murder” in 1777, to the twentieth
century interpretations as expressed in the language of contemporary psychology. The locus for
blame and responsibility vary significantly between the entries. Besides offering an important
reminder of the dramatic shifts in the meaning of the concept, the study also identifies key
philosophical treatises cited in the various editions, which serve to signpost the ideological
purposes to which suicide has been tied. Because of its function as a reference tool for broad
English-speaking public audiences, the Encyclopedia provides an indication of the more
influential theories of suicide in Western ideologies.
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The 1910 article on suicide offered a primarily mathematical interpretation, citing it as
“a sign of the presence of maladies in the body politic [which] deserve careful consideration.”103
By 1973, the official offering from Encyclopedia Britannica included definitions from diverse and
contradicting sources. While Saint Augustine and Saint Aquinas condemned suicide as a failure
of a “deficient person,”104 and deemed it a sin, Hume calls it neither crime nor sin. Next the
early sociological interventions of Durkheim, whose in-depth study emphasized the social
causes of suicide. Freud, by contrast, unsurprisingly locates the blame for suicide on the
individual, more specifically isolating it in the unconscious mind, or caused by unresolved
trauma. The inclusion of these diverse offerings by the Encyclopedia Britannica illustrate a
recognition of the unresolved tensions existing between suicide discourses across medicine,
law, philosophy and religion. With each new edition, the entries became more elaborate and
reflect a greater diversity of voices.
While contradictory definitions are not surprising, the disagreement between liberal
philosophers is relevant to the establishment of power over individual life under liberal
democratic governments. The 1860 edition of Britannica includes a passage from John Stuart
Mill’s On Liberty. Mill, alongside several others engaging with the classical liberal tradition, also
including Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant views suicide or the end of life as crucial to
elaborating liberalism. Mill argues that forcibly preventing someone from buying poison is a
violation of their freedoms.105 By this logic, suicide is understood as a kind of ultimate privilege
in defining the breadth of liberalism, an ultimate limit of the rights of the individual. At the
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heart of the debate is a question of ownership. Philosophies of liberalism do not offer any
consensus, or resolute solution to the problem, but their shared fixation with suicide illustrates
its importance to defining the rights of the citizen under liberal doctrine.
Rousseau, whose 1761 novel Julie, or, the New Heloise106 argues against permitting
suicide, and following Rousseau’s belief that man is naturally innocent, weighs the blame of
suicide on social forces. John Locke, in contrast to Rousseau, cited earlier Christian views,
“claiming that though God bestowed upon us our natural personal liberty, that liberty does not
include the liberty to destroy oneself.”107 In Locke’s theological politics, the right over life and
body are tied to his understandings of arbitrary power, self and property.
No Body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no Body has an
absolute Arbitrary Power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own Life, or take
away the Life or Property of another.108
Locke’s statement contradicts Mill’s affirmation that no one should be prevented from the
possibility of suicide. It also bears resemblance to section 14 of the Criminal Code of Canada,
that states “No person is entitled to consent to have death inflicted on them.”109 According to
both the Code and Locke, the power over life lies not with the individual, but with a higher
power.
A survey of the shifting definition of suicide illustrates suicide’s divergent definitions;
slaughter, sin, deficiency, and inherent political right. There was no single consensus within
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liberal doctrine as to the moral status of suicide. Examining the shifting discourses of death and
dying denaturalizes assumptions about which kinds of deaths are violent and premature, and
which kinds are naturalized as timely and acceptable. Part of the challenge for those advocating
the legalization of assisted dying in Canada has been in distancing assisted dying from such
older definitions as some of those detailed above, where suicide is equated with violence, sin or
tragedy. As the above examples illustrate, definitions of suicide frequently gesture to the
political and ideological forces that shape society. The importance of suicide in defining the
limits of liberty has carried forward into contemporary debates such as Canada’s. I turn next to
identifying the distinct modes by which suicide has been typified in public discourse in Canada.
Charting these perspectives in the history of liberal thought demonstrate micro shifts in
opinions towards suicide and death. Before there was any possibility of becoming the sorts of
subjects who have a right to die, to borrow Tierney’s phrasing, Liberalism questioned the outer
limits of autonomy and state power with regard to suicide. This breadth of tone with regards to
the historical limits of the rights of autonomous individuals sets a precedent for a wide variety
of perspectives on MAiD, which is addressed in the next section.

2.2 Contemporary Discourses of Death and Dying in Canada
In the months following the Supreme Court of Canada’s Carter v. Canada decision, the
External Panel on Options for a Legislative Response to Carter v. Canada (hereafter the panel)
prepared a report presented to the Minister of Health, Jane Philpott, on the future of legislating
assisted suicide after the landmark court ruling. The intent of the report was to consider how
government should organize to meet the coming demand for assisted dying, in the legislation
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to follow as well as the guiding philosophical principles that would steer new decisions. The
final consultation report was published on December 15th, 2015. It provides some of the
clearest articulations of the goals of instituting a “permissive system.” It includes extensive
coverage of consultations with stakeholders, including lobby groups, medical associations,
scholars and community representatives. Given its breadth, which includes input from
individuals (who mailed in statements) and experts (with whom the panel met face-to-face, or
from whom they received official statements), the report offers an extensive survey of the
breadth of opinions on physician assistance in dying in Canada.
One portion of the report, a media analysis of the period between September 2014 and
November 2015, illustrates how media coverage and public awareness were influenced by
events such as the Supreme Court litigation and the announcement and coverage of the
consultation process itself. The analysis section of the report was conducted by an independent
external media analysis service. The section deals with provincial and national news coverage in
print and online. The articles were sampled and coded for tone; either positive, negative, or
neutral. Representative excerpts are included to demonstrate changes over time, as well as to
show how coverage differed by province. This media analysis section is useful in that it serves
as a snapshot of national media coverage of the issue during a finite period, while illustrating
the shifts in the favorability towards a permissive system. The breakdown of geographic areas
offers the opportunity to correlate the positive or negative tone of coverage by province to the
respective legal actions and provincially mandated health policy that takes place during this
time period and shortly after.
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In this research, I use the media analysis portion of the Consultation Report as a kind of
index to the multitude of news articles on the subject. The majority of the news articles, public
statements and other discursive texts that I looked at were collectedly independently. The
Analysis section of the consultation report covered 8,939 media items, collected between
September 1, 2014 through November 22, 2015.110 Whenever possible, I consulted the original
texts of the news articles excerpted in the Consultation Report. The Consultation report also
contains abstracts of 321 documents received by the panel, including consultations from
Dignitas, the operation that assists death in Switzerland, statements from religious
organizations and interest groups, and statements written and submitted by individuals
expressing their beliefs. This report also includes details on the federal and provincial roles in
governing health, comparable international laws addressing MAiD, a discussion of issues
regarding terminology, details on eligibility criteria and other procedures such as the request
for MAiD, recommendations regarding government oversight and records management, and
the issue of reconciling existing palliative care systems with the implementation of MAiD.
Overall, the report served as a useful resource for contextual detail throughout the research
process.
In Emily Martin’s categorization of interviews on immunity in American culture, she
treats the diverse assortment of data collected as “a collectively produced text, a kind of
encyclopedia of what a diverse population thinks is sayable, imaginable, or thinkable about
health, illness, the body, and the society.”111 In that study, the divergence of opinions and
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understandings of the immune system demonstrate its crucial status as a source of social
power. Following Martin, in this chapter, I highlight a common pattern among the things said
about assisted dying, identifying what is “sayable, imaginable, or thinkable” about physician
assisted death. Across these discursive arenas, three dominant strains of discourse are
apparent, which follow a pattern outlined by Van Brussel in “A Discourse-Theoretical Approach
to Death and Dying.”112 My own approach draws on Van Brussel’s three original categories,
with the addition of a fourth I call autonomy in dying discourse. While a great deal of the
material I reviewed resonated with the three categories it became evident that a fourth
category was necessary to encompass a great deal of what was said. The autonomy in dying
discourse that percolated around the Carter case was what made the shift towards a permissive
system possible.
The four primary categories of statements I examine are as follows: moral rejection,
medical rationalist, medical revivalist, and autonomy in dying discourse. Moral rejections
disagreed most strongly with MAiD, primarily on the basis of faith, or a belief that it was an
assault on the sanctity of human life. Medical-rationalist discourse centered on the belief that
medicine’s goal is the preservation of life, frequently arguing that no assistance in dying could
legitimately be called medicine. Medical-revivalist discourse challenged the conventions of
medicine, suggesting that incompatibilities between medical ethics and assistance in dying
should be rectified in order to meet with public support for the practice. Finally, autonomy in
dying discourse consisted in a demand for total autonomy of the dying to choose the conditions
of their death. Autonomy in dying discourse was frequently accompanied with the notion that
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the right to choose had to be earned, by meeting several criteria such as having lived a happy,
fulfilling life, having worked hard, and having lived with purpose. I conclude by arguing that
discourse about autonomy at the end of life demonstrates that regimes of “good living” also
dictate the conditions of dying.
2.2.1 Moral Rejection
In this section, I turn to the first of these four categories, the rejection of assistance in
dying on moral grounds. For many interest groups and individuals commenting on the
possibility of introducing a permissive system, voluntarily shortening any human life remained
unthinkable. The rejection of MAiD on moral grounds was a common occurrence throughout
the media coverage of Carter v. Canada and Bill C-14. By contrast with the Belgian context of
Van Brussel’s study, in which MAiD was already legal and more widely accepted, a greater
number of outright rejections were present in Canadian popular discourse. Groups rejecting
MAiD on moral grounds were vocal in multiple media outlets, as well as in the federal public
consultation process. Many, though not all, of these rejections made appeals to faith. A great
deal of them were expressed through individual submissions to the consultation committee.
Others were published in newspaper editorials and opinion pieces. A number of the statements
that reject MAiD from a moral stance draw comparisons with suicide as it is conventionally
understood, as an act of violence and desperation. In likening MAiD with suicide, moral
arguments recall the diagnosis of social or individual failures and maladies from earlier
Liberalisms to negate the possibility of a justified voluntary death. In focusing the blame and
responsibility of suicide on larger social problems, moral rejectionist discourse echoes the logics
of Rousseau and Durkheim. Moral-rejectionist discourse equates MAiD with suicide, diverting
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attention from the question of individual rights and freedoms that serve as the basis for most
demands to legalize MAiD, such as in the Rodriguez and Carter Supreme Court cases. By
diverting from the question of individual rights, moral rejection focuses on the larger social ills
deemed to be the cause of a degradation of the general quality of life.
Other moral rejections argue against MAiD because even the legal permissibility of
MAiD in cases where death is “reasonably foreseeable” could create a “slippery slope.” The
slippery slope argument posits that by allowing any one kind of assisted death or euthanasia to
occur, other forms of coerced or unjustifiable assisted deaths will inevitably follow. Slippery
slope comparisons were common, appearing in nearly every argument against MAID from a
moral standpoint. Some suggested that if legal procedures and drugs were made available that
patients would be coerced into requesting MAiD, while others argued that it might become so
commonplace that elderly people, or those experiencing mental illness without a fatal
prognosis would seek MAiD as an ‘easy way out.’ One such commentator was conservative
newspaper columnist Margaret Wente.
The trouble is that practices that begin as extremely rare – such as killing depressed
people – can quickly become normative. And social permission to die can evolve into
social pressure to die. How many elderly people do you know who are terrified of
becoming a burden to their children? I’ve known a few. I suspect that if they’d had the
choice, more than one of them would have gladly chosen to die early to avoid that fate.113
In suggesting that one form of assisted dying would quickly “evolve” into another, Wente
summons an image of social norms and moral standards cascading into chaos. Wente likewise
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draws the possibility of assisted death for depressed people into the frame of argument.
Assisting the suicides of otherwise healthy mentally ill or depressed people remains illegal in
Canada, but its legality in the Netherlands114 remains a target for those using the slippery slope
model to argue against any form of euthanasia.
Another such example was André Schutten, a lawyer for Christian legal action non-profit
the Association for Reformed Political Action (ARPA), who emphasized that legalising MAiD
would undermine the state’s primary role in protecting the lives of citizens from other people.
“When it comes to the right to life, a substantially minimized risk is an unacceptable risk.
Innocent people will die and the state will be complicit in their deaths.” 115 Schutten refers to
the loss of innocent lives as an inevitability under a permissive system. While the above
newspaper editorial was argued in secular ethical language, the ARPA mandate is a pro-life
organization, fighting for “pre-born human rights,” and foregrounding biblical passages in its
core principles. Schutten and Wente’s statements both underscore the potential for good and
innocent people to face harm. Implicit in this focus on innocence is an equal and opposite
assessment of guilt among those involved in MAiD.
Finally, a very large number of public comments came from religious groups of diverse
faiths, including multi faith coalitions. These statements focus primarily on the sanctity of life,
with any attempt to end human life constructed as being in violation of either explicitly cited
religious beliefs, or moral standards, regardless of the age or health of the person in question.
Many statements from faith groups focused on the limited availability of palliative care, which,
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they argued, would provide a better alternative to ending life prematurely. In one statement, a
joint group argued that “that any action intended to end human life is morally and ethically
wrong,” and indicated that their coalition was “on the basis of our respective traditions and
beliefs.”116

2.2.2 Medical-Rationalist
Among historians of death and sociologists of medicine, there is some disagreement as
to how public conceptions of death have evolved in Western history. Medievalist historian
Phillippe Ariès argues that from the twelfth century onward, death was increasingly denied,
although it had been considered tame and not feared in the early middle ages. 117 Contrary to
Ariès’ death denial theory, the discourse centred study of medical sociologist David Armstrong
suggests that shifting conceptions of death that occurred during the modernisation of the
western world was not a denial, or silencing of death discourse, but rather an increasing
number of voices (specifically experts, clinicians, doctors etc.) who spoke about death.
According to Armstrong, there was no “replacement of speech by silence, rather a
reconfiguration of what could and could not be said”118 about death. Beginning in the mid
nineteenth century, death moved out of the private sphere and into the sphere of the public
institution, with a proliferation of expert opinion and medical advice structuring discourse
about death. This mode of discourse is termed “medical rationalist” by Van Brussel.

116

Ottawa Citizen, “Faith Group Urges Palliative Care over Assisted Suicide.”
Ariès, Western Attitudes toward Death.
118 Armstrong, “Silence and Truth in Death and Dying,” 652.
117

55

Van Brussel describes a shift in discourses of death and dying, in which a “medicalrationalist” approach is replaced by a “medical-revivalist” approach.119 The “medicalrationalist” discourse describes the attitude toward death and dying that has dominated much
of Western popular culture and medical practice in the twentieth century. This attitude
originates in late eighteenth century medical practice, where withholding a poor prognosis
from the patient became the norm. Under medical-rationalist logic, the denial of death—
however inevitable or imminent—was understood as essential to maintaining the hope and
minimizing the distress of the dying patient.120 Furthermore, the technical understandings of
the illness overshadowed the dying subject.
In the modernist logic of medical–rationalism, dying was articulated as instrumentalist
and impersonal; the dying processes became a technical matter, bereft of their existential
and personal significance. Because of the strong belief in medical progress, death was
often regarded as an extreme example of illness.121
Understanding that the medical-rationalist approach viewed the patient as no more
than a carrier of, or host to the disease or illness, it isn’t difficult to see why sheltering the dying
from their prognosis became common. Moreover, physicians and nurses were not specifically
trained in caring for the dying,122 focusing instead on the treatment of illness and prevention of
death. This medical-rationalist discourse is at the heart of many popular dramatizations of
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death, where even in late old age, death is often narrativized as the patient losing a battle, or
succumbing to tragedy.
Medical rationalist discourse posits that life’s end should occur within the sphere of
medicine. It champions the unique history of knowledge and treatment that medicine holds. It
recognises the authority of doctors as superior to patients when it comes to the question of
when life should end. Van Brussel, drawing on Seale, explains that medical-rationalist discourse
constructs “the dying subject as no more than a carrier or an exemplar of disease,” in which
they are merely a more extreme case than some.123 This discourse understands death to be the
exclusive territory of the bodily knowledges of medicine. Without MAiD, the problem of when
life will end is tied to the complex web of scientific research, available treatments, drug
formularies and a multitude of determinations each of which, without the legalisation of
assisted dying, is to be arbitrated exclusively by doctors and medical professionals. Since
roughly the mid twentieth century, doctors no longer withhold the truth about the eventuality
of death from their patients. But even these more recent examples of medical rationalist
discourse, can, according to Van Brussel, be understood as an extension of the same modernist
logic. For many people, the conventions of modern medicine are incommensurable with the
possibility of assisted dying. Medical-rationalist interlocutors invoke medicine’s own discursive
tools to discredit or discourage a permissive system.
Across the assisted dying debates in Canada, doctors were most frequently cited in
opposition to a permissive system. In the months leading up to the SCC decision, and to the
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passage of Bill C-14, many physicians were active in national media outlets arguing against the
possibility of introducing MAiD. While few initially voiced support of medical assistance in
dying, after the passage of Bill C-14 the Canadian Medical Association reported that eightythree percent of its delegates supported modifying the law to make it less restrictive and that
physicians who had been on either side of the legalization debate were seeing the
implementation of medical assistance in dying as “going relatively well.” 124 This reluctance to
publicly voice support for a practice that is still legally contentious, may be, as Wright et al.
point out with reference to the UK and Belgium, strictly based on hesitation to support
practices that are not yet legal.125 Physicians in jurisdictions with permissive MAiD protocols, by
contrast, more frequently express public support of the matter. Data collected for this project
found, in agreement with Wright et al.’s study of comments made in the press by Canadian
doctors, that many of the statements made about MAiD are centered on contentions about
integrating euthanasia with the goals of medicine. Medical rationalist discourse seeks to align
the possibility of implementing a permissive system alongside the central tenets of medical
reason. It aims to make sense of the practice of MAiD, including its possibilities and limitations,
according to the rules of medicine itself, with limited reference to measures of acceptability or
norms external to medicine. Furthermore, doctors employing medical rationalist discourse in
deliberating publicly on the issue of MAiD tended to focus on their role as protectors of life,
sometimes to iterate the threat of prolonged suffering, and, conversely, at times to caution
against abuse of the vulnerable.
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In this section, I trace the position’s relationship with the history of medicine and the
means by which doctors and others make appeals to this history as a way of distancing medical
practice from assisted suicide. Some who argue by this logic also suggest that it should fall
under the purview of some other care system. Medical-rationalist discourse is tied to moral
oppositions to assisted dying but is distinct from the moral approach in that it is ostensibly
focused on preserving the ideals of medicine.126 Medical rationalists cite the Hippocratic
tradition as a foundation of contemporary civil society. Medical rationalism also suffuses
deliberations that are neither for nor against legalizing MAiD. The sticking point, across much
medical rationalist discourse is whether or not assistance in dying could possibly be considered
medical care. Even some proponents of assisted dying believe it should not be the responsibility
of medical professionals because of inherent contradictions with medical ethics.
One of the more active opponents of MAiD, the Quebec-based Physician’s Alliance
Against Euthanasia,127 take a medical-rationalist approach as central to their mandate. The
group argues that “medical licensing bodies must continue to fulfil their role as protectors of
the public and of life…”.128 So long as the patient is alive, they claim, it is the priority of
medicine to preserve life, never to shorten it.
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Medical-rationalist discourse emphasizes technical language and terminology when
discussing death. It is also characterized by favoring disease statistics and discussions about the
capacities of medicine, rather than attention to the patients themselves. This mode of
reasoning reverts attention to survival statistics, or to advanced treatment procedures and
away from the individual situation or wishes of the patient. Medical-rationalist discourse also
frequently cites modern medicine’s enhanced mastery over the symptoms of suffering as
reason to avoid MAiD. This discourse reifies modernist narratives of progress to illustrate
medicine’s ever-expanding abilities to both treat illness and ease suffering. This is one of the
rhetorical approaches undertaken by the Physician’s Alliance Against Euthanasia in their official
mandate.
The 2400-year-old Hippocratic tradition was a major advance in civilization. It forbids
euthanasia and mandates the protection of the weak and the maintenance of trust
between the physician and the patient. It calls on physicians and other health
professionals to use their knowledge and skills to heal the sick, creating a climate of
mutual solidarity. It is ironic that the accepted standards of this ancient code of conduct,
written at a time when the means of countering end of life suffering were very limited,
might be considered inadequate in this age of refined capacity to control symptoms.129
The statement argues that advances in medical technology and treatment are further reason to
treat the dying without limit. Citing statistics of survival rates and the modernization of pain
management drugs renders the experience of the dying patient as another component or stage
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of traditional medical care, arguing that modern medicine can provide everything needed to
see them through to the ends of their lives without unnecessary pain.
Some medical commenters employing medical-rationalist discourse redirect discussion
of MAiD to highlight the nature of disease. One Vancouver doctor, Dr. Will Johnston, when
asked on March 9, 2016 to comment on the first known instance of MAiD in Canada,
denounced the doctor involved and lamented the years the patient may have lost as a result.
Johnston describes the involvement of Dr. Ellen Weibe, “…unseemly and, I would say,
unprofessional behaviour that you would expect from a zealot for suicide.” 130 He continues by
explaining that 600 people die of ALS each year in Canada, adding that it is “very unusual for
people with ALS to have pain from the ALS.” The comments, published for an interview in a
Catholic magazine, are exemplary of medical-rationalism as Van Brussel describes it, with the
dying subject understood as first and foremost an extreme or advanced case of disease. Ms. S,
the first person to receive MAiD in Canada, was a retired clinical psychologist, a hiker and a
dancer.131 Under medical rationalist thinking the bottom line remains life expectancy and
prognoses, both of which are used to undermine or challenge the legitimacy of MAiD.
At times, commentary in the media from doctors was directed towards explaining the
professional commitments of medicine to lay audiences in an attempt to underscore the direct
contradiction of being a doctor with shortening or ending life. Some medical professionals were
cited in the consultation report published by the External Panel on Options for a Legislative
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Response to Carter v. Canada expressing such sentiments, directly citing their professional
responsibilities as contradictory to the legalization of MAiD.
As a doctor, I can’t accept something that is non-medical, non-scientific. It even goes
against my code of ethics in Quebec. Under the code of ethics, if we have treatments to
offer or an operation, we must always use the least dangerous.132
The doctor further argues that MAiD is not a health service, and asks that the justice system do
more to clarify this matter on a national level. This comment was made by Dr. Paul Saba, who
headed an effort by the Coalition of Physicians for Social Justice in Quebec who in 2015 were
seeking to challenge the Supreme Court’s Carter decision. In rejecting the legalisation of MAiD
on the basis of its incompatibility with medicine, physicians like Johnston and Saba express their
discontent with the law using moral and ethical reasons, but they are primarily rejecting MAiD
on the basis that it is incompatible with the tradition of medical practice. This discursive
strategy is a powerful one, but it notably focuses on the medical framework by way of omitting
discussion of the people affected by, or in favor of MAiD.
Medical rationalist discourse is not limited to medical professionals. Some of the public
lay respondents to the open consultation also espouse this mode of reasoning in the rejection
of MAiD. In the case of one respondent, they argue that the rightful role of medicine necessarily
excludes it from having any part in the voluntary dying process. “Physicians are not
executioners. Their purpose is to promote health and to heal. They should never be put into a

132

The Canadian Press, “Quebec Doctors’ Group to Contest End-of-Life Care Legislation in
Court”; Media Miser, “‘Media Analysis.’ Consultations on Physician-Assisted Dying - Summary of
Results and Key Findings.”
62

position that they have to execute an individual or recommend an executioner to them.”133 In
juxtaposing “physician” with “executioner,” the respondent renders the two as necessary polar
opposites, with one resting in the arena of crime and punishment and the other that of healing
and medicine. Like the medical professionals cited above, this respondent did not actually
directly comment on whether they thought assistance in dying should happen in some form or
another in Canada, focusing instead on its incompatibility with the sphere of professional
medicine. While there are other approaches to the rejection of MAiD that also use medical
rationalist reasoning, such as the rejection of the possibility of total informed consent
throughout the process of legalization,134 the most common manifestation of this type of
discourse in the rejection of MAiD is to position it as diametrically opposed to the practice of
medicine.
Medical rationalist discourse is significant in that it demonstrates a prominent belief
among Canadians about who should be trusted to determine how the final stages of life are
lived. It asks that doctors continue to work to treat disease, prolong life and prevent death. It
asks that the state do its duty to ensure that medicine continues to function in this way. It also
reifies the authority of medicine and the state over the individual subject-patient. By deferring
judgements about the legalisation of assistance in dying back on to medicine itself, medical
rationalist discourse creates a kind of feedback loop whereby the legitimacy and veracity of
medical logic reaffirms itself. Within the statements discussed above, the question of whether
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medical assistance in dying should happen is answered in the language of medicine itself,
landing at a resounding ‘no’ when the matter is pitted against the Hippocratic foundations of
medicine as its defining characteristic.
Assisted dying protocols are closely tied to the experiences and beliefs of doctors. As the
statements detailed above demonstrate, many doctors conceived of goals of their profession as
directly in contradiction with the changes being proposed. They argued against the institution
of a permissive system drawing on the history of medical reason as evidence. The cultural
moment that the MAiD debate catalyzed provided a challenge to doctors in many ways. While
for some the possibility of a permissive system promised to offer new ways for doctors to care
for and give solace to suffering patients, doctors and medical professionals espousing medical
rationalist discourse remained committed to upholding the longstanding principles of medicine
as the protection of human life. While not all Canadian doctors who discussed MAiD in a public
way disagreed with the implementation of MAiD, the proliferation of medical rationalist
discourse to counter movement towards a permissive system illustrates how assisted dying can
be conceived as a large-scale challenge to the goals of the practice of medicine itself.

2.2.3 Medical-Revivalist
Not all medical professionals are invested in keeping a distance from assisted suicide,
and many Canadian doctors publicly voice support for the legalisation of MAiD. In direct
contrast with those discussed above, a tendency toward challenging a stagnancy in conventions
of medical care that prevent MAiD, or otherwise withhold options for patients at the end of
their lives is emerging among some doctors. Van Brussel has termed these discussions medical-
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revivalist discourse. Some commenters employing medical revivalist discourse argue that
medicine should change to accommodate MAiD, while others argue that if assistance in dying is
to be provided, doctors will have to relinquish their authority over end-of-life patients to other
professionals better equipped to assist the dying. The “medical-revivalist” discourse focuses on
accepting death without embarrassment. The shift to medical-revivalist discourse, Van Brussel
argues, is marked by a greater acknowledgement of the patient themselves and a move away
from the absoluteness of the corpse. Following the revivalist discourse, “the truth of death
ceased to be located in dark recesses of the silent corpse, and instead became embodied in the
words and deeds of the dying patient.”135 As Armstrong explains, the shift supposes that a
greater level of autonomy is granted to the patient themselves, who then takes up the planning
and decisions surrounding their end of life as a practice of self-identification.
Thus the new discipline of medical ethics took over the medical analysis of death and
required the confession of the clinician while the new discourse on dying encouraged the
dying qua subject to speak. For one hundred years it had been the body which spoke,
now it was the subject identity.136
Armstrong further characterizes this new form of subject identification as more than a moment
for empowering the dying. Beyond the autonomy granted to the patient-subject, breaking the
silence imposed by the medical-rationalist discourse also enacts a challenge to the
“unconditional benevolence”137 of the biomedical apparatus. If the patient takes up the
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medical-revivalist discourse, the role of doctors, drugs, and the “tangle of tubes”138 that
envelop the dying patient in the medical sphere take a backseat to the patient’s own needs and
wishes. Van Brussel stresses that medical-revivalist discourse does not signify any departure
from biomedicine, since even this “reflexive and conscious planning of one’s dying process”139
occurs within the confines of the hospice or care home.
Some physicians taking a medical-revivalist approach often signal the move as a way to
align Canadian practices with a more global move toward permissive systems underway in the
US and Europe. These doctors signal an awareness, or affiliation with this broader conversation,
for example, European medical ethicists Bosshard et al., whose “A Role for Doctors in Assisted
Dying?” reconciles the public demand for assistance in dying with the possibility that doctors
may not actually be the ones best suited to positions of expertise in the matter.
A society striving for an open approach towards assisted dying should carefully identify
the tasks that should be assigned exclusively to medical doctors and separate out those
that might be better performed by other professions.140
These physicians recognise that whether they opt to keep out or become the experts141 in the
matter of assisted dying, the momentum of the issue dictates that they will need to play a role
in one form or another, regardless of any perceived contradiction with medical ethics. One
physician in Victoria, British Columbia argued in a 2015 letter to the Times Colonist newspaper
that while the relinquishing of control over patients at the end of life may seem to pose a
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threat, the benefit to the peace of mind of those affected should make the legalisation of MAiD
the only plausible option.
The advantages of this legislation are simple but immense. It will give control, and hence
peace of mind, to patients who are facing progressive illness and helplessness when they
know that they are able to end it if and when they feel ready.142
When medical professionals such as Bosshard et al. call for this approach, they also draw
attention to the possibility that the role of medicine may change, that it may need to adapt so
as to meet new demands of public health care systems. By implication, when doctors and
medical professionals suggest that others may be more qualified to make end of life decisions
for patients (including the patients themselves) they are theorizing an alternate possible future
for the function of medicine at the end of life, one in which the expertise of doctors may take a
backseat to the desires of patients or to the recommendations of experts from nonmedical
professions. Medical-revivalist discourse contrasts with medical-rationalist discourse by arguing
that changes should be made to protocol and ethical standards. Whereas both acknowledge
that MAiD contradicts long-held standard procedures, medical-revivalist discourse emphasizes
changes that meet social need, while medical-rationalist discourse refuses to do so.
Since the June 2016 passage of Bill C-14 legalizing MAiD, the official position of the
Canadian Medical Association (CMA) has been to embrace MAiD, offering physician training
programs and other resources for physicians and medical professionals adapting to the new
procedures. The Consultation Report notes that elective training could cover technical
procedures relating to the administration of assistance in dying, as well as making assessments
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of the patient, sharing decision making, and communication with the family of the patient.143
The College of Family Physicians of Canada (CFPC) also supported lifting the prohibition of
MAiD, emphasizing how changes to physician training from residency through to continuing
professional development would help meet the new demand. These revisions of professional
and technical procedures signal a desire to update and adapt the conventions of medicine to
rectify the latent incompatibilities between the permissive system and medical practice.

2.2.4 Autonomy in Dying Discourse and the Framing of Self-Determination
Ultimately it was in articulating it as a reasonable act of self-determination that
proponents, particularly dying people and their families, were able to reframe MAiD as a
culturally acceptable practice. Often a central focus of discourse in support of legalisation
focused on details from the lives of individuals seeking access to MAiD. These details served to
frame their lives as fulfilling and happy, thereby making the choice to die a timely and/or
justifiable one. Articulating assisted dying as a choice made by a rational person, who has, it is
argued, contributed to society and lived a ‘good life,’ makes it possible to interpret MAiD as a
‘good death.’ The terms ‘good life’ and ‘good death’ are my own—these were not present in
the texts themselves—and yet it was remarkable how frequently discourse of assisted dying
talked about life. In these rhetorical gestures I call Autonomy in Dying Discourse, as much is said
about living well (encompassing full participation in society, rewarding work, and strong family
bonds) as is said about dying. Discourses of ‘good life’ were inextricable from argumentation in
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favor of MAiD; details evidencing a life well lived were all those things the individual could do
before they fell ill but couldn’t do anymore as a result of their illness. Likewise, descriptions of a
‘good death’ could encompass everything that the alternatives—the “agony of treatment,”
dying “piece by piece,” or the “violence and trauma”144 that unassisted suicide might inflict on
family members left behind—could not offer. In this discourse, a common theme is that a ‘good
death’ is that which makes it possible to not “suffer from the knowledge that they lack the
ability to bring a peaceful end to their lives at a time and in a manner of their own choosing.”145
Though frequently defined in the negative, these modes of reasoning that emphasized good
living and dying were common throughout pro-MAiD discourse. Immediate challenges to the
eligibility clauses of the legislation, however, argued that the autonomy being granted to some
whose death is “reasonably foreseeable” was being denied to those whose conditions were
ineligible but could nonetheless be intolerable. Disability proved a difficult challenge to the
stability of eligibility conditions. This was officially due to the “reasonably foreseeable”
restriction, but the discourses of self-determination and autonomy that granted MAiD to those
people who could demonstrate their having lived long, happy fulfilled lives also excluded those
disabled people for whom making such a case proved more challenging.
For the Supreme Court Case dealing with physician assisted suicide prior to Carter v.
Canada in 2016, a case filed by Sue Rodriguez of British Columbia in 1993, Supreme Court
Justice Sopinka wrote in the decision that, “…there is a right to choose how one’s body will be
dealt with, even in the context of beneficial medical treatment, has long been recognized by
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the common law.”146 Sopinka was in favour of Sue Rodriguez’ right-to-die appeal, but was
ultimately in the minority and the court ruled against Rodriguez’s plea. Throughout legal
discourse on the right to die in Canada, the Rodriguez case, as well as the suits filed by abortion
physician Dr. Henry Morgentaler in 1976, 1988, and 1993 serve as touchstones for defining the
limits of personal bodily autonomy. Many of those arguing in favour of the right to die draw
reasoning from more personal places, but legal precedents are common fodder in official
documentation. Sopinka’s phrasing of this right is repurposed in the consultations report as a
working definition of personal autonomy under medicine, “as a cornerstone principle of
medical ethics and practice…”147 Discourse of autonomy at the end of life has become
increasingly visible in North American news media in the last five years, for example appearing
in a series of long-form articles profiling recent recipients of MAiD in Canada and the United
States in the New York Times. As I will demonstrate, the Supreme Court decision hinged on the
situation of one woman, for whom the establishment of independence and autonomy were
critical factors in the case of legalisation. Although she ultimately died before the Federal
Supreme Court decision was made,148 Gloria Taylor was one of five plaintiffs in a British
Columbia Supreme Court suit against the federal ban on assisted suicide.149 The descriptions of
Gloria Taylor in the Consultations Report are an indication of what conditions are considered as
acceptable measures of autonomy and independence.
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The individual at the heart of the Carter decision, Gloria Taylor, was described at trial as ‘a
strong and independent person’ who lived ‘a busy life’ with the satisfactions of work, a
loving and present family, and meaningful community engagement. From the trial
records, and from personal accounts heard by the Panel, it is clear that Ms. Taylor was
loved, respected, supported and secure—a woman who faced the certainty of her death
with clarity and candour. In the circumstances of Ms. Taylor’s life, the Court found her
request for physician-assisted death to be a fully autonomous and personal choice.150
In this narrativization of Taylor’s life, the discourse of the ‘good life’ is recognizable in its
markers of fulfilment, like the emphasis on her engagement with community and family. In
these proceedings, Gloria Taylor is described as an active member of society, meeting a number
of criteria we might consider indicative of a happy life. If, following the logic of autonomy in
dying discourse, Taylor was both autonomous and well supported by her community and family
engagement, then there is less concern that her choices at the end of life are not being made
autonomously. That these elements of Taylor’s life are reproduced in the Consultations Report
as well as in the Carter v. Canada Supreme Court trial documentation indicate that the report
authors also see “satisfying work,” a “loving and present family,” and “meaningful community
engagement” as proof both of her ability to make a reasoned decision about ending her own
life and of her having lived a good life. Autonomy in dying discourse argues that a ‘good death’
is possible when the dying person has the right to choose some of the conditions of their death.
Beyond using these descriptions to qualify Taylor as a fully capable person, able to make
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rational decisions, the report authors also use these details from Taylor’s life to suggest that
these also represent a ‘good’ life and, it is suggested, she was better able to face “the certainty
of her death with clarity and candour”151 as a result. The implication is that, given her history,
Taylor was a natural candidate to have been allowed to choose MAiD. In this sense, the role of
autonomy in MAiD goes beyond informed consent and becomes almost a set of preconditions
marking the subject as eligible for a ‘good,’ assisted death.
Autonomy in Dying Discourse mobilizes the concepts of ‘good life’ and ‘good death’ to
justify the transition to a permissive system. The individuals seeking legalisation of MAiD for
their own benefit featured in media reporting and as plaintiffs in legal cases have a wide variety
of prognoses and conditions, but a majority have physically or neurologically degenerative
diseases that are associated with a decline in quality of life. Although some statements of this
type are tied to past legal battles, they also frequently discuss issues related to maintaining
autonomy and independence at the end of life. Of all the statements collected, these
arguments that employ Autonomy in Dying Discourse are the most unambiguously in favor of
legalisation, with subjects arguing that the right to die at a time of their own choosing should
be granted to Canadians without restrictions that could prolong unnecessary suffering.
There is a demonstrated pattern of gradually increased patient autonomy in end-of-life
decision making. Timmermans, writing about the context of medicine in Western societies in
general, traces a trend in which patients and families are vying for greater authority over endof-life procedures within the sphere of professional medical care. He argues that people at the
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end of life have access to “increasingly flexible cultural scripts,”152 within the medical
infrastructure and beyond. If death is to be interpreted as good it should involve “aggressive
symptom management, and attention to the religious, social and psychological needs of the
dying and their loved ones to achieve the normative goal of accepting impending death.”153
Most scripts are directed toward establishing death as good wherever possible. Timmermans
calls the processes by which doctors and medical professionals render death meaningful in an
institutional setting “death brokering,” which has the function of assigning meaning and value
to different possible death scenarios. Death brokering “...Distinguishes the acceptable line
between curing or letting go, achieving a ‘good’ death and avoiding ‘bad’ deaths.”154 Under
these conditions, the patient’s prognosis and ultimate outcome are rendered meaningful for
the family and to the institution of medicine. Taylor’s case in the Supreme Court, although
taking place in a legal rather than a medical setting, follows the same pattern of brokering that
Timmermans describes. Setting up her life as ‘good,’ helps to reason that her death could
follow a script of ‘letting go’ and not have to follow the conventional scripts of curative
medicine in which death is conceived as only a failure to cure. This distinction privileges those
whose lives carry enough sunny details to fit the ‘good living’ bill, and leaves out the rest.
Autonomy in dying discourse posits that the desires of the dying patient should come
before those of families and care providers. The focus on patient autonomy is also often paired
with evidence that the person in question has lived a full, happy, and rewarding life. The
prevalence of autonomy in dying discourse in the Canadian news media indicates a shift in the
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tides of discursive construction of death and dying. Autonomy in dying discourse represents a
move away from an emphasis on medical control and toward the dignity, control and desires of
the dying person. In this sense, autonomy in dying discourse may be seen as going against the
“sick role” described by sociologist Parsons in the 1950s, which expects “child-like behaviors,
passivity, isolation, and dependency”155 of the patient. Ultimately, however, because MAID still
depends on health providers to approve and administer, it is not altogether detached from
medicine,156 but still refigures the cultural scripts available to the dying person.
Frequently, discourses of autonomy reflect an in-depth knowledge of the condition
affecting the patient. Those advocating for their right to die frequently express mastery of the
medical knowledge of their condition, which is expressed alongside frank discussions of
personal beliefs. Disability was frequently framed in public exchanges as a challenge to
articulating the kind of autonomous choice that would be necessary for voluntarily choosing
MAiD. One vocal proponent of legal MAiD, Stephen Fletcher, is a Member of Parliament and
quadriplegic who gave several interviews expressing his beliefs. “I’m disabled. I’m as disabled as
you can get,” he explained, “But I don’t think my life is going to be in any way diminished
because, in the hospital down the street, there’s less suffering.”157 Fletcher’s comments
underscore a desire for ultimate autonomy in his final stages. He also argues against the notion
that giving patients at the end of life the right to choose to die sooner increases the risk of
abuses against disabled people. In leveraging his own disabilities against oppositions to MAiD
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made by Canadian disability rights group Toujours Vivant—Not Dead Yet Canada,158 who voiced
concern that a permissive system threatened the livelihoods of disabled people, Fletcher argues
that people with disabilities may also assert rational autonomy in choosing MAiD at the end of
their lives. Fletcher’s comments emphasize how MAiD is able to provide for a good death with
minimized suffering. Furthermore, by juxtaposing his own agency against the precedent set by
the legislation, Fletcher argues that disability should not preclude access to end-of-life choices
like MAiD.
After the assisted dying legislation was passed in 2016, with Bill C-14, numerous groups
spoke out against one limitation within the bill. The requirement that the patient in question’s
death be “reasonably foreseeable” was seen by some as an unnecessary restriction for
individuals whose suffering is too great to bear, even when they may not be close to death. One
of the more visible outcries came from the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, and the
plaintiff Julia Lamb who has spinal muscular atrophy. “If my suffering becomes intolerable,” she
said in an interview with the Toronto Star, “I would like to make the final choice about how
much suffering to endure.”159 Lamb’s case complicates the naturalized link between gaining
access to a ‘good’ death as a result of having lived a ‘good’ life. Her case instead focuses on how
the eligibility criteria restrict her access to a good death. Restrictive criteria were understood by
many in the deliberative process as a protection against the abuse of vulnerable disabled
people, but if, as Lamb’s statements suggest, the restrictions may only prolong suffering and
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withhold self-determination from some individuals, Bill C-14 might rightly be charged with
ableism, a problem I discuss in more detail in Chapter 4.
A common feature of autonomy in dying discourse is the tendency to emphasize the
happiness and emotional stability of the people in question. This justification counters the
assumption that choosing to end one’s own life is necessarily an act of desperation and crisis. It
also proposes the possibility that the person in question might still be satisfied with the life they
have lived up to this point. This mode of argument asks opponents of MAiD to reconsider the
view that a life ended through medical intervention is necessarily cut short. The Star article
describes Lamb as having “lived a fulfilling life with a loving family,” and that she “enjoys her
part-time job as a marketing assistant.”160 In another interview, Lamb explained that:
I live a great life and I’m very happy. And I do not want to die right now… But I do want
the option to have dignity with death and to be able to alleviate any severe suffering I
might come into at the hands of my disability.161
The description of a life full of friends, family and work, as well as a fulfilling and happy
experience distances medical assistance in dying from the assumption that it is like suicide as
we normally understand it. While suicide is understood as a choice made in a moment of
desperation and crisis, autonomy in dying discourse constructs MAiD as a decision made after a
period of careful deliberation. It constructs the subject as having lived a happy life but for the
recent decline in their health.
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Autonomy in dying discourse is recognizable for its focus on how the right to die a ‘good
death’ without suffering and uncertainty should be made available to people who have lived
‘good’ lives. The move towards this line of rhetoric follows a pattern of “increasingly flexible
cultural scripts” surrounding death and dying in general.162 These shifting end-of-life scripts
have marked moves toward greater patient autonomy in general. Those employing this
discourse argue that autonomous people who have lived happy fulfilling lives should be granted
access to cultural scripts that permit modes of dying that were not offered by conventional
curative medicine prior to the legalization of MAiD. To counter the argument that legal MAiD
sets a dangerous precedent, or exposes the vulnerable to coercion, autonomy in dying
discourse centers on the rights of individuals, rather than the vulnerability of groups like people
with disabilities. Autonomy in dying discourse’s focus on the happy, fulfilled lives of people
seeking MAiD seeks to rewrite the conventional script of suicide to include the possibility that
death is not always about failure. Instead, by focusing on avoiding prolonged suffering in the
final stages of life, autonomy in dying discourse argues that access to MAiD should provide
people at the end of their lives the right to ‘let go.’ In some ways, the notion that assisted
suicide would be rendered acceptable by framing it as autonomy is unsurprising. After all, why
at the end of life, would we want to think of ourselves as anything other than the strong and
independent individuals we present during other stages of life? While this may provide some
the opportunity to limit their suffering, it may also stretch the ideal of total autonomy beyond
any functional limit. The problem with this, is that none of us live our lives as perfectly
autonomous individuals; we all move through many stages of dependency and vulnerability,
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however independent we believe ourselves to be. This is especially true at the end of life.
Perhaps isolating this gesture as a discursive strategy, one that serves to expand the cultural
scripts available to those at the end of their lives, helps to identify at what cost the
performance of happiness and autonomy comes.

2.3 Reifying a Biopolitics of Ability
To the degree that it has offered some people a chance to reduce their suffering, the
effort to reframe assisted suicide may be understood in a positive light. The framing of the right
to die, however, is troubled by the same paradox that anthropologist Naomi Richards163 has
identified in the UK euthanasia debates: that at the same time as right to die discourse
demands greater freedom from the medicalized state, it must also seek to acquire the “consent
and authentication” from within the medical profession to be given such freedom. Following
Richards, I ask if, as the discursive patterns detail here, we grant the right to die only to those
whose lives are marked fulfilled or complete through meeting certain conditions in their
lifestyles, then is it really an emancipatory biopolitical effort? Or does autonomy in dying
discourse’s fixation on having lived an independent, fulfilling and autonomous life merely
reinforce the biopolitical order that constructs individualized and self-regulatory subjects
whose continued participation and contribution to society depends on their status as healthy
and active?
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Autonomy in dying discourse recasts assisted suicide as culturally acceptable by folding
the practice in with the concept of health as a practice of individual achievement. This framing
of health fits with that identified by Kirkland and Metzl, who argue that health is increasingly
framed as “a source of self-concept and achievement.”164 Contemporary biopolitical scholarship
identifies how the institutions of health and wellness, the science of pharmacology, and the
logics of physical fitness work to reinforce control over bodies through regimes of selfdiscipline.165 Crip theory demonstrates how compulsory able-bodiedness limits our
understanding of ways of being in the world.166 Within the communication tradition, the
expanding tradition of critical studies of health scholarship is documenting how the shift
towards conceiving of health as an individual practice is taking place, particularly in the
recasting of care as patient choice,167 and the individual responsibility to make healthy lifestyle
choices.168 Examining the ideological implications of Canada’s assisted suicide debates offers a
closer understanding of how people are renegotiating the meaning attached to the end of life.
Following Zoller and Kline, taking a critical communication perspective in the study of health
discourse enables us to “attend to the audience’s ability to negotiate meaning” across medical
and wellness discourse.169 Autonomy in dying discourse suggests that death and dying are
becoming more closely tied to this emphasis on thinking about health as a matter of personal
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choice. We are moving towards conceiving of the end of life as a ritual of self-identification,170
one that occurs within the realm of medicalization, but simultaneously attempts to keep a
distance from the authority of medicine.
The discourses of autonomy addressed here reflect a pattern of patient advocacy, and
challenges to medicalization. In pushing back against legal and medical authority to claim new
rights for themselves, MAiD advocacy and the demand for greater autonomy at the end of life
resemble the efforts of the AIDS activist effort ACTUP171 and the long history of feminist
scholarly and activist challenges to the medicalization of women’s bodies.172 Although MAiD
still occurs within the purview of medical care and supervision, it represents for many a step
away from the absolute medicalization of death and dying, for example as the prolonging of
aggressive treatments into the final stages of life, which has become standard. The very
acknowledgement that such a choice to die sooner might be preferable to the options of
prolonging treatment or sedating pain, posed a threat to the medical status quo. Even for
doctors and care workers who supported the transition to a permissive system, MAiD
represented a departure from the Hippocratic conventions of medicine.173 Canada’s MAiD
debates provide an opportunity to interrogate the terms by which people come to understand
what makes life livable in the era of medicalized governance.174
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As critical knowledge about the ways discourses of health shape our lives continue to
emerge, we are learning more about what it means to be a healthy subject in contemporary
society. What autonomy in dying discourse suggests is that the right to die is established
through the same troubled logics that structure the biopolitics of the living. Autonomy in dying
discourse takes up the same logics of ‘righteous’ living that Lupton identifies in the discipline of
the self in an era of secularization. Lupton argues that among certain classes “‘healthiness’ has
replaced ‘godliness’ as a yardstick of accomplishment and proper living.”175 Autonomy in dying
discourse focuses on its subjects having lived healthy, happy lives because such descriptions of
health are the means by which we measure a ‘life well lived,’ which signal at the same time that
their death is acceptable or timely. People taking up discourses of autonomy from medicine to
assert a right to die are making a demand for freedom, but the effect of such discourse is to
reassert the notion that good liberal subjectivity is centred on self-regulation and productivity.
In so doing, this reification of the able and productive subject excludes many from
consideration, particularly the disabled, and others to whom the conditions of permissibility for
alternate end of life scenarios are not extended.

2.4 Conclusion
As an increasing number of jurisdictions reconsider the legality of medical assistance in
dying, heated public debates have sprung up around the question of medical assistance in
dying. In Canada, those advocating for a transition to a healthcare system that permits MAiD
foregrounded the idea that such a decision should be considered a right of the autonomous
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individual to end their suffering. In order to frame MAiD as an act of self-determination,
advocates took up a mode of rhetorical framing that I characterize as autonomy in dying
discourse. Reframing MAiD as a rational choice and not an act of desperation, proponents
emphasized that those seeking the procedure had lived happy, healthy and independent lives.
This framing sought to position MAiD as a choice like any other decision about healthy living
that individuals make in their lifetime. Positioning the right to die with medical assistance as a
concern of the individual helped to make MAiD more culturally acceptable by aligning it with
the broader ideological valorization of the self-determining liberal body. Such a shift in the
contours of the biopolitical imaginary fits with the tendency for Western historical conceptions
of suicide to evolve alongside changing beliefs about the rights and limitations of liberal
subjectivity.
Today, as a growing number of nations worldwide are facing aging populations, the
question of how healthcare will evolve alongside such transition is ever present. One of the
changes precipitated in such a shifting healthcare landscape is that many are rethinking what
the end of life should look like; we are witnessing a greater number of public debates about
what characterizes a ‘good’ death in the era of secularization. While actively discussing the final
stage of life was still relatively taboo just a few decades ago, it is now more commonplace for
the terminally ill to participate in coordinating “choreographed” deaths, to which they give
careful consideration, “as if planning a wedding.”176 This ‘good’ death is constructed within the
competing influences of medicalization, individualism, and ableism. Although the Canadian laws
still only apply to a limited range of patient circumstances, MAiD is being woven into shifting
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ideological understandings of how to die well in the contemporary era. What is valuable here is
that these changes are a step away from outright denial and delay of the onset of the end of life
that medicalization and youth-fixated consumer culture have been upholding. Conceptualizing
death as something other than failure is a step in the right direction. Understanding how MAiD
has been made culturally acceptable is crucial to keeping track of how the politics of dying are
evolving. Despite these arguably progressive shifts in beliefs about death and dying, I have
argued here that the language used to justify the legalization of MAiD operates within the same
exclusionary logics of autonomy and self-determination that structure much health discourse
today. In this sense, the case of autonomy in dying discourse in Canada illustrates how
decisions about dying are still rooted in how we interpret good living; they favor selfdetermination over dependence.
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CHAPTER 3
“CITO, TUTO ET JUCUNDE”: THE MANY LIVES OF THE DRUGS USED TO
KILL QUICKLY, SAFELY AND PLEASANTLY
Social studies of medicine and pharmaceuticals have articulated how drugs function as
boundary objects, serving to “…reconfigure relations between multiple social worlds.”177 In
functioning as both commodity and technology, drugs are boundary objects in that they fulfill
multiple social roles, while demarcating barriers between social strata. Barbiturates, for
example, serve as boundary objects in the ways they mediate between spheres of medicine and
law. Watkins observes the blurring of boundaries between licit and illicit drug use,178 arguing
that the history of drug abuse is inextricable from that of the pharmaceutical industry.
Gradmann’s study of vaccines in nineteenth century history examines how the development of
tuberculin forged bonds between industrialists, public health officials, and clinicians in this
era.179 Gaudillère and Löwy’s collection likewise explores the boundaries of market and
research imperatives in the history of pharmaceutical development.180 By tracing the arc of a
drug’s career, or “cycles”181 as Pieters and Snelders have described them, historians of medicine
can observe the social boundaries traversed and reinforced in the lifetime of a drug’s
popularity. These social histories of drugs expose the many attachments that pharmaceutical
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technologies have across disparate spheres of society. Additionally, “drug biographies,” such as
the work of medical historian Andrea Tone, whose study of barbiturates provides historical
context to this chapter, disrupt the notion of a singular purpose or effect of a drug on social
environments. I draw from these approaches to the study of drugs to consider barbiturates and
other sedatives hailed for their ability to send someone into a quick and painless death within
the context of the drugs’ past lives as everyday sleep aids and party pills.
The question guiding this chapter is: What is the relationship between the
medicalization of death and barbiturates? I interrogate the affective inequalities across their
use in different social spaces, looking at how their social function has shifted in relation to class,
race and gender. In this chapter, I use drugs as an entryway into examining the biopolitical
construction of a “good death,” in which barbiturates, and benzodiazepines and others have
been used to induce death quickly and without pain or uncertainty. Following Lentacker, I
position the drugs as a boundary object that exists at intersections between social worlds.
Mobilizing Berlant and Puar’s theories of slow death and debilitation, I argue that barbiturates
exemplify the inherent instability of drug technologies, whose usefulness and benefit are
contingent on social circumstance. Following Puar, I argue that barbiturates (and their closely
related substances) follow the biopolitical metrics of capacitation and debilitation; they
facilitate capacitation for some as a liberal rationale, while enacting in the same vector the
deliberate debilitation of others.
In a growing number of medically assisted dying protocols, barbiturates are being used
to facilitate quick and painless deaths for those for whom a certain measure of biopolitical
agency is within reach. Discourse surrounding these protocols suggests that many are willing to

85

discuss how and when a ‘good’ death may occur, but in addition to meeting the criteria of
sufficient medical need, these good deaths are only made accessible to those who already
enjoy a certain level of social and biopolitical capital. As the analysis of autonomy in dying
discourse in the previous chapter details, access to a medically assisted good death is
contingent on a prerequisite set of criteria that establish the subject as deserving, having
earned a good death by virtue of having lived well. In the first section, I examine the cultural
history of barbiturates, whose extensive usage across therapeutic, recreational and clinical
contexts demonstrates their function as boundary objects. In juxtaposing an analysis of the
early stages of barbiturates’ therapeutic and recreational career with their recently catastrophic
application in lethal injection protocols, I explore how the drugs illustrate the radical
contingency of pharmacological technologies on social circumstance. The shifting meaning and
use of the drug illustrate the changing social landscape upon which the career cycles of
barbiturates have taken place. The many determining social, economic and cultural factors
shaping the “complex unity”182 of the drugs’ significance has meant that barbiturates have
signified different things at different times. Early in their career, they promised to enhance life
by easing fear, pain and anxiety and offering a good night’s sleep. By mid 20 th century,
barbiturates were a dangerous threat to society, increasingly associated with accidental death
and suicide. Finally, in their most recent career cycle, they came to signify a swift and painless
death, have been used successfully in medically assisted dying protocols, and less successfully
for lethal injection as capital punishment. Each of these applications offers a radically distinct
interpretation of the politics of life.
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3.1 Early Barbiturate Use: A New Form of Chemical Comfort in the U.S. and Canada
At the turn of the 20th century, the belief that modern medicine could provide solutions
to the everyday ills of individuals was increasingly popular. While the average person previously
did not visit a doctor unless they were seriously ill, the twentieth century saw increasing rates
of drugs prescribed for ailments once seen as a natural part of everyday life. For many decades
before barbiturates were used to induce death in executions and assisted dying protocols, they
were widely prescribed by doctors for therapeutic purposes and were made relatively easily
available to the middle class in the United States.183 As the history of barbiturates shows, such
trends in drug proliferation and use are tightly connected to economic imperatives of the
pharmaceutical industry, as well as to the importance tied to certain ideals of health and good
living by social and cultural forces. The rise of barbiturates owes a great deal to a dream of
living without fear and anxiety in the perils of fast-paced modern life. At each juncture in their
career, barbiturates signified a different ideal, each of which was not tied exclusively to an
inherent property of the drug itself, nor of its effect on bodies, but that reflected the culture
norms of the era.
3.1.1 Discovery
Barbiturates are a group of drugs that act as central nervous system depressants, having
relaxing, anti-anxiety, and anti-convulsive effects.184 Barbituric acid, the parent compound of all
barbiturates, was first synthesized in 1864 by German chemist and Nobel laureate Adolf von
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Baeyer.185 The base molecule was easily modified and each of the hundreds of variants boasted
slightly different therapeutic effects. Thirty different variants were trademarked and sold in the
United States.186 As Tone’s chronicle of anxiety drugs details, barbiturates were less toxic than
their antecedents and widely considered effective treatments for “extreme nervousness,
neurasthenia, hypochondria, melancholia [and] conditions of anxiety.”187 With the market
rapidly responding to the demand for barbiturates, their proliferation was exponential.
Barbiturates were first introduced to the U.S. market in 1903 and increased in
popularity after their initial application in asylum psychiatry. Barbiturates were being
prescribed for the same reasons, such as nervousness and anxiety, but were seen as a newer
better alternative to currently available drugs.188 Doctors and patients migrated toward
barbiturates when strategic marketing from Merck and Bayer popularized the idea that they
were a safer alternative to the other sedatives and hypnotics available at the time.189 The
indications for barbiturates were not new. Veronal, the first brand name version of a
psychotropic barbiturate, and its successor drugs were “rapidly and enthusiastically adopted by
prescribing doctors”190 who used them in treatments as diverse as “depression, anxiety,
insomnia, epilepsy, chronic alcoholism, obstetrics, ulcers, and hyperthyroidism.”191 In 1912,
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when vast new categories of hypnotics and sedatives were emerging, German psychiatrist Max
Seige commented that many did not satisfy the requisite qualities for therapeutic treatment.
The first reports sounded in every respect extremely favourable; but before long it
became clear that [these drugs] did not satisfy the traditional conditions of Cito, tuto et
jucunde [quickly, safely, and pleasantly], at least, that they already in small doses caused
all kinds of unpleasant or detrimental side-effects. Finally most of them found a small
limited special territory, in which the conscientious physician uses them.192
The spike in the popularity of barbiturates also coincided with the tightening of restrictions on
opiates, after an opium convention at The Hague, and the Harrison Act in the United States.193
Pieters and Snelders describe how newfound concerns about the safety of opiates had left a
“gap in family medicine chests,” after which point, “doctors and lay consumers in search for
psychoactive substances with sedative and hypnotic properties increasingly drifted towards the
barbiturates.”194 The solution had shifted in favor of barbiturates, but the problem remained
the same: anxiety, neuroses and stress were being reported and observed at higher rates than
ever before, particularly in the United States.195 Even when admonishing the over prescription
of barbiturates during the high peaks of their usage, a 1956 official inquisition published in the
United States admitted that there must be “a large volume of legitimate therapeutic need.”196
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Barbiturates came to be seen as something of a necessary evil, which in spite of certain dangers
and abuses, was considered a reasonable solution to many ailments.
3.1.2 Recreational Use
The drugs were not only popular as doctor prescribed cures but became widely popular
in black and grey market uses, for recreation and self-medication. According to Bryant, the wide
availability and acceptability of barbiturates, as opposed to marijuana and heroin, made them
the cheapest and most socially acceptable way to take the edge off in the 1930s and 1940s.197
Although initially priced higher than other popular sedatives,198 barbiturates came to be
considered a more accessible option for lower income people who couldn’t afford
psychoanalysis. Tone describes barbiturates as “a poor man’s alternative to psychoanalysis,”
and explains that they could be purchased without a prescription in the United States until
1922.199 Despite later regulation of barbiturates, they became increasingly available through
backchannel resellers, pharmacists and bootleggers, who “did a brisk trade at saloons, truck
stops, hotels, and other public venues.”200 This rapid proliferation of a prescription drug into so
many other arenas of daily life coincides with the deeper trend of medicalization underway in
the United States in the mid twentieth century. During this time, as Clarke et al. explain,
medicine and medical ideologies were creeping in to new parts of daily life. Not only was
medicine given new jurisdiction in presiding over aspects of life once relegated to religion or to
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the law, such as that of crime, drug abuse, alcoholism, and abortion,201 but individuals
increasingly turned also to the new and promising solutions to familiar problems that medicine
had to offer. As such, in the case of recreational use of and self-medication with barbiturates,
people came to see the drug as a cure-all for common ailments, serious afflictions and even
boredom. In keeping with the progression of medicalization as Clarke et al. define it, in which
medical control and logic are extended into new frames of life, many barbiturate users of this
era were not necessarily unwell. Just as medicine began to take control of rituals such as
childbirth, medical control became the new norm in dealing with stress and anxiety.
As the drugs grew more popular, production steadily increased, and by 1950 Veronal
and other barbiturates could be bought for as little as a dollar a dozen.202 Roughly 1500
different variants had been made for the US market by mid-century. Collectively nicknamed
“goofballs,” there were so many varieties available that users came up with names like “yellow
jackets, blue angels, pink ladies, and reds” to distinguish between all of the pills, capsules and
powders that were available. Popular accounts of barbiturate use, such as Seconal in Jacqueline
Susann’s Valley of the Dolls,203 explore how widespread recreational use became in the middle
of the twentieth century. Doctors also continued to prescribe the drugs despite mounting
public outcry over their dangers. While the popular press lamented the rise in overdoses, it was
widely believed that under proper regulation and doctor supervision, barbiturates were an
advanced solution for the modern day stresses of the nervous housewife or worried
businessman. Despite the commonality of overdoses, some of them deadly, public health

201

Clarke et al., “Biomedicalization,” April 2003, 164.
Tone, The Age of Anxiety, 26.
203 Susann, Valley of the Dolls.
202

91

reports of the era claimed that withholding barbiturates from anxious patients in need was
unethical.204 Beyond the frame of medicine, economic forces also contributed to their
proliferation. Pieters and Snelders describe how even in the early days of barbiturates, when
costs were higher, they became the most popular of the available sedative and hypnotics
thanks to the “…successful efforts of the pharmaceutical industry to associate barbiturates with
science, but also the growing economic strength of the middle-classes and the expanding
health insurance industry which reimbursed patients for prescription drug costs.” 205 As these
factors contributed to the growing belief that medicine would provide the solution to nearly
any common problem, barbiturates enjoyed a flourishing career.
In their seminal “Biomedicalization” article, Clarke et al. describe how new and
increasingly complex processes of medicalization are rapidly expanding how we understand
health and the human body. The authors chart its rise from the latter half of the twentieth
century to the present day. Biomedicalization is distinct from medicalization. Medicalization
refers to the “extension of medical jurisdiction, authority, and practices into increasingly
broader areas of people’s lives,”206 while the addition of bio signals a greater attention to detail
at the micro level, resulting in “transformations of both the human and nonhuman made
possible by such technoscientific innovations as molecular biology, biotechnologies,
genomization, transplant medicine, and new medical technologies.”207 These changes have
resulted in large-scale revisions of the ways that health and bodies are understood not only by
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medical specialists, but also by the so-called lay public. In addition to reshaping the
epistemological frames of medical knowledge, biomedicalization has also been manifested in
changes to how such knowledge is “produced, distributed and consumed.”208 This includes the
expansion of for-profit interests in the sphere of medicine, but also takes place at the individual
level. Under biomedicalization, subjects also view their own health and illness in new and
different ways. Part of the process of biomedicalization, the authors explain, is the “extension
of medical jurisdiction over health itself (in addition to illness, disease, and injury) and the
commodification of health.”209 In this process,
… health itself and the proper management of chronic illnesses are becoming individual
moral responsibilities to be fulfilled through improved access to knowledge, selfsurveillance, prevention, risk assessment, the treatment of risk, and the consumption
of appropriate self-help/biomedical goods and services.210
The resulting changes, the authors explain, results in a transformation of the “bodies and lives”
of the subjects of biomedicalization. These transformations are not an inevitable force, nor are
they the direct result of technological advancement changing human destiny. While advances in
technologies play a role, social dynamics are the driving force across the changes wrought by
biomedicalization. Crucial to understanding the massive proliferation of barbiturates during this
era is the medicalization of health itself, even where illness was not present. Complaints of
stress, difficulty sleeping, and recurring pain were not treated with drugs only a few decades
prior. Rather, they were considered a part of natural healthy life. As the history of the drugs’
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popularity illustrates, these shifts in the treatment of and attitudes towards stress, anxiety and
pain illustrate the permeability and flexibility of the boundary between health and illness,
underscoring the function of health as a semiotic process. During the period of widespread
recreational use of barbiturates, new conceptions of what it means to be healthy or ill were
articulated as they passed through new spaces of culture and consumption.
3.1.3 Reclassification and Replacement
In the United States as well as in Canada, barbiturates were used to complement
narcotics, in addition to being a replacement for them. In Canada in the 1960s, the sharp rise in
deaths from barbiturates was attributed to this shift, where “persons formerly addicted to
narcotics were now utilizing various combinations of barbiturates, amphetamines, alcohol, and
newer forms of chemical comfort.”211 One statistical study of barbiturate deaths in Canada,
showed an increase in both accidental deaths and suicides resulting from barbiturates.212 As the
drug came increasingly to be associated with danger, government inquiries tracked the drug’s
effect on the population, and the search for a new wonder drug had already begun. Veronal
remained in use until the 1990s, but barbiturates in general began to fall out of popularity in
the 1960s when increased awareness of the risks of overdose proliferated, overruling their once
celebrated benefits. During the peak of their popularity, however, barbiturates were also
frequently intentionally used for their fatal effects and were involved in many high profile and
celebrity overdoses, including Marilyn Monroe, Judy Garland and Jean Seberg. The increasing
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popularity of other drugs, like benzodiazepines (such as Xanax, Klonopin, and Valium, all
overwhelmingly popular today), which were newly introduced and heavily marketed at the
time, coincided with the decline of barbiturates. At this stage of their career, in the 1960s,
barbiturates were increasingly recognized a public health hazard, but the demand for a way to
take the edge off when the stress of modern life was too much was as high as ever. Widespread
use of the drug, notably its increase in popularity among working class people, had drawn
attention to problems with its safety. Barbiturates could still deliver a quick and pleasurable
relief from pain and anxiety, but lacked in tuto, the safety that was seen as essential to the
acceptability of drugs.
Overall the drugs were considered a helpful aid for treating anxiety and stress. The
legitimacy of the drugs was supported by advances in wartime psychiatry, with pills becoming a
more accessible and cheap option for civilians with a case of the nerves. Just as
benzodiazepines were introduced, barbiturates were classified as unsafe for long-term use and
fell out of fashion. The social history of pharmacology demonstrates that this is not an
uncommon pattern; drugs considered safe for widespread therapeutic distribution are only
marked hazardous when newer options are patented and made ready to flood the market.
Barbiturates were no exception and disappeared from most medicine cabinets by the late
1980s.213 While the medicalization of anxiety has continued after the rapid decline in
barbiturate use, the exponential growth in popularity and proliferation of use had been
unmatched up until this time. The popularity of the drugs demonstrates how desperately
ordinary people sought a quick, safe and painless escape from pain, insomnia and anxiety. As
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studies of this period suggest, medicine was being freighted with fulfilling what was for many a
deep-seated desire to live free from fear and anxiety. As their troubled history suggests,
barbiturates were far from able to provide such a solution, but their reputation in providing a
swift and painless death was growing.
While barbiturates failed safely to deliver on the promise of life without pain, they were
increasingly associated with death and suicide214 and largely fell out of popular recreational and
therapeutic use. In the early 1980s, when American law enforcement officials looked to
injectable drugs as a more humane alternative to existing methods of execution, the Oklahoma
state legislator asked its medical examiner for a solution. Dr. Jay Chapman, who was not a
licensed anaesthesiologist, came up with what would come to be known as the standard three
drug lethal injection protocol within a matter of days.215 During this final and most recent
career of barbiturates, the three-drug protocol for capital punishment’s troubled history points
to new limits established within medicine’s pursuit of a humane lethal procedure. In their new
application, barbiturates crossed the boundary between medicine and law enforcement. These
three drugs, including the short acting barbiturate sodium thiopental, took on an “aura of
scientific fantasy about the benefit of the new,”216 and promised to modernise and sanitise
capital punishment for the contemporary era.
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The history of barbiturates from the turn of the twentieth century to date has traversed
boundaries between state, medicine, self, and, increasingly, corporations. In the course of
these shifts, the drugs have fulfilled a variety of medicinal and social needs, articulated by ever
changing ideals of medicine and conceptions of embodiment. As they moved through different
vectors of scientific and social need, the drugs have borne witness to multiple stages of the
medicalization and biomedicalization of illness, health and death. In exploring the
medicalization of death through the cultural history of barbiturates, this chapter articulates the
shifting relationship that medicine has had with the drug. In the process of uncovering the
history of the drugs, I explore the pharmacological side of barbiturates, including their initial
discovery, mechanism of action, and the history of their therapeutic applications in Western
(mostly North American) clinical practice. While attention to this facet of the drugs enriches the
story of their many lives, ultimately in the process of this research it became clear that the
precise mechanism by which barbiturates induce death remains unclear to scientists. This
lacuna in the realm of institutionalized medicine is certainly troubling, given the drugs’ crucial
role in providing a quick, painless and reliable death under a growing number of assisted dying
protocols worldwide. In examining a number of cases of their application in clinical and also
criminal settings and the recent literature on the mechanism of action of barbiturates,
however, this chapter argues that successful medical assistance in dying is highly contingent
upon social factors. The precise means by which death can be brought about by medical means
is unclear and while the possibilities of a swift and painless death as brought on by
pharmaceutical means do exist, it is rather the conditions dictating the embodied experience
during life that make an easy death possible.
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3.2 Barbiturates: Uncertainty and Indeterminacy
In addressing matters of technology, culture and embodiment, my approach is
grounded in a conception of nature and culture as coextensive, always interacting and
“infolding” upon one another in what Haraway calls the naturecultural.217 Scholars who
theorize across the “natural” realm of the biological and scientific, and the “cultural” realm of
the social argue that no articulation of so-called natural phenomena is complete without the
recognition that it exists only in the context of cultural and socially metered modes of
perception.218 Elizabeth Wilson’s study of the pharmacology of mood raises questions about
how the pharmacokinetics (the study of the movement of drugs in the body) of other drugs
intersect with cultural practice. If, as she argues, a better understanding of the pharmacology of
mood can be “a vibrant source of political agency and energy”219 for feminism, then how might
knowledge of the pharmaceutical technology used to induce a “good death” inform our
understanding of assisted dying? Following Wilson, I zero in on these drugs that kill as a way of
interrogating the presumption that medico-pharmaceutical expertise can expedite easy
painless death. Finally, drawing on Puar’s mobilization of crip nationalism to fold the mutually
constitutive processes of racialization, poverty and debilitation into my conception and
mobilization of neoliberal biopolitics, I examine the current status of “a good death,” one
provided by the technological assemblage of contemporary pharmacology, where experiences
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of embodiment, ability and agency vary by extremes. Ultimately, I argue, these disparate
experiences are as likely to dictate the likelihood of a painless death, as the technical mastery
of pharmaceuticals.
In this section, I employ naturecultural thinking to explore how an unexpected turn in
the practices of global pharmaceutical corporations have reshaped possibilities of American law
enforcement agencies providing a swift and painless death as a part of their capital punishment
protocols. Scientific understanding of how to induce death in a humane manner with consistent
results is limited. Given that medicine is oriented toward the preservation of life, this is perhaps
unsurprising. The institutions of medical and pharmacological research are directed toward
identifying and ameliorating the drugs and procedures that will extend and enhance living. Just
as some doctors have argued that any procedure inducing death could not be classified as
medicine, although drugs have been used to hasten death for centuries, these instances are
treated as crimes and rarely approached from a medical perspective. To put it in different
terms, within the frame of medical reason, death has always been a risk or side effect of a drug
and not an intentional result. Barbiturates are one of the primary drugs used in euthanasia and
medical assistance in dying, alongside opioids and another class of drugs called neuromuscular
relaxants, and benzodiazepines. Of the variety of barbiturates that have been synthesized,
marketed and prescribed for different purposes, sodium pentobarbital and secobarbital are
best suited to medically assisted dying because of their ability to induce sleep and have a fatal
effect in a single dose within a relatively short period of time.220 For this reason, the drugs are
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favored by medical professionals inducing suicide, as well as in prisons for capital punishment.
Secobarbital is currently the most common prescription for assisted suicide in Oregon and
Washington.221 The effects are dependent on dosage, but barbiturates can “reduce blood
pressure, disrupt normal heart rate, and cause circulatory collapse.”222 Fig. 2 depicts the
complex assortment of drugs used in assisted dying and capital punishment applications,
including the breadth of the drugs’ original medical purpose. In both intentional and accidental
cases, they induce death through severe respiratory depression, once the person is
unconscious.223 The precise biological mechanisms by which barbiturates kill a person,
however, are not clearly understood. In 2000, sixteen years after the Netherlands legalized
euthanasia, Dutch commentators lamented that no one had yet invented the easy and effective
suicide pill named the “Pil van Drion,” or “Drion’s Pill” after Huibert Drion, a Dutch Supreme
Court Judge had proposed a suicide pill that would end someone’s life “in an acceptable way at
the moment that to them… appears suitable.”224 That even a country where intravenous
euthanasia and assisted dying via oral drugs are widely accepted and has been integrated into
clinical practice, struggles to find the right drug suggests the persistence of a pharmacological
problem.
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Wilson argues that curiosity about pharmacology can recapture biology for feminism.
Her study of anti-depressants traces the politics of anti-psychiatry in feminism, which casts
Prozac and other SSRIs and SNRIs (drugs popularly referred to as antidepressants) as too
deterministic, or blind to its social causes. In this register, anti-psychiatry actually obscures a
good understanding of depression and hence its treatment. A fixation with social construction
casts the realm of biology as “a site of stasis and predetermination,” she argues, which “has left
academic feminism in a singularly ineffectual position for analyzing the new biochemical
treatments of depressive states.” Wilson has two recommendations; that depression be treated
with attention to both emotional and organic aspects of its manifestation, and that feminist
theory should pay better attention to the political agency of biology. Of particular note is
Wilson’s engagement with the pharmacokinetic action of antidepressants. Her analysis
highlights the interdependence of biological and cultural systems at work in the regulation of
serotonergic activity (serotonin is the neurotransmitter believed to be responsible for feelings
of happiness and thus the target of many modern treatments for depression). In detailing the
coextensive effects of chemicals (the drugs) and culture (the forces shaping how they are
prescribed and taken) Wilson articulates a naturecultural perspective. She illustrates how even
the physical phenomena, such as diet and the synthesis of proteins, are shaped and governed
by cultural practices and beliefs. In her formulation, there is no biological phenomena that
exists somehow above or beyond cultural influence or measurement. And yet she is adamant
that feminism has a great deal to gain from “engaging with the vicissitudes of biological
systems.” She argues that feminists engaged with the treatment of depressive states can’t
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afford to ignore the biological phenomena that shape physiological and psychological
treatments of depression.
My approach in examining medico-scientific control over life in the neoliberal era also
draws from the tradition of biopolitical theory that extends out of Foucault’s Omnes et
Singulatim and Society Must Be Defended lectures.225 These studies of Judaeo-Christian protopoliticizing regimes of power brought to light the models by which Western political structures
have sought to control life (bios) with power (regulae). While biopolitical rule existed first as the
absolute monarchic or godly power to “take life” or “let live,” more recent scholarship argues
that it has evolved into a decentralized and diffuse effort to foster some kinds of life, while
disallowing others.226 To theorize the biopolitical through the frame of fostering and disallowing
life renders new iterations of life giving and life taking into the realm of the political. Lemke,
Rose, and Rabinow, following Foucault suggest that the function of biopower in the twenty-first
century is increasingly a force of an individualizing politics.227 This political logic renders the
institutions of health and wellness, the science of pharmacology, the logics of physical fitness,
reproductive science, surgical enhancement, immunization, technological mastery and
biological weaponry as functions of the contemporary biopolitical era. I draw from theories of
biomedicalization228 that trace the instrumentalization of life through the vectors of medicine
and technoscience to interpret the rapid proliferation of barbiturates as a recreational drug and
widely available anxiety and insomnia remedy.
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Despite the usefulness to the study of depression that the science of pharmacokinetics
brought to Wilson’s study of depression, as it turns out, existing knowledge of the ways
barbiturates act on the body is limited. The variant types of barbiturates are numerous, and
each produces a slightly different effect, but overall, they are used to produce a feeling of
relaxation and euphoria. Despite the risks, during the first phase of their use, the drugs were
seen as a useful aid to promote healthy living in stressful times. Therapeutic and recreational
barbiturate use in the drugs’ infancy were intended as supports for living, but the frequency
with which they killed people continued to be a problem. The most recent pharmacological
research still has not identified the exact mechanism of action by which barbiturates affect the
body.229 This means that despite over a hundred years of widespread use, neither physicians
nor neuroscientists know precisely how they work. Current pharmacological research suggests
that “barbiturates act by prolonging and potentiating the action of γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA)
on GABAA receptors and at higher concentrations directly activating the receptors.”230 All that is
known for certain is that barbiturates depress the central nervous system, and have sedative
and anticonvulsant effects.231 Despite the differences between types, all variants produce
“anticonvulsant and anxiolytic activity, sedation, hypnosis, general anesthesia.”232 They have a
low and highly variable therapeutic window. At the highest doses, they produce what is called
“death by respiratory depression,”233 which means that they slow down vital functions to the
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point of stopping breathing. That is, it is clear that they work by relaxing you to death, but
exactly how this takes place in the body remains unknown. This may be part of the reason why
it is frequently paired with other drugs that will stop breathing or the heartbeat after the
anaesthetic effect of the barbiturate.234
Shorter acting variants can be used for emergency anesthesia, and, because of their
rapid effects in depressing the central nervous system, for lethal injection in the United States
and some other countries. At the time of its introduction to capital punishment in 1982, the
short-acting drug sodium thiopental was celebrated as a more humane option than
electrocution. In reality of course, this drug and the other barbiturates frequently fail when
they’re put to the task of killing, even when prepared and delivered in a cocktail of other drugs.
While the switch to lethal injection was seen as more humane, most of the numerous problems
arising after the fact have been tied to the paradox of killing with drugs designed to cure.
The use of lethal injection is increasingly problematic, as producers of the drugs in the
United States and abroad cut off the supply to law enforcement citing moral objections. In the
last ten years, numerous headlines have reported the botching of executions, where prisoners
suffered through the process. This year, Arkansas announced its intention to execute seven
inmates in eleven days, in what many considered to be a rush to use its expensive drugs in
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advance of their expiration.235 Of the increasing number of botched executions, many were the
result of attempting to use only one drug instead of three; usually with the barbiturates sodium
thiopental, or pentobarbital.236 To complicate things even further, the European Union and
some international drug manufacturers banned the sale of the more reliable sodium thiopental
and pentobarbital for use in executions,237 and so law enforcement turned to entirely new drug
cocktails, now consisting of drugs from the benzodiazepine family (that of Xanax, Klonopin, and
Valium). Just as with barbiturates, there are no official clinical guidelines for how to administer
a lethal dose of these drugs, meaning that the execution is supposed to occur through the toxic
side effects of the drugs, while making (sometimes blind) guesses as to at what levels that will
occur.238 The rush to conjure up new pharmacological preparations has had catastrophic
results. The executions can take up to several hours, and inmates have experienced a spectrum
of horrific symptoms before passing. In a handful of cases, inmates have survived and remain
on death row today, as in the case of Doyle Hamm of Alabama, a 61-year-old inmate with
advanced lymphatic cancer and carcinoma who survived the execution process. 239
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Of the new experiments, Deborah Denno, of the Neuroscience and Law Centre at
Fordham University says: “It’s like when you wonder what you’re going to be eating tonight and
you go home and root through your refrigerator to see what’s there. That’s what these
departments of corrections are doing with these drugs.”240 When some states recognized the
new impossibilities of lethal injection, they brought back older methods, including the electric
chair, hanging and firing squad. All three of these methods have been used in the last ten
years.241

3.3 Slow Death and Debilitation in the Contemporary Neoliberal Era
In the years following the 2010 elimination of sodium thiopental, the most common
drug in the three-drug protocol,242 from the U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturing market, a
number of cases of botched executions came to light in news media discourse. The cases
pressed the question of the permissibility of lethal injection as well as cast capital punishment
itself with greater doubt. In the national media discourse that ensued in the U.S., people
debated whether there was any possibility of inducing a “humane” death for those sentenced
to die. Some lamented the irony that while a good death was still possible for euthanized
animals, the fierce international debates about the permissibility of the death sentence were
making such a practice impossible for ending human lives. As my analysis of death row inmate
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Clayton Lockett’s case illustrates, although the drug shortage made it difficult for states to carry
out lethal injection, examining the bigger picture points to a crisis much longer in the making.
Rather than simply exemplifying the impossibility of producing a quick and painless death, the
recent cases of botched executions are only a more extreme example of the debilitating effects
of neoliberal logics of health in the capitalist era. I suggest a reading of Lockett’s life in which
debilitation and decline are not wrought as an accident or failure of a well-intending system of
governance, but rather as an extreme example of deliberate slow debilitation as articulated by
Puar in The Right to Maim.
As the earlier chapter on autonomy in dying discourse in this dissertation argues,
establishing the right to an autonomous and dignified death, as demonstrated in Canada’s
medical assistance in dying debates, is highly contingent on establishing that life has been lived
to the fullest. The right to a good death, one without pain, anguish, or uncertainty became
hotly debated when, beginning in roughly 2010, the drugs used in providing a “humane” death
to American death row prisoners became scarce. This section examines the case of Clayton
Lockett, whose death provoked debate about the pharmacological possibility of providing a
good death. Tracing the transnational symbolic economy of drugs, specifically the barbiturates
and benzodiazepines relied upon to reliably provide a swift and painless death, I explore how
“drugs emerge from and reconfigure relations between multiple social worlds.” 243 Furthermore,
drawing on Berlant’s conception of “slow death” and Puar’s articulation of debility, I examine
Lockett’s case through the lens of neoliberal biopolitics. In light of the direct implication of the
pharmaceutical industrial complex, I argue that contrary to the narrative that classified them as
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a crisis, botched executions like Lockett’s are an inevitability when contemporary systems of
biopolitical governance naturalise the debilitating decline and slow death of impoverished and
racialized populations.
A June 2015 article in The Atlantic recounts the final moments in the life of Clayton
Lockett, a convicted Oklahoma death row prisoner. Lockett’s execution had gone so poorly as
to make national news in the United States, invigorating debates about the moral status of
lethal injection, of capital punishment itself, and of the tenability of then current law
enforcement protocols which were in flux as a result of a shortage of the drugs initially used in
lethal injection. The 38-year-old Lockett had both confessed to and been condemned to the
death penalty for the brutal murder of 19-year-old Stephanie Neiman fifteen years prior.
Beyond his own criminal past, the story of Lockett’s life that emerged in the decades-long
criminal cases, and the media discourse surrounding his execution, detailed a life marked by
poverty, neglect, rape and abuse. In examining Lockett’s life, and the conditions of his death, I
explore the darker flip-side of the world of barbiturates and benzodiazepines, one which
disrupts the association with a swift and painless deliverance that they enjoyed in the earlier
decades of their use.
Before being brought to the death chamber, Lockett had unsuccessfully attempted to do
the job himself three times, fashioning a noose out of bedsheets, swallowing hoarded pills, and
slitting his wrists with a blade cracked from a safety razor. According to the article, Lockett had
known about the experimental nature of new injection procedures, and that when fellow
Oklahoma prisoner Michael Wilson was executed earlier the same year, that he had been heard
saying “I feel my whole body burning” in his final moments. When Lockett’s stepmother visited
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him for the last time, he had begged her not to attend the execution as a witness. “I do not
want you to be at the execution, because I do not know the outcome. I do not think it’s gonna
be very good. Because the drugs that they use have not been tested.”244 His fears were well
warranted. Lockett finally died after a drawn-out process, with multiple attempted injection
sites all over his body, and only ten minutes after the director of the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections had given the order to stop the execution. In the attention that Lockett’s case
garnered after the gruesome details of his final moments circulated across popular media, two
patterns of concern emerged. The first, that Lockett’s death and other botched executions were
unacceptable to the most supportive of capital punishment and that even convicted killers may
even deserve greater dignity in death than they were presently allowed. And second, that the
problem of lethal drugs and how to use them may be posing as great a challenge to the capital
punishment as other issues plaguing the system including, among other things, increasing
attention to “significant evidence of mental illness, intellectual disability, brain damage, severe
trauma, and/or innocence”245 combined. The catastrophe became symbolic of the widespread
failures of the American system of law enforcement, in addition to representing a crisis for
states with lethal injection protocols.
Lauren Berlant articulates her concept of “slow death” as referring to “the physical
wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in that population that is very
nearly a defining condition of their experience and historical existence.”246 The concept is
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rooted in a critique of neoliberalism; Berlant takes as a point of departure David Harvey’s
observation that “under capitalism sickness is defined as the inability to work.” 247 In
investigating obesity as rooted in the political and cultural rituals that shape work, leisure, and
the racializing logics of class, Berlant reflects on how, when it comes to matters of health, the
odds are stacked against some more than others. Berlant’s articulation of slow death is also
rooted in the tradition of Foucauldian biopolitics; Berlant relies on the concept of biopower to
centre the diffuse nature of the forces that engender a growing obesity epidemic. She argues
that those embodying the so-called obesity crises are neither unintended casualties of
capitalism, nor “dupes to the interests of power.”248 Rather, biopolitical forces frame the
victims as guilty of creating an obesity epidemic, or some other public health crisis.
Biopower operates when a hegemonic bloc organizes the reproduction of life in ways that
allow political crises to be cast as conditions of specific bodies and their competence at
maintaining health or other conditions of social belonging; thus this bloc gets to judge the
problematic body’s subjects, whose agency is deemed to be fundamentally destructive.249
Following these logics, Berlant explains, people belonging to certain populations are “marked
out for wearing out.”250 In Berlant’s formulation, these are the “working-class and
subproletarian” populations whose status as consumers is essential to the continued successes
of the global processed-food regime and capital in a more general sense. The wearing out takes
place simultaneously in the privatization of health care and the erosion of the welfare state,
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with consumption and care repackaged as a concern of individual will and self-determination.
While obesity, the resulting illnesses and associated decline are one facet of the manifestation
of slow death that Berlant delineates, slow death’s heuristic function provides a capacious
frame for investigating the affective and embodied experience of the present neoliberal era.
Revisiting the tragedy of Clayton Lockett’s life and death through the lens of Berlant’s
configuration widens the frame of interpretation. Following Berlant, we might interpret
Lockett’s cruel, unusual and inhumane slow death as beginning not at 5:27 PM on April 29,
2014 when he was scheduled to be executed by the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, nor even
after being sentenced to the death penalty or for other prior infractions. Rather, Lockett’s
debilitating decline and eventual demise began much earlier, during the years of childhood in
which he experienced neglect, rape, incarceration, systemic racism and abuse. In The Right to
Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability, Puar argues that critiques of embodiment and social
welfare are lacking in attention to the contributions of disability theory. Puar argues that we
should understand bodily capacity and debility as tied to the cultural and financial trappings of
neoliberalism. In identifying the category of debility, which is distinct from disability in that it, in
consonance with Berlant, “foregrounds the slow wearing down of populations instead of the
event of becoming disabled,”251 Puar designs a means for critiquing the expectations of life
under late capitalism and the neoliberal order. Drawing from Lauren Berlant’s conception of
“Slow Death,”252 Puar conceives of debility as marking “the convergence of capitalism and slow
death via its enfolding into neoliberalism.”253 Following Puar, we might examine where
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Lockett’s life was marked by his poverty and race, and how his debilitation and decline were
inevitabilities, even where his criminality and sentence were not. The naturalizing discourses
that link race, poverty and criminality marked Lockett’s trajectory as inexorable, however grim
or shocking the details of his life and death. The discourse of crisis that ensued from Lockett’s
execution painted his final moments as cruel and unusual. However, as Berlant suggests,
biopower operates to cast crises as conditions of specific bodies, and while Lockett’s final 43
minutes of agony were undoubtedly cruel, his having lived under a regime of racialized poverty
and the debilitating decline that ensued were far from unusual.
This formulation extends the conception of capacity beyond something like corporeal or
intellectual ability, theorizing the social means by which we come to inhabit modes of living
that are supported or neglected through systems of racialization, technology, governance, and
capital. According to Puar, these forces shape our social being far beyond the conventional
indexing of culturally rooted valuations of bodily ability, or capacity. Stressing that a universal
definition of disability does not exist, she argues that “disability is not a fixed state or attribute
but exists in relation to assemblages of capacity and debility, modulated across historical time,
geopolitical space, institutional mandates, and discursive regimes.”254 This is not only a
statement as to the relativity of disability, or that everyone will pass through states of disability
at some point in their lives, but is rather intended to index the manifestation of disabled states
to global regimes of political and rhetorical power that both produce disabled states, and name
it as such (or not) according to their own needs.
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The globalization of disability as an identity through human rights discourses
contributes to a standardization of bodily usefulness and uselessness that discounts
not only the specificity of location but also the ways bodies exceed or defy identities
and subjects. The non-disabled/disabled binary traverses social, geographic, and
political spaces. The distinctions or parameters between disabled and non-disabled
bodies shift historically, as designations between productivity, vagrancy, deviancy,
illness, and labor market relations have undergone transformations from subsistence
work to waged labor to hypercapitalist modes of surplus accumulation and neoliberal
subject formation.255
Puar’s conception of disability and debility is important here because it consists in a
theorization of embodiment that indexes a multitude of bodily interactions with the global,
historical and cultural forces that shape capacitation. With regard to debilitation, we no longer
have any separation from the technologies, or more specifically “technological assemblages,”
that shape embodiment. As a result, bodily capacity or ability can no longer be measured by
their reliance on technological enhancement, but rather through the degree to which one has
access to resources. The advantage of Puar’s mobilization of debility is that it operates beyond
conceptions of disability, to mark the social processes by which populations as a whole are
debilitated by the forces of neoliberal capital, among others. Expanding on Berlant’s term “slow
death,” Puar conceives of slow death as “a mode of neoliberal and affective capacitation or
debilitation as mediated by different technological assemblages.”256 In theorizing ability and
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debility on a continuum that transcends national boundaries or networks of care, Puar
juxtaposes this spectrum of embodiment with the forces of global capital.
What Berlant and Puar’s complementary theories offer is a mode of theorizing death
and debility as shaped by forces beyond the frames of medical knowledge and practice, or of
pharmaceutical technology. Death and debility, when framed as contingent on matters such as
race, coloniality, labour market relations and deviancy, in addition to their conventional
associations with illness and ability, are no longer understood as individual tragedy, but rather
as systemic inevitabilities. “Debilitation is not a by-product of the operation of biopolitics but an
intended result,” writes Puar, “functioning both as a disruption of the non-disabled/disabled
binary—as an in-between space—and as a supplement to disability, that which shadows and
often overlaps with disability.”257 Puar’s formulation strikes back at the normative logics of
health and ability put forward by the discursive spheres of health and medicine. Under the
logics of medicine and normative regimes of health, illness, death and debilitation are
understood as unfortunate inevitabilities against which diligent self-care and healthy living
must strive. While these frameworks help to contextualize the “crisis” of lethal execution within
broader cultural occurrences of debilitation, they alone do not respond to the matter of drugs,
specifically the fact that the same lethal drugs seem to be unevenly successful at doing what’s
expected of them. To better understand this, I discuss next the intersections of natural
phenomena (the drugs and how they act upon the body) and the cultural contexts that render
different outcomes.
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3.4 Medicine, Discourse and the Naturecultural Body
Medical anthropologist Byron Good argues that we should think of medicine “as a
symbolic form through which reality is formulated and organized in a distinctive manner.”258
This framing suggests that medicine is not an objective or straightforward set of practices, but
rather a kind of belief system, just as religion, science and mythology similarly function to shape
imagination and perception. Critical discursive studies of health and wellness have established
the radical cultural contingency of our understanding of health and good living. Scholars
exploring the function of medicine and public health argue that while the definition of health
and illness are constantly shaped by government and capital, bodies in “constant renegotiation,
subjectivity and bodily practices”259 are a locus of power and struggle. This naturecultural
perspective facilitates the exploration of the dynamics between new biotechnologies and their
environments, which Acero argues “substantively mediate gender relations and the
environment in contemporary livelihoods; they reshape bodies, change health practices, and
redefine rights.”260 Studying medicine as rooted in, rather than acting objectively upon society
exposes the inseparability of social power from bodies as subject to medical reason.
The recent histories of biological reason and its application as a tool of governance have
demonstrated instrumentalization of human life, and the scope of racist politics of medicine
and technoscience.261 Bodily knowledge and biological reason are shaped by cultural ideals that
are frequently predetermined by prejudice. Historically, scientific knowledge of difference has
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been used to reinforce hierarchies of superiority through supremacist specification. This is true
for differences of sexuality, gender, ability and race. The archive of science, upon which all
biological knowledge is built and continues to circulate today, is a sexist, racist and colonial
one.262 Clinical techniques, and the parameters of health and normalcy have been established
as a result of centuries of exploitation. The proliferation of medical reason, the medicalization
of the rituals of daily life, and the resulting shifts in how most people interpret their own
embodied experience arise out of the instrumentalization of bodies marked as difference. Such
practices of differentiation have treated racialized, gendered, classed and homosexual bodies
as “objects to be measured, zones to be mapped, and texts to be interpreted.”263 Recognizing
this history of medical reason and biological knowledge is one way to illustrate the rootedness
of bodies in culture, or what is called the naturecultural body. Bodies, even as accessed through
the language of medical science are always already cultural and are therefore inflected with the
presumed inequality and difference that have historically suffused medical discourse. Given
medicine’s function as a symbolic form through which different iterations of social reality are
produced, how should we interpret the dramatically different articulations of embodiment and
health that have been reflected in each of the career stages of barbiturates? To attempt an
answer, I examine next the history of corporate involvement in barbiturate distribution, the
result of which has shaped the drugs’ availability and social significance.
In their function as tools of medicine, drugs provide a useful point of analysis in
decoding the status of death in the contemporary era. Forces within the pharmaceutical
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industry, encompassing not only giant transnational corporations, but also smaller producers
from India, importing services from the UK and European regulators were entangled in the
recent scramble among US states seeking lethal drugs. While the blockage of exportation of
lethal drugs was celebrated as a triumph for human rights, it’s had unintended effects for the
experiences of Michael Wilson, Clayton Lockett and others whose executions were botched as a
result. When Hospira, the American manufacturer of sodium thiopental, the primary drug used
in lethal injection protocols since the beginning ceased its production in 2010, corrections
agencies had to turn to other options. While sodium thiopental is a rapid-onset short-acting
barbiturate, the next choice of drug was pentobarbital, which American agencies imported
from Lundbeck, a Danish corporation who also subsequently ceased export of the drug in 2011
as soon as they learned how it was being used in the U.S.264 After Lundbeck’s decision,
American prison authorities ultimately resorted to backroom deals to acquire the drugs in
question, including tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of pancuronium bromide, sodium
thiopental and the same type of solution, potassium chloride, which was used in Lockett’s
execution. One investigation revealed that the supplier for several states’ supply of the drugs
was an operation run out of a single locked cabinet by one man in the back of his driving school
in a London suburb.265 Lethal injection drugs, which straddle medicine and law by their very
nature, demonstrate how, as historian Antoine Lentacker argues, “drugs emerge from and
reconfigure relations between multiple social worlds.”266 Drugs are weighted with enormous
symbolic potential, coming to represent social ideals far beyond their actual capabilities and,
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when they fail to meet expectation or do what we hope they will do, expose how the symbolic
economy of drugs “works to dissimulate the inherent instability of substances; it disguises and
displaces the long and fragile chain of agents, practices, and institutions that affirms the
identity and efficacy of medications.”267 The use of the drugs posed a threat to the public
identities of the drug manufacturers, for whom the image of enhancing and preserving life was
paramount and the association with execution was seen as bad publicity.268 In exposing the
connection of Lundbeck’s drug with capital punishment, a London human-rights organization
called Reprieve drew attention to the off-label use of pharmacological technologies as a means
of leveraging political power against the U.S. legal system. This move forced a reconfiguration
of the relationship between the American departments of corrections and the pharmaceutical
industry on whom they had come to rely to provide a swift, painless and quick death for
condemned death row prisoners. It also complicated access to the drugs used in assisted dying
protocols in the U.S., since some states used similar drugs for this purpose.269
In 2014, when news of botched lethal injections first broke, law enforcement was using
a different cocktail of drugs for each execution, prompting commentators and watchdogs such
as the ACLU and the Death Penalty Information Center to suggest that inmates were being
experimented on.270 There’s no reason to suspect that this is an exaggeration. As grisly reports
have emerged detailing the executions of inmates, it seems clear that some states are
experimenting on their death row inmates as a way of identifying some new set of procedures
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or cocktail of drugs that works better, killing faster, with no pain, and more predictable results,
than do the current options. Beyond the fact that this is a gross violation of human rights, this
practice exemplifies the “government of life” whereby regimes of biological control reshape not
only the epistemological frameworks of professional and medical expertise, but also the
everyday lives of regular people. Rose argues that while human life was once articulated at the
level of individuals, or populations, vitality is now observed, controlled and commodified at the
level of discrete disembedded and diverse biological objects.271 That is, what we might call “life
itself” no longer only references people or groups of people, but is also articulated at the level
of organs, cells, genes and proteins. Furthermore, whether intentionally or not, the recent
string of experimental lethal injections continues the tradition in Western science and medicine
to instrumentalize the bodies of poor and racialized people in the service of advancing
knowledge about lethal procedures.272
Given the increasing attention to and popularity of medically assisted dying in a number
of countries worldwide, it is difficult to imagine that these experiments, which recall better
known catastrophes from the history of medical ethics such as those in Nazi-era Germany, the
American Tuskegee Experiments and Imperial Japan, could not contribute in significant ways to
contemporary understandings of the limits of life. Doctors played important roles in each of
these experimental projects. Dr. Guillotin’s 1789 invention was intended to provide the most
humane death, and while the electric chair was conceived by a dentist, Groner explains that its
debut was attended by many doctors.273 In the United States today, medicine has a
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complicated relationship with execution by lethal injection. While the original three drug
protocol first tested in 1982 was developed by a doctor, most major medical associations and
nurse associations are “strongly opposed” to participation in executions or forbid them
altogether. In practice however, many physicians and healthcare workers participate in the
procedures, by injecting lethal drugs, ordering lethal drugs, placing intravenous lines,
monitoring vital signs, or pronouncing the prisoner dead. In spite of this, one doctor writing in
2002 claimed that while many American doctors were willing to participate in executions, some
were unaware that their participation directly contradicts professional directives.274 Across the
U.S. statutory codes regarding the permissible extent of physician participation in executions by
lethal injection vary from state to state and in at least two states, medical boards have faced
legal action for their participation.275 The participation of medicine in the lethal injection
process remains a complicated battle, with each new obstacle to the process creating ever
more uncertain outcomes for the inmates facing capital punishment.
Given that there has been some measure of professional medical participation in the
lethal injection procedure since its inception, whether through direct participation or in the
form of expert consultation or design, how can the frequency of botching executions be
explained? One possible reason, discussed in more detail below, is that the drugs selected in
execution protocols are intended to give the impression of a peaceful and painless death, with
the experience of the inmate themselves coming second. A second potentially more significant
reason is that the likelihood of an inmate’s having a peaceful or painless death is already

274
275

Groner, 1027.
Denno, “The Lethal Injection Quandary,” 90.
121

predetermined by cultural circumstance, as much as any certainty that biological knowledge of
ending life could provide. So, while there are several similarities in the ways that (intravenous)
medical assistance in dying and lethal injections are done, it is not exclusively the drugs
themselves that dictate a swift and painless death but a complex set of mutually constituting
determinations. In Canadian MAiD protocols, for example, the doctor or nurse practitioner
conducting the process brings a full set of extra drugs in a separate box, in the event that the
first aren’t effective in an appropriate timeframe.276 The second set of syringes are rarely used
but serve to reinforce peace of mind for those participating and bearing witness to the
procedure. In an effort to maximize the comfort of the patient, those implementing MAiD inject
a small amount of lidocaine into the veins of recipients, to numb the burning sensation
associated with some of the drugs used, including propofol. Although lidocaine is inexpensive
and widely available, such precautions are less common in executions, as evidenced in the final
words of inmate Michael Wilson, who was heard saying “I can feel my whole body burning” as
he died.277 These kinds of differences suggest that it is not merely the availability of drugs or
the accessibility of expertise that predict a painless end of life, but rather that the caution,
preparation and respect that participants dedicate to the event that shapes its outcome.
Perhaps the state of mind of MAiD patients, who necessarily have to have been reflecting on
and preparing for their deaths for weeks, is a factor. We might further speculate that the
already declining physical health of MAiD patients distinguishes them from lethal injection
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patients, but the botched executions of already old and infirm inmates complicate such a claim.
For medical assistance in dying, the interaction is framed as care and upheld as an idealised
final rite of passage. In the instance of execution, beyond the obvious fact that it enacts
punishments, lethal injection sanitizes and attempts to disguise the nature of the act. Execution
by lethal injection fails in its effort to embody the conflicting ideals of the Hippocratic oath and
criminal justice. In its failure to provide the promised humane alternative, it further contributes
to the hierarchizing of human life that is present elsewhere across the manifestations of global
capital and the neoliberal erosion of the welfare state.

3.5 Implications for Medicine and Assisted Dying in Dying in Canada
These fumbles and failures speak volumes as to the unique status of lethal injection; it is
neither exclusively a medical procedure, nor an act of law enforcement. Law enforcement
workers have little to no expertise in anatomy or pharmacology, and although doctors are
called on to verify the time and nature of an inmate’s death, they cannot and do not participate
in executions because this would be in direct violation of the Hippocratic Oath binding all
physicians to “Do No Harm.” It exists in an overlap between medicine and law but fails at
meeting the goals or ideals of either one.278 Compounding pharmacies (who traditionally
tailored drugs to unique needs and applications) are cooking up their own synthetic versions of
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pentobarbital for use in executions, with uncertain and untested results. In some jurisdictions,
compounding pharmacies are vying for the right to anonymity in producing pentobarbital for
law enforcement for fear of public backlash. In this sense, the liminal status of lethal injection,
as neither exclusively medical nor punitive, provides one in-road for fighting the legality and
application of capital punishment. Beyond deliberating on the impossibility of humane
execution, however, these institutional failures point to another problem for the pursuit of
autonomy and dignity at the end of life: that pharmacology is designed to cure and medicine is
itself necessarily at odds with killing.
While the rate of execution in the United States has been on a steady decline every year
since 1999, the numbers of medical patients opting for assistance in dying grows each year.
Public support for the death penalty in the U.S. is at an all-time low, but acceptance of medical
assistance in dying for the terminally ill is steadily rising in the country. As of 2016, either
assisted suicide or euthanasia is legal in the Netherlands, Belgium, Colombia, Luxembourg,
Switzerland, Germany, Japan, and Canada. In the U.S. it is currently legal in seven states. In
increasing numbers, people are demanding the right to take matters into their own hands when
life becomes unliveable. While barbiturates were once used to take the edge off of a long or
stressful day, they are being used at increasing rates to take lives through assisted suicide. In
both instances, barbiturates are being used to stifle and subdue those parts of life deemed not
worth living, whether that of the unbearable anxiety of daily life, of a condemned criminal or of
a suffering patient. This duality operates not as an exception to the patterns of biopolitical
vectors, but, as Puar argues, is at the heart of it.
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Biopolitics deployed through neoliberal guises is a capacitation machine; biopolitics seeks
capacitation for some as a liberal rationale (in some cases) or foil for the debilitation of
many others. It is, in sum, an ableist mechanism that debilitates.279
What distinguishes the two procedures, besides their dramatically different contexts, is that in
the case of capital punishment bodily autonomy is constructed by the neoliberal state
apparatus as problematic to the general social health of the population, while in the case of
medical assistance in dying, death as the ultimate final act of bodily autonomy is upheld as
essential to the health of the population.

3.6 Conclusion
In the aftermath of botched executions, the search for viable lethal drugs continued. In
2017, two U.S. states announced they would introduce fentanyl into their lethal injection
protocols moving forward.280 This announcement took place the same year the opioid
epidemic, which is being called “the deadliest drug crisis in American history,”281 resulted in
record numbers of overdose deaths in the U.S. Canada’s own “serious and growing” opioid
crisis resulted in nearly 3000 deaths in 2017.282 The reactions of shock that ensued—how could
these agencies resort to using drugs now so widely associated with tragedy and accidental loss
of life?—ignore the familiarity of such a trajectory, from clinical therapeutic treatment, to
dangerous recreational craze, to controversial lethal tool, which, as I have detailed, has now
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transpired in the careers of multiple barbiturates, then benzodiazepines such as midazolam and
finally opiates like Fentanyl. The outrage surrounding lethal procedures seemed to suggest at
face value that there is a push to improve the quality of the final moments of the dying person.
As Lockett’s case, and those of other inmates who have requested alternate execution methods
indicate however, those condemned to die would frequently choose other means if given the
option. The drugs used in a lethal procedure are chosen for their ability to meet the
expectations of those who must bear witness to the deaths. They facilitate an end of life that
looks like something as familiar as a medical procedure; they made execution look like
something other than being killed. A 2014 photo collection published by the New York
Magazine’s Intelligencer depicts all of the available images of state execution chambers, from
1991 to 2008.283 The images depict rooms intended for executions ranging from a gallows, to
gas chambers, to electric chairs. While some of the older rooms with electric chairs might be
mistaken for a turn-of-the-century historical image, most of the images from after 2000 look
more like a teaching hospital operating theater with a stark, white, sanitary look to them, some
using modern medical gurneys like those used to transport patients in medical settings. As
Denno explains, “the reason we keep looking for something else… is because it’s not really for
the prisoner. It’s for the people who have to watch it happen. We don’t want to feel squeamish
or uncomfortable.”284 The appropriation of these drugs serves as an attempt to mask the
realities of the state of capital punishment, by drawing it from the realm of punishment into
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that of care. This transition illustrates the function of pharmaceutical technology in functioning
as a boundary between social worlds.
The history of the popularisation of barbiturates exemplifies the biomedicalization of
health itself, a process traced by Clarke et al., Lupton, and others,285 in which subjects who
would have been considered healthy in previous decades, take up new rituals and
recommendations in order to maintain their health. During this time, new drugs were
proliferating in the service of improving everyday life, not just to treat illness. In their ability to
facilitate a good night’s sleep and alleviate the anxiety and stress of life, the drugs initially
represented the best modern medicine had to offer. At the same time, they bore witness to a
reconfiguration of the role of medicine, which was moving towards a role of enhancing and
improving life, rather than treating illness. Next, I explored the status of current research on
barbiturates, including their effects on bodies and the theories about the manner in which they
can produce a lethal outcome in patients. The uncertainty and indeterminacy of their function
within the body underscore the inherent instability of drugs in general, whose function and
purpose are usually disguised by a complex entity of agents, institutions and practices that we
can think of as a symbolic economy of drugs.286
Clayton Lockett, whose execution by a so-called cocktail of experimental drugs,
including benzodiazepines was botched, came to symbolize a moment of crisis for the
institution of capital punishment itself. On the one hand, his death was accidentally made much
more torturously slow and difficult as a result of efforts to make the practice of lethal injection
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in the country impossible. On the other hand, I argue that Lockett’s final moments might also
be read from the perspective of Puar’s theorization of debilitation, in which a slow and painful
demise is not an accident but rather the intended effect of a biopolitical system which upholds
the capacitation and good living of some at the intentional expense of the lives of others.
Next, I contemplated the manifestation of the simultaneously debilitating and
enlivening effects of the drugs from a naturecultural perspective, asking what dynamics exist
between the physiological processes of the drugs in question and the culturally-determined
forces shaping their use and implementation. I interrogated the paradox of a simultaneous
increase in the acceptability of one form of lethal procedure, while another faces elimination.
Both medical assistance in dying and lethal injection rely on the role of the international drug
industry, whose interventions can facilitate or interrupt their feasibility. Considered in
juxtaposition with the national conversation about whether and how a good death can occur in
Canada, I examined how the instances of botched executions forced American law enforcement
agencies and international observers to ask whether a good death, or at the very least a quick
and painless one, remains possible for condemned death row prisoners in the United States.
The paradox that lies at the heart of each of these discursive events is that at some point in
their histories, each one has been rationalized by liberal logics. While proponents of lethal
injection believed they could modernize the execution procedure to sanitize the process and
alleviate unnecessary suffering, proponents of medical assistance in dying likewise seek to
alleviate unnecessary suffering, but in the name of respecting the rights of the individual and
their absolute bodily autonomy. In the former case, the procedure debilitates, while in the
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latter it prevents debilitation, granting the liberal subject the power to cut life off when
suffering and debilitation become unbearable.
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CHAPTER 4
DISABILITY AND THE RIGHT TO DIE IN CANADA
This chapter examines the efforts to expand MAiD eligibility criteria that immediately
followed the passage of Bill C-14 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code. Disability was visible
throughout the Carter proceedings in 2015, with the case against the criminalization of assisted
suicide being argued by Joe Arvay, who uses a wheelchair. Before Carter, Sue Rodriguez’s 1993
Supreme Court case for the right to die was rejected on the basis that making assisted suicide
legal would make elderly and disabled people more vulnerable. In June 2016, immediately
following the passage of the legislating permitting MAiD, Julia Lamb, a 29-year-old woman who
is disabled, lead the challenge to the legislative restrictions that would likely make her ineligible
for MAiD in the future. To better understand how disability plays a central role in determining
the fate of permissible assistance in dying in Canada, I examine the efforts to justify the
expansion of MAiD eligibility criteria to include people whose deaths are not “reasonably
foreseeable.” The disability community, including advocacy groups and representative bodies,
were sharply split on the implications of access to MAiD for disabled people. Both sides argued
that the other would foster exclusion and undermine equality for people with disabilities. For
some, like Arvay, who spoke out against what he understood as a reversal of the precedent set
by the case he presented to the Supreme Court, denying MAiD to those without terminal illness
or imminent death was “discriminatory” and “infantilizing,”287 to disabled people and
represented a stripping of the autonomy granted to all Canadians in the Carter ruling. For

287

Lunn, “Assisted-Dying Bill ‘Worse Than Nothing,’ Says Lawyer Who Argued Carter Case.”
130

others like bioethicist and disability rights activist Jennifer Johannesen, the reasonably
foreseeable clause is a necessary safe guard to protect disabled people and those who suffer
“from poverty, from disenfranchisement, from exclusion, from poor health care,” and “poor
palliative care.”288 I focus on the discontent with the reasonably foreseeable clause, scrutinizing
it through the lenses of theories of compulsory able-bodiedness and crip theory. I seek to draw
attention to the voices of disabled people on both sides of the debate. I draw on the disability
and crip theorists Robert McRuer and Alison Kafer as a means of unpacking the uneven stakes
of the debates for people of different abilities. To interrogate how the right to die moment in
Canada is shaping understandings of disability in the country, I ask: What rhetorical strategies
are used to justify the expansion of MAiD eligibility criteria in Canada? By considering what it
would mean to grant people like Lamb, Moro, Brault and Nadeau-Whissell access to MAiD, this
chapter imagines “other approaches to futurity beyond curative ones.”289
If the autonomy of the medicalized body is complicated by a number of factors,
including race, gender, class, and ability, then it is necessary to articulate how these processes
may be shaping discourses of ‘good’ life and ‘dignified’ death today. Furthermore, and disability
scholars Haegele and Hodge argue, “the way in which disability is defined is important because
the language people use to describe individuals with disabilities influences their expectations
and interactions with them.”290 Legal and media discourse about the right to die is important
because it has the potential to shape perceptions of disabled people, in addition to rescripting
the medical options available to people nearing the end of life. In order to tease out the frames
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and limits of disability that have been the focus of this most recent debate with regard to
Canada, I focus on four cases: Julia Lamb, Robyn Moro, Jean Brault and Suzanne Nadeau
Whissell. These four people have in common a history of vocal support of eliminating the
“reasonably foreseeable,” though their circumstances are otherwise different.
Critical theories of biopolitics challenge the exclusion of minority bodies from the ideals of
good living. Critical biopolitics upset the notion that there is only one good way of living.
Theorizing death and dying through queer and disabled lenses is important because, just as it
disrupts the limited scope of normalized good living, these perspectives can expand who is
included in discourses that seek to rescript death and dying for the better. McRuer points out
that although ability and sexuality are usually falsely dichotomized, they are always
interdependent.
Compulsory heterosexuality is intertwined with compulsory ablebodiedness; both
systems work to (re)produce the able body and heterosexuality. But precisely because
these systems depend on a queer/disabled existence that can never quite be contained,
able-bodied heterosexuality’s hegemony is always in danger of collapse.291
Crip politics draws on queer theory, expanding and politicizing a term that is “claimed by those
whom it did not originally define.”292 Queerness and disability are linked for two key reasons.
First, because both queer and disabled bodies are read as “other,” in that their future is
presumed to follow something other than the “normal” reproductive trajectory. Second, much

291

McRuer, Crip Theory, 31.
Sandahl, “Queering the Crip or Cripping the Queer: Intersections of Queer and Crip Identities
in Solo Autobiographical Performance,” 27. Cited in Kafer, 15.
292

132

like the category of queer, disability is positioned here as fluid and relational, subject to the
culture and institutions that mark them as such.
In the accounts of death and dying I detail here, there is an overt presence of the ‘never
quite contained’ mode of living. The lives of Lamb, Moro, Brault and Nadeau-Whissell exceed
easy categorization. The question of their deaths likewise exceeds containment in the laws
meant to improve the experience of dying in the nation. In this chapter, I examine the
paradoxical situation faced by those who have been left in a liminal space, somewhere without
access to a ‘cure,’ but without MAiD. The people I discuss have been excluded on the basis of
an ‘unforeseeable’ death by the stipulations of the legislation. In the process, I borrow from
queer feminist disability scholar Alison Kafer’s theory of crip temporality to examine how
disability is often cast “out of time.”293
While the ultimate legal fate of MAiD eligibility criteria will be undetermined until the
Lamb case is settled, the debates surrounding the court challenge to Bill C-14 yielded an
unforeseen opportunity. They provided a platform for ill and disabled people to detail the
conditions that make their lives livable and meaningful. ‘Disability’ was not a stable category
throughout the debates, since those affected by the exclusionary laws lived, or are living with
different levels and timeframes of ability. Proponents of expanding access to MAiD likewise
used a flexible language of ability to express their demands, sometimes enacting ableist
subjectivity to “perform wholeness”294 and justify a life well lived, other times taking up the
language of disability rights to denounce exclusion and demand equal accommodation of their
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unique needs under the law. Under the conditions of compulsory able-bodiedness, the
suffering of the disabled is naturalized, and MAiD advocacy by disabled subjects repositions
assisted dying as an interruption of the medical model of disability in which intervention and
cure supersede patient autonomy. This discourse of equality and self-determination holds a
paradoxical relationship with the temporalities of medicine and disability. It cuts short the
curative logics that conventionally extend into the final medicalized moments of life. At the
same time, however, pro-MAiD disability discourse contradicts the importance of centering
disabled longevity that grounds Kafer’s theory of crip time. Instead of demanding access to a
future with greater longevity, the proponents featured here framed MAiD as improving both
their lived experiences of the present and their final days of life. I also address disability rights
criticism of MAiD that continued after Bill C-14, which was less prominent than challenges to
eligibility criteria. To my knowledge, there are no disability rights groups challenging MAiD’s
legality altogether in legal proceedings, for example, and though most press coverage I
reviewed for this chapter addressed voices from both sides of the issue, there appeared to be
some resignation on the part of groups fighting against MAiD in the two years that have passed
since the legislation was enacted. I focus on the fight to expand access to MAiD for two reasons.
First, this framing of disability counters nearly everything argued about disability in the context
of MAiD leading up to legalization, in which the risk of harm to vulnerable people was the
dominant anti-MAiD narrative. Second, the tradition of crip theory has a longstanding
engagement with the problem of vulnerability and medicalization, one that I have not yet seen
discussed in the context of a permissive system. I believe Lamb and the other cases discussed
here provide a unique opportunity to attend to those who have lived the experience of
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medicalization and disability, and who argue their needs are not being met with empathetic
care.

4.1 Background to the Legal Challenge to Bill C-14
4.1.1 Summary of Lamb v. Canada’s Legal Context
As of June 27, 2016, the BCCLA (British Columbia Civil Liberties Association) has
launched a court challenge that charges Bill C-14 with excluding people with degenerative
illnesses (including, but not limited to: spinal muscular atrophy; multiple sclerosis; spinal
stenosis; locked-in syndrome; severe conversion disorder; traumatic spinal injury; Parkinson's
disease; and Huntingdon's disease) from having access to MAiD on the basis that the
requirement that the person’s death must be “reasonably foreseeable” is both a contradiction
of the precedent set in the Carter ruling, and a violation of their rights as defined in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. When the Bill was being debated in parliament, Lee
Carter, the daughter of Kay Carter the plaintiff in the Supreme Court case argued295 that the
Bill’s restrictions would have excluded her mother from accessing MAiD, despite the courts
having ruled in favor of legalizing MAiD on her behalf (though she ultimately died before the
ruling was made).
The Carter ruling states that:
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▪

MAID be available “to individuals with terminal and non-terminal grievous and
irremediable medical conditions that cause enduring suffering that is intolerable to the
individual in the circumstances of his or her condition” (recommendation 2);

▪

a psychiatric condition should not be a bar to eligibility (recommendation 3);

▪

the capacity of a person requesting MAID to provide informed consent should be
assessed using existing medical practices (recommendation 5);

▪

competent mature minors should have access to MAID within three years of the
coming into force of the provisions relating to MAID for competent adults (and that
during that three-year period, the issue of competent mature minors and MAID be
examined) (recommendation 6);

▪

advance requests for MAID should be permitted in certain circumstances
(recommendation 7);

▪

the request for MAID be made in writing and in the presence of two witnesses
(recommendation 9);

▪

the federal government work with the provinces and territories and their medical
regulatory authorities to establish a process that respects the freedom of conscience
of health care practitioners while respecting the needs of patients, and that objecting
health care practitioners should be required to provide an effective referral for a
patient (recommendation 10);

▪

all publicly funded health care institutions provide MAID (recommendation 11);

▪

MAID be carried out only if two physicians who are independent of one another have
determined that the eligibility criteria are met (recommendation 12);
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▪

physicians, nurse practitioners and registered nurses working under the direction of a
physician to provide MAID be exempted from sections 14 and 241(b) of the Criminal
Code (recommendation 13); and

▪

Health Canada re-establish a Secretariat on Palliative and End-of-Life Care
(recommendation 19).296

In Bill C-14 - An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, a “grievous and irremediable medical condition”
is defined in new section 241.2(2) as requiring all of the following criteria:
•

the person has a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;

•

the person is in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;

•

the illness, disease or disability or the state of decline causes enduring physical or
psychological suffering that is intolerable and cannot be relieved under conditions that
the person considers acceptable; and

•

natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of the medical
circumstances, although a prognosis as to the specific length of time remaining is not
necessary.”297

Lamb v. Canada references the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, stating that denying
some people access to MAiD, Bill C-14 is in violation of the following section:
“15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
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discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability.”298
4.1.2 Support for the “Reasonably Foreseeable” Restriction Clause in Disability Advocacy
While the focus of this chapter is on those who used a disability perspective to support
expanding the accessibility of MAiD, there were numerous other groups who fought the
expansion of eligibility. For the most part, groups who had, before Bill C-14, expressed outright
rejection of the possibility of legalizing MAiD, redirected their efforts towards ensuring that
disabled people would not be harmed in the permissive system. Rather than seeking to
invalidate legal MAiD by posing a legal challenge to Carter or Bill C-14, some concerned groups
turned their efforts towards minimizing the threat to people with disabilities. For some, like
David Baker, a lawyer representing the Council of Canadians with Disabilities and the Canadian
Association for Community Living, resisting the BCCLA’s effort to expand criteria was
paramount to protecting people with disabilities. Commenting on the BCCLA’s press release,
Baker expressed concern that too many people could gain access to MAiD. “Is someone who is
blind condemned to interminable suffering? Is someone who has autism condemned to
interminable suffering?”299 Broadening eligibility, argued Amy Hasbrouk of Toujours Vivant/Not
Dead Yet Canada, could put disabled people at risk because disabled people may already be
experiencing “devaluation” from others: “If you’re surrounded by people who think that your
life is a tragedy because you're disabled, of course you're going to believe that because that's
the message that society gives you… Of course you're going to feel like your life is worthless if
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everyone around you is telling you that.”300 These arguments are of course particularly
important for considering the potential consequences of expanded eligibility. The fears of
devaluing the lives of people living with disabilities is well-founded, as is the problematic
category of suffering, which is by its very nature so difficult to quantify, let alone regulate.
While my focus with this chapter is on pro-MAiD accessibility discourse within the
disability framework, arguments in favour of protecting vulnerable people from abuse also
deserve attention. In the media discussion of Bill C-14, Lamb’s case against Canada received
more coverage than did supporters of the eligibility restrictions. In most instances, in the source
texts I analyse here both sides of the issue were represented, but Lamb’s case (and argument)
were headlined, while MAiD detractors like Baker and Hasbrouk appeared later on, as
counterbalance to arguments in favor of expanding criteria.

4.2 Case Descriptions
4.2.1 Julia Lamb
Julia Lamb is a 29-year old woman living in Chilliwack, British Columbia. She has had
spinal muscular atrophy, “a genetic disease affecting the part of the nervous system that
controls voluntary muscle movement,”301 from infancy. Lamb has severe osteoporosis and
requires help with most daily activities. Since spinal muscular atrophy is a degenerative
condition, she faces an increasing number of symptoms related to her illness, including
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increasing difficulties with “breathing, swallowing, speaking and walking.”302 She lives
independently and works part-time as a marketing assistant. She is the primary plaintiff in the
constitutional court challenge filed by the BCCLA against the Bill C-14 on the basis that it is too
restrictive.
4.2.2 Robyn Moro
Robyn Moro was a 68-year old woman from Delta, British Columbia who was diagnosed
shortly after retiring with Parkinson’s disease.303 She joined the Lamb V. Canada case as a
plaintiff on May 23, 2017. She was initially denied access to MAiD but died with the assistance
of a doctor on August 31, 2017. During the time between the denial of access to MAiD and her
death, she participated in public advocacy of the BCCLA’s initiative to expand eligibility criteria,
by giving media interviews.
4.2.3 Jean Brault
Jean Brault was a 61-year-old man living in Sherbrooke, Quebec. A sudden illness at the
age of 19 partially paralyzed him and restricted his ability to communicate. Brault attempted
suicide multiple times in his life, once giving up a hunger strike when doctors threatened to
send him to a psychiatric ward. After the passage of Quebec’s Bill 52: An Act to Amend End-ofLife Care, he sought access to MAiD, but was denied on the basis of not being near enough to
the end of life. In protest of being denied the procedure, and as a means of bringing about the
symptoms necessary to be considered eligible, Brault began a 53-day hunger strike. At the end
of the strike, during which he starved instead of dehydrating in order to be able to give
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unimpaired consent, he was deemed eligible. He gave a television interview with the CBC two
days before dying with medical assistance on April 7th, 2016.
4.2.4 Suzanne Nadeau-Whissell
Suzanne Nadeau-Whissell was a palliative care nurse and public advocate of expanding
access to MAiD, living in Estrie, Quebec. She was diagnosed with ALS shortly after retirement
and created a blog she called “Le Vent Se Lève,” or roughly, “The Wind Picks Up,” to document
and share her experiences with the public. She denounced the exclusion of people dying from
conditions other than cancer from palliative care facilities304 and sought to de-stigmatize
assisted dying practices in general. She died on November 28th, 2016 with medical assistance,
after first announcing her end of life plans on her blog.

4.3 The Context of Compulsory Able-Bodiedness
Theories of disability and crip scholarship have a lot to offer the study of MAiD. While
death with dignity advocates continue to grapple with what they understand as a reclamation
of autonomy from the totalizing regime of medicalization, decades of disability scholarship have
carved out a space for disabled folks that transcends the medical mode’s assumption that
disabled people are child-like, passive and dependent.305 As sociologist Sara E. Greene explains,
critical theories of disability have worked to distance the conflation of ‘sickness’ with disability,
a central issue in the medical model of disability. Such conceptions of disability worked to
exclude people with impairments from certain spheres of economic and social participation.
Nagi and Zola’s important contributions, for example, moved toward dynamic and non-medical
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understandings of disability that focused instead on the relationship between people with
disabilities and their environment.306 This perspective enables a shift away from focusing on
individual experiences of disability and towards understandings of “the interaction between
society, impairments, and people.”307 One problem in drawing parallels between disability and
the growing attention to the needs and rights of those nearing the end of life is that it might
reify the association with mortality that disability activism has struggled against. At the same
time, however, those seeking to establish greater autonomy for the dying could benefit from
the disability perspectives that challenge medicalization and emphasize community care and
decision making. Compulsory able-bodiedness is inescapable in the MAiD debate, shaping the
culturally-embedded values that define good living for all sides of the debate, in addition to
influencing the language that delineates the acceptable, from the unacceptable ways of living.

4.3.1 Describing a Life Fully Lived
In a similar manner to the Carter case, a central rhetorical strategy for expanding MAiD
eligibility criteria was in framing the lives of the individuals affected as full, long or happy. The
fight against the restrictions straddles the question of compulsory able-bodiedness, a concept
that expands Adrienne Rich’s influential contention in “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian
Existence.”308 In some cases, the framing of the lives of those affected by the restrictions to
MAiD in the C-14 bill represented them as living full lives in spite of their conditions, while in
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others illness or disability were framed as a limitation to fulfilling life, against which they
struggled to live well as best they could. Throughout the statements made denouncing
limitations, the uneven positioning of disability and disabling illness as obstacle to good living
demonstrates the complexity of regulating end of life practices for such a wide variety of
circumstances.
Statements about Julia Lamb in particular emphasized her independence, work and
participation in a wide variety of social activities. The BCCLA press release and statements from
and about Lamb in media coverage underline the fact that spinal muscular atrophy had not
stopped her from having enjoyed a fulfilling life. In her own words, Julia describes the
opportunities she has enjoyed, in spite of her mobility issues.
I was a happy child. My parents called me a social butterfly… My family went on many
adventures including river rafting camping and trips around the country. I was always told
growing up to never let any obstacles deter me or hold me back from what I wanted in
life. I took that message to heart and lived life.309
Such descriptions serve to distance Lamb’s experiences of living with disability from
assumptions that life with disability is always necessarily lacking from the fulfilling experiences
that are ascribed to able-bodied lives. They offer a way of forgoing the charge that Lamb,
whose age (she was 25 in 2016) marks her request for MAiD as less naturally or obviously
acceptable than the individuals of a more advanced age who were upheld as representative
cases during the Carter case.
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Just as Lamb’s fulfilling childhood is levied as indication that she has not had an unhappy
or limited life, media coverage of Lamb’s story foregrounds her continued participation in
familiar rituals of work, travel and communication. Attention to the ways Lamb’s life resembles
that of the average twenty-five-year-old works to underscore that at present life with spinal
muscular atrophy is still rewarding and productive for her.
She works part-time as a marketing assistant for a clothing company, writing newsletters
and managing social-media accounts, mostly from home – though she makes weekly
visits, in her wheelchair, to the company's outlet and to competitors to do market
research, the court documents say. She can use her hands to type.310
Working with the connectivity provided by her wheelchair and the communication afforded by
the internet offers Julia the social and professional connections associated with a good life.
Such descriptions offer the opportunity to recast living with a disabling illness as having the
potential to resemble the lives of any other able-bodied person.
Robyn Moro was likewise described as having enjoyed a full life. After her eligibility was
reconsidered Moro passed with medical assistance after the Lamb v. Canada court challenge,
for which she was a plaintiff, was filed. The descriptions of her life emphasize the happiness she
enjoyed before her illness interrupted a ‘normal’ life. A statement released by her husband
Lenard Moro after her death through the BCCLA details moments from a happier time in their
lives.
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Prior to her diagnosis Robyn was an independent, active grandmother. She enjoyed
spending time with her four grandchildren. She loved the outdoors, boating and
camping. She and her husband would often host friends and family in their home.311
Unlike the framing of Lamb’s case as living independently with disabling illness, this statement
points to Moro’s illness as, in addition to other grievous symptoms, having stripped away her
independence. In positioning the illness as having taken away her independence, Moro
gestures to how obtaining the right to die with MAiD is also a way of reclaiming a measure of
independence. Having been initially denied access to MAiD, Moro’s case illustrates the
confusion that has surrounded the legislation. In many instances, physicians and other care
workers have been uncertain about the legality of providing MAiD, resulting in long waiting
times, or periods of uncertainty for those, like Moro, who were not immediately obvious
acceptable candidates.
Jean Brault, although his case received a great deal less English language press coverage
in the national media, was also positioned as having lived a fulfilling life. Like Moro, however,
depictions of Brault’s life emphasized his illness as an interruption of a fulfilling life. Brault’s
paralysis is the result of a brain illness at the age of 19. In a feature article published by the
French language arm of CBC, Brault’s condition is understood as limiting his opportunities:
In April 2016, Jean marked the 42nd anniversary of his disability. At the young age of 19,
athletic and completely healthy, his fate befell him: a blood clot affected his cerebellum
and brain stem, leaving him partially paralyzed and unable to speak. Doctors said he had
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little chance of regaining the use of his limbs and voice, but he succeeded through his
efforts and determination and was able to build an interesting life.312
The young age at which Brault was affected by his illness, paired with the 42 years he has lived
with disability are used to signify his prolonged suffering. At the same time, however, the
statement underlines his having ‘made the best’ of the time he had. Brault’s life is represented
as coming to an end, with his choice to die likewise interpreted as being a reasonable one,
given his living conditions. Brault is the only person among the cases addressed here who is
noted as having attempted suicide in the past. Describing his life as interesting seems to side
step the more positive labels attached to the lives of Lamb and Moro. His disabling condition is
marked as an unfortunate “detour” in what might otherwise have been happy, able-bodied life.
A collage of images of Brault’s youth313 featured in coverage of his story illustrates the
slippery duality of reasoning with able-bodiedness. One image shows Brault as a toddler riding
a bicycle. In others he is playing the guitar, posing on the beach with a boat, and next to a
horse. The most striking is one of Brault as a young teen, posing with two friends, all three in
swim trunks. Arms draped over the back of the chair, he is relaxed, perhaps at a backyard pool,
or on a family vacation. Brault is immediately recognizable as the same man who is depicted in
the present day. Both are looking out at the camera from a reclined position, but the tanned
skin and muscles of the young man are in stark contrast to the older, paler man with grey hair,
set upright in a reclining soft chair under a blanket. Brault lived well, the contrasting images
seem to suggest, but there is no returning to his able-bodied past. The images are not unlike
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those you might see in a funeral slideshow, in which the happier days are celebrated after
someone has passed. Such representations have a palliative effect;314 they distract from the
painful reality of facing death.

Figure 3 Jean Brault Family Photos

Suzanne Nadeau-Whissell expressed her end of life experience as complete, signaling
that her illness had not been a complete interruption of her life. Although she herself was not
excluded by permissibility restrictions, in her work as a palliative care nurse herself, she had
lobbied against the effort of palliative care facilities who were fighting for exclusion from
providing MAiD. In a post on the blog she updated throughout her illness, Nadeau-Whissell
called for continued attention to finding a cure for ALS, but also expressed that she had made
peace with the life she had lived.
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I want to thank the followers of my blog. You have given me wings! Above all, I hope I
have educated people about ALS. The better it becomes known, the easier it will be for us
to find a cure. I remain hopeful that Estrie’s citizens and media will participate in the
Marche de la SLA [March Against ALS] each year! My mission on Earth is ended.315
Giving testimony to her experiences advocating both for awareness and pursuit of a cure for
ALS, and also in voicing her support of MAiD, Nadeau-Whissell’s blog served as a platform for
expressing her experiences with illness and accepting death. She announced her decision in
advance and had advocated for the practice of assisted dying throughout her illness. In NadeauWhissell’s rendering, the figure of the ill body is mobilized to take action against ignorance
about the realities of the disease. At the same time that she fought for awareness and change,
however, the documenting of her decline and the progressive loss of her abilities are used as
justification for MAiD. Illness and the debilitating effects of her disease are refigured as
justification in rationalizing voluntary death.
The figure of the healthy, happy, able body looms large in the accounts of the lives of
those positioning themselves as proximate to the MAiD issue. Although most of the testimonies
given depict the subjects as having come to terms with the realities of their condition, their
liveliness is always negotiated with reference to the activities and states of being that we
understand as good and healthy. In the cases of Brault and Nadeau-Whissell, testimonies of
their experience served as preemptive grieving rituals, marking a coming to terms with the
immediacy of death, but also providing an opportunity for them to speak frankly and openly
about their end-of-life experiences. Lobbying for MAiD effectively provided Brault and Nadeau-
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Whissell the opportunity to take part in their own memorialization. West describes the impulse
to take an active role in narrating one’s own mediated end of life experiences as a way to
“resist the default of social invisibility”316 that is associated with dying. Her study of
documentary representations of the end of life demonstrates how offering greater visibility to
the final stage of life works against the death taboo, a gesture that may “puncture” the
fictitious neoliberal subjectivity that is exclusively autonomous and invulnerable. 317 NadeauWhissell’s blogging practice enacts this same impulse to make visible her experiences. In this
sense, the impulse towards increasing the visibility of people in states of illness and decline
works to dismantle the limiting frames of longevity and vitality that are the legacy of our
medicalized gaze.
At the same time that the testimonies of Lamb, Moro, Brault and Nadeau-Whissell seek
to reclaim a measure of agency with the help of the right to MAiD, however, their reasoning
necessarily takes place within the space of compulsory able-bodiedness. As disability scholar
Carol Gill notes, the matter of right-to-die laws risks naturalizing the suffering of the disabled.
She argues that disabled people face additional disadvantages when it comes to the question of
euthanasia. Their suffering, while it may be primarily the results of institutional shortcomings, is
naturalized when assessments about their wellbeing and prospects for the futures are laid out
along ableist logics that assume disabled lives are not worth living. In the U.S. cases that Gill
studied, the right to die is considered “dynamically different, more natural, or more reasonable
for disabled people than for non-disabled people.”318 People articulating their need for and
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right to MAiD in Canada had to walk a fine line. In their pursuit of the right to a good death, the
testimonies mobilized the imagery of a good and happy life. The healthy, bourgeois, able body
figures heavily throughout these discourses. In order to frame death as reasonable, those
fighting against the exclusionary clauses of the post-Bill C-14 legislation had to draw upon
ableist markers of good living. In reality, such markers of fulfillment—a healthy active lifestyle,
a close-knit family, outdoorsy recreation—were unevenly available to those making their case.
In drawing attention to the fulfillment they enjoyed, these speakers sought to make a case for
the “cultural acceptability”319 of their deaths. Within the same gesture, however, such framing
risks naturalizing the suffering of disabled bodies in general. It could lead people to assume that
everyone who lives with disability is unhappy and suffering.

4.3.2 Denouncing Exclusion
In order to argue against the restrictive criteria, people fighting to expand MAiD
eligibility explained who would be affected and detailed how they themselves were affected by
the decisions. Grace Pastine of the BCCLA explained that many people were contacting their
organization frustrated to learn that they were no longer eligible, although they believed
themselves to be eligible after the Carter ruling.
I think there are many Julia Lambs… people who are paralyzed from the neck down,
individuals whose pain is extreme, chronic, unending, untreatable, who are suffering
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greatly because their lives no longer have meaning, but they are simply not eligible under
the government's new legislation…320
Offering generalized descriptions of the conditions of those affected provides a sense of unity
among the diverse group on individuals in question. Arguments denouncing exclusion tended to
focus on the negative experiences and lived realities of the people in question, rather than
naming illnesses or disabilities outright. To focus on the breadth of people affected, the court
challenge to C-14 also pointed to young people, who might be suffering from debilitating
illness, suggesting that the current legislation is a violation of the Charter of Rights and
Freedom’s guarantee that “Every individual is equal before and under the law.” 321
This inequality is imposed on younger persons and/or persons who are materially
physically disabled, which are both personal characteristics listed as enumerated grounds
of discrimination under s. 15( 1 ).322
Qualifying the law as being a violation of guaranteed rights draws attention away from the
opposing view that restrictions would protect the vulnerable from abuse or coercion.
Positioning the court challenge as unconstitutional suggests that the present law is the
reason for the continued suffering of many people. “This law deliberately excludes a class of
people: those who are suffering with no immediate end in sight,” argued Pastine, “How can we
now turn away and ignore their pleas?” 323 “My option is to die by dehydration,” Moro said in a
television interview, “It takes usually apparently about 12 days to die. And that’s all that people
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like me have.”324 While much of the court challenge was grounded on the “reasonably
foreseeable” clause, others, such as Dying with Dignity denounced the exclusion of those who
could not give informed consent at the time of death because of their illness.
Our supporters were heartbroken last year when they learned that the federal assisted
dying law would unfairly restrict choice for individuals with dementia and other
conditions that rob victims of their mental capacity.325
The focus on the inclusion of people with mental illness was much more controversial than
those with neuromuscular disorders like Lamb, Moro and Brault, since many feared that it
would be impossible to get truly informed consent. Nevertheless, groups denouncing the
restrictive criteria demanded greater consideration be given to anyone who might be excluded
by the current laws.
Some pointed to the ways that legal ambiguity was causing great distress to those trying
to access MAiD as the legal deliberation was taking place. For people like Moro, argued her
husband, having life and death hanging in the balance of such legal minutiae was agonizing.
Moro weighed against the exclusion (which was ultimately overturned), explaining how
confusion about the permissibility criteria had upset his wife’s plans.
It seems very wrong that someone could be denied an end to their terrible suffering
because they were not going die. It seems just as wrong to be ineligible one day and then
eligible the next based solely on an interpretation.326
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Lobbying simultaneously for clearer rules than those laid out by C-14, and against the exclusion
of those whose deaths are not imminent, Moro’s letter asks that greater consideration be
afforded to those who are experiencing some of the worst periods of their lives.
Nadeau-Whissell utilized her position as a palliative care nurse to advocate for those
excluded by the restrictions. Living in Quebec, where the Bill 52, “An Act Respecting End of Life
Care” passed before C-14 made MAiD legal nationwide, Nadeau-Whissell’s access to MAiD
would likely have been denied if C-14 had not been passed in time. Her final reflections
expressed frustration on behalf of all those who suffered without an end in sight.
I am an activist for justice and an end to discrimination against those nearing the end of
life! We’re all going to die. We, the population, share a part of the responsibility to
uphold our own rights. Therefore, we must express ourselves! As for people who suffer
from diseases other than cancer, they have been forgotten in our society and need
adequate palliative care! Do we not all have the right to die without discrimination, in
dignity, and according to our own will?327
Making her decision to access MAiD public served as a political tool for Nadeau-Whissell, who
used her blog as a platform for making public the private suffering of those excluded from
access. Drawing from her work as a palliative care nurse, a role for which she bore witness to
many different end of life scenarios, she speaks against the forgetting and exclusion of those
living their final moments, suggesting that both frank discussions about the end of life, and the
possibility of requesting MAiD can improve conditions for those affected.
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McRuer argues that disability and able-bodiedness are mutually constitutive, that one
cannot exist without the other. Representations of these two categories serve to reinforce the
boundary between them. In examining the “…institutional sites where compulsory ablebodiedness and heterosexuality are produced and secured and where queerness and disability
are (partially and inadequately) contained”328 crip theory moves to challenge the preservation
of such boundaries that takes place in the institutions of the law and domestic life. The figure
of the crippled, ill body disrupts hegemonic narratives of ability. The “cult of ability (centered
on discipline and domesticity),”329 is challenged by queer and disabled identities that interrupt
presumed identities that take shape in the spaces of domestic life.
People denouncing their exclusion from MAiD have lived with a variety of conditions.
There is no doubt some danger in trying to lump together disabled people with those who have
lived most of their lives as able-bodied people, only to develop debilitating illness in old age.
Furthermore, crip and disability theorists and activists have worked hard to separate the
representation of people with disabilities with the association of death and decline. 330 The fact
that it has been primarily disabled people who were excluded from accessing MAiD, however,
makes clear that ableism is part of the issue and that exclusion is deeply troubling for some of
those who are affected by the restrictive clauses. Particularly for those who have lived with
disabling conditions for most of their lives, the exclusion from the new permissive system only
adds to a long list of privileges and activities from which they have been excluded.
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Exclusion, as disability scholars explain, is not accidental. As Rosemarie GarlandThompson explains, pathologizing disabled bodies serves to reinforce the “social power and
status” of the unmarked, “neutral space of normalcy.” 331 In the case of eligibility for MAiD, this
neutral space of normalcy is articulated in the discourses of good living that are attached to
able-bodied living and the fulfillment of social expectations that are associated with ‘normal’
bodies. In the sense that “homosexuality and disability clearly share a pathologized past,”
explains McRuer, the two categories have served to reinforce the idealized (heterosexual and
able-bodied) subject; a figure that serves as “a nonidentity, as the natural order of things.”332
Following Garland-Thompson and McRuer, I would argue that the exclusionary clauses
associated with MAiD in Canada function to legitimate the autonomous healthy individual as
the ideological centre.
Further complicating the matter of access to MAiD, is the problem of vulnerability. The
exclusionary clauses have been widely regarded as a necessary protectionary measure,
including people within networks of disability scholarship and activism.333 Concern for
vulnerable older and disabled people was a motivation for those who fought against the
institution of a permissive system for years before the Carter decision. Yet as the statements
detailed above illustrate, excluding some people because their situations do not fit with
proscribed criteria may also serve to reinforce limiting determinations about embodied ideals.
As Garland-Thomson notes,
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Constructed as the embodiment of corporeal insufficiency and deviance, the physically
disabled body becomes a repository for social anxieties about such troubling concerns as
vulnerability, control, and identity.334
For those denouncing their exclusion from access to MAiD, the law as it stands in Bill C-14 does
not represent protection from abuse, or a shield from vulnerability, but rather an obstacle that
prolongs suffering. In this sense, people denouncing exclusionary MAiD criteria are also
effectively suggesting that there may be other better ways to protect vulnerable, or suffering
individuals nearing the end of their lives, besides restricting their access to MAiD.

4.3.3 Asserting Self-Determination
The framing of the Lamb V. Canada case was centered on asserting the right to die as a
right like any of the others guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In
aligning this claim to rights with the claims made by plaintiff Gloria Taylor in the Carter case,
Lamb and the BCCLA position Bill C-14 as stripping Lamb and others of a right afforded to other
Canadians. Much of the language of the Lamb court challenge is reminiscent of the language of
self-determination that was the focus of pro-MAiD discourse during the lobbying for and
subsequent transition to a permissive system.
The right to liberty is engaged and infringed by state interference with the right of the
individual to a protected sphere of autonomy over decisions of fundamental personal
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importance. The choice to live or die, and to control the when and how of one’s death,
are decisions of profound and fundamental personal importance.335
In arguing that the right is one that defines personhood, the wording of the case points to the
potential for the restrictive clause to devalue the rights of people like Lamb and others in
parallel situations. In Lamb’s own press conference, the wording was even stronger:
This is about agency, choice, and compassion. This is about the most fundamental values
that define being Canadian. Respecting each other’s choices, even when those choices are
different from one another.336
Unlike the Carter ruling, which did make reference to the establishment of women’s
reproductive rights in the country, the Lamb case does not directly draw on this marker of
bodily autonomy. And yet Lamb’s phrasing directly parallels the wording of prochoice advocacy
that has been associated with the legalization of abortion. “It's a deeply personal decision and it
should be mine to make.”337 In claiming the decision as her own, Lamb effectively asks that her
audience consider the alternative to granting her the right to die. Lamb links the restrictions of
C-14 with the prospect of prolonged suffering to lay her claim to the right to choose.
Nadeau-Whissell used her final farewell blog post to underscore her argument for the
individual’s right to choose to die. She works to distance her decision from appearing as an act
of desperation.
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I wasn’t depressed, I was just being realistic. I was weighing the pros and cons. I was living
in my own truth. No one can understand what someone else is going through… As long as
we’re not all, without exception, guaranteed the right to death in dignity where and when
we desire it, then there will still be work to do. I hope at least I’ve made people stop to
think. I would even like to think that I’ve made a small difference in some people’s lives. I
am passing the torch now to all of you, whose turn it will be, one day, to face death.338
In emphasizing how important the right to choose the “when” and “how” of her death, NadeauWhisell makes the claim for MAiD as a decision one may come to as the result of reasonable
reflection. Such a claim works to highlight MAiD as a desirable feature of civil society. Finally, in
her reminder to her readers that they too will undoubtedly face such a difficult decision one
day, Nadeau-Whissell echoes one of the claims common across disability scholarship, that we
must recognize “illness and disability as part of what makes us human.”339 The pictures that
accompany her messages to readers on the blog further make Nadeau-Whisell’s case. She
poses laying on a reclining chair, surrounded her large family, who are all dressed up in
matching Christmas pajamas. Her posts emphasize the possibilities for closure that MAiD has
provided her. Using her blog to express her gratitude to family and caregivers, and to those
who helped her make her case for the acceptance of MAiD serve to demonstrate her belief that
having MAiD as an option allows someone to die in the best way possible, with intentionality
and in the presence of friends and family. Such a claim to the generalizability of MAiD as a
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potentially positive social force attempts to move beyond its association with suffering and
centers its potential to improve the conditions of dying for all Canadians.

4.4 Medicalization and Curative Time
Queer feminist disability theorist Alison Kafer identifies a paradox in the futures imagined
for disabled people. In recounting her own experiences in recovery from a disabling accident,
Kafer delineates between two contradicting “imagined futures” that could be attached to her
experience. In the first, disability is cast as a “pitiable misfortune, a tragedy that effectively
prevents one from leading a good life,” while in the second, a critical approach to disability in
society points to “ableism—not disability—as the obstacle to a good life.”340 In unpacking this
dichotomy, Kafer illustrates how the hegemony of medical reason shapes how we look at illness
and disability. Labelling this a “curative imaginary,” Kafer argues that fixation on curing and
eliminating disability attempts to erase and undermine the lived experiences of people living
with disabilities, who are cast into a “liminal temporality” as a result.341
I am concerned here with compulsory able-bodiedness/able-mindedness, not with
individual sick and disabled people’s relationships to particular medical interventions; a
desire for a cure is not necessarily an anti-crip or anti-disability rights and justice position.
I am speaking here about a curative imaginary, an understanding of disability that not
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only expects and assumes intervention but also cannot imagine or comprehend anything
other than intervention.342
Curative reason suggests that the only good future is one in which illness and disability are
eradicated. Since not all bodies can (or want to) be “cured” of what ails them, what is to be
made of the futurity of disability in the era of medicalization?
In exploring disability’s relationship with futurity and desire, Kafer draws parallels
between crip politics and Edelman and Halberstam’s theories of queer futures and
temporalities.343 She argues that ‘crip time’ both mirrors and exceeds queer time. Crip bodies
are often read in the same ways as queer bodies. They are seen as undesirable, or as posing a
threat to heteronormative reproductive futures, by disrupting the centrality of the figure of the
child to the future. Unlike queer theorizations of time that problematize the predominant
fixation with longevity as “health” and “stability,”344 Kafer’s understanding of crip time
embraces the importance of longevity since disabled people are too often erased from
idealized futures. “I, we, need to imagine crip futures because disabled people are continually
being written out of the future, rendered as the sign of the future no one wants.” 345 A
configuration of temporality that acknowledges crip bodies both interrupts the notion that
disability is always and only a ‘pitiable misfortune’ and also poses a threat to the teleology of
curative time. While some medical care is of course necessary, as the statements below
illustrate, it is also important to prioritize individual experience, particularly at the end of life.
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4.4.1 Articulating Frustration with the “Reasonably Foreseeable” Rule
On June 17th, when Bill C-14 was assented, the most controversial section was the
language that identified what constitutes a “grievous and irremediable medical condition.” The
Canadian Medical Association offered further clarification: “What constitutes enduring and
intolerable suffering; it is a matter of the patient’s subjective interpretation.”346 The definition
of “reasonably foreseeable,” however, is more elusive. According to the Bill, candidates must
meet all of four criteria to be considered eligible. In this section, I focus on the most
controversial of the four as a means of unpacking what it signifies about curative reason in the
context of MAiD. The criterion that precipitated immediate legal upheaval states that someone
has a grievous and irremediable medical condition if:
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the
specific length of time that they have remaining.347
For those arguing for the expansion of the criteria to include people like Lamb and Moro,
“reasonably foreseeable” was seen as a roadblock because their conditions were such that
interminable suffering would come much sooner than would any signs of the immanency of
death. For others, the phrasing was plainly illogical. After all, argued some, is death not to some
extent reasonably foreseeable for everyone? On the other hand, from a clinical perspective,
predicting death is not particularly straightforward and the phrasing of the law created upset
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among doctors. In 2017, Quebec, whose own provincially mandated permissive MAiD
legislation was superseded by Bill C-14, the health minister reported that pressure from
professional orders convinced him to press the federal government for clarification. “That part
of the law creates problems because you can’t define what is a reasonably foreseeable death…
it is unworkable, inapplicable, too fuzzy.”348 Clinical practice requires careful detail and logical
prediction, but foreseeing death seemed to be beyond the purview of even those providers
who wanted to participate in MAiD.
One of the more troubling results linked to the phrasing of the law was Jean Brault’s
hunger strike. Brault went 53 days without food and 8 without water, both in protest of his
exclusion from the eligibility criteria, and in order to force a decline in his condition that would
render him eligible. Speaking to media after his strike proved successful, Brault called the
existing laws inhumane. He argued that it was incomprehensible to “force people almost to the
point of self-mutilation so they can benefit from a law that is poorly thought out and noninclusive, a law that basically excludes those who have the biggest stake in its use.”349 Not being
attached to high profile legal cases, Brault’s case remains relatively unknown outside of
Quebec. In publicly denouncing his exclusion from MAiD, Brault’s words underscore the
impossibility of perfectly ‘containing’ end of life experiences into tidy categories. The
descriptions of his life underline a long slow decline, at the end of which a reprieve was briefly
offered, then taken away again when he was denied.
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It is impossible to detail the end-of-life experiences of those denied access to MAiD
without constantly making reference to the complex and ever-changing legal timeline that
shaped their realities. For example, many people requested MAiD after Carter, but before C-14
by filing for legal exemptions from the ban on assisted dying. In these cases, as in the Carter
ruling, no reference to the reasonable foreseeability of death had to be made.350 In this sense,
the BCCLA case argued, the federal legislation took away the rights to death with dignity that
the Supreme Court had mandated in Carter. Their fates were doubly bound up in the conflicting
determinations of medicine and the law.
Many of the individuals opposing restrictions on MAiD face degenerative diagnoses for
which the only guarantee is a gradual decline in condition. Although ALS, SMA, Parkinson’s and
other neuromuscular degenerative disorders vary in symptoms and prognosis, most people
living with these disorders will lose one capacity after another. In many of the plaintiff’s
testimonies and media statements, attention to the likelihood of a declining quality of life
served a central role in arguing for more flexible access to MAiD. As Kafer, drawing on Jain and
Puar, details, a prognosis for ill or disabled people does more than introduce sickness into
someone’s life; it can upset their lived experience of chronology altogether. “Living in
‘prognosis time’ is thus a liminal temporality, a casting out of time; rather than a stable, steady
progression through the stages of life, time is arrested, stopped.”351 For those experiencing
debilitating illness, the foreseeability of the future plays a bigger role than it does for a doctor.
A stark prognosis, or one that involves continuous decline represents a greater urgency of the
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present, while the future seems to shrink, explains Kafer, recounting the experiences of poet
and disability activist with muscular dystrophy Laura Hershey. “Futurity itself becomes tenuous,
precarious.”352
Lamb’s court challenge takes aim at the unreasonableness of the “reasonably
foreseeable” criteria, arguing that numerous jurisdictions now allow MAiD for people “for
whom a natural death is not reasonably foreseeable or who are not in an advanced state of
irreversible decline.”353 But beyond challenging the clause on the basis of legal precedent, as
the court challenge does, Lamb’s own recasting of the experience of the foreseeable is more
arresting:
I feel a shadow looming over me. I know I can lose the ability to breathe well enough on
my own and require a ventilator which will affect my ability to speak. I can lose the
remaining function in my hands and arms which would lead to the inability to use my
computer, write and use my phone. If I reach a point where I require constant care I will
lose my independence and freedom. I am terrified by the idea I can become trapped in a
state of physical and mental suffering that goes on for months, years or even decades.
Having to think about the future causes me immense stress.354
Rather than having access to a means of bypassing the most intolerable of the final moments of
life, as “persons of requisite physical ability”355 have been granted, Lamb argues that she is
instead trapped in the prognosis time that Kafer details, in which the present and future are
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collapsed into a distressing liminal state of chronology. By arguing that MAiD represents a
reprieve from the daunting future of her reality, Lamb may also be making a case for effectively
lessening the grip that prognosis time has over her present day reality.

4.4.2 Addressing Suffering and the Loss of Ability to Communicate
Detailed descriptions of the suffering that patients have experienced and anticipate
experiencing are a central feature of arguments in favour of expanding eligibility criteria. In
particular, while many listed descriptions of their present situation, an even greater emphasis
was placed on the anguish caused by foreseeing a steady decline in the patient’s condition. In
this sense, it is the future suffering that this discourse holds to the light. Arguing that this
anticipation exacerbated their struggles, plaintiffs and advocates sought to show how granting
the right to MAiD would improve the end of life experiences of those excluded by the
restrictions of C-14. With the understanding that most disabled and ill people face a biopolitical
devaluation of their lives and futures under the hegemony of an ableist society, how should we
understand Lamb’s demands? Does the demand for the right to curtail future suffering using
MAiD threaten vulnerable disabled people when, as Kafer argues, “disabled people are
continually being written out of the future” to begin with? In this section I explore the
relationship between anticipated suffering and the ongoing lived experiences of people with
illnesses and disabilities.
Arguments about expanding MAiD paradoxically point to medicine as both the
perpetrator of extending suffering and the relief of it. Karsoho et al.’s study of MAiD’s legal and
expert discourse during the Carter case found that “proponents see curative medicine as
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complicit in the production of suffering at the end of life.”356 In the language used by those
discussing suffering during medicalized end-of-life care, the medicalization of dying, and more
specifically curative efforts are seen as the cause of extended suffering. In some cases, this
suffering is the result of extended interventions that aim to prolong life, while in others even
palliative care aimed at improving the quality of dying without intervention, such as pain
medication and antidepressants, were perceived as causing increased suffering for patients at
the end of their lives.
When Quebec requested clarification of the C-14 criteria, health minister Gaétan
Barrette called suffering the “common denominator”357 in all of the problems surrounding the
laws. The BCCLA pointed out that waiting out the slow process of legal change has proved
impossible for some experiencing unbearable suffering.
We do not want sick and suffering Canadians to have to endure another incredibly long
wait. We know from Carter that some people simply won't be able to wait. Some will die
in agony. Some will be forced to live in agony. And so we're asking the government to not
put any delays in the way.358
The narrative of the Lamb court challenge relies heavily on positioning the denial of MAiD as
perpetrating tormenting conditions for patients. Having been denied MAiD initially, they
argued, Moro “suffered unbearably throughout the summer”359 until her condition was
reassessed and she was granted MAiD. Lamb’s testimony explains how with each new symptom
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that results from her deteriorating condition, such as the “excruciating headaches”360 that she
experiences as a result of breathing problems throughout the night, her living conditions
become less bearable.
In some cases, emphasizing the small daily pleasures that Lamb still enjoys enabled her
to express frustration in trying to imagine life without them. “Julia may lose the use of her
hands,” the court challenge details, “She fears losing the ability to drive her wheelchair and
write and type because she loves to express herself through writing. She also loves to use
illustration and drawing programs on her computer.”361 Talking about her communication
habits, and the importance of her daily routines enables Lamb to frame her experience outside
the curative frames of medical reason.
I know that potentially, given the nature of my disease, it is progressive, so there may
come a time where I could be grievously ill and suffering. Things like not being able to
breathe properly and communicate, not being able to write, not being able to use my
hands.362
Lamb’s claim is for her right to having a future on her own terms, even if that future includes
accepting death. This is a radical claim because it also demands that she be granted more selfdetermination through enacting her right to a life without fear of future suffering now. Kafer’s
approach demonstrates the inextricability of disabled, crip futures and presents. In offering “a
politics of crip futurity, an insistence on thinking these imagined futures—and hence, these

360

British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 6.
362 Ireland, “‘I Feel Quite Abandoned.’”
361

167

lived presents—differently”363 she insists on modes of futurity that improve the lives of
disabled people today. Given Lamb and Moro’s explicit claims that MAiD represents not only
the elimination of future suffering but would (or could have) also improve the conditions of
their present lives, we should consider the possibility that MAiD may signify for some not a
threat to vulnerable or disabled people, but, so long as it does not enact an erasure of disability,
may also be a means of empowering those whose present conditions are shaped by the
anticipation of irreversible decline.

4.4.3 Expressing Relief
Nadeau-Whissell and Brault, who did ultimately die with medical assistance, expressed
relief at having had the right to go out on their own terms. Brault and Nadeau-Whissell’s final
statements underscore their belief that MAiD enables a ‘good death’ by both alleviating
suffering and enabling rituals of closure, such as saying goodbye to family and friends.
Brault was uniquely positioned to express his final sentiments about the process in that
he gave a television interview two days before his MAiD procedure was scheduled. Brault’s
MAiD experience took place after Carter and Quebec’s Bill n°52, An Act respecting end-of-life
care, so his initial denial of access to the procedure was on the basis of the provincial law, as
the federal legislation had not yet passed. Even without the criteria of a “reasonably
foreseeable” death, Brault was likely denied on the basis of not suffering from an advanced
state of irreversible decline in capability, one of the Quebec law’s eligibility criteria.364 In the
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interview, Brault expresses that, even having been denied MAiD initially, he is relieved to go out
on his own terms. In the final question, the interviewer asks Brault how he feels, now that his
request has been granted. His voice cracks, perhaps from emotion or the strain of speaking, as
he explains his relief.
I feel happy, I feel relaxed, I feel like it’s the first time since very, very long ago that
anyone’s heard what I was saying […] It’s like a total, absolute liberation. 365
Expressing MAiD as lifting a weight from his conscience, Brault gives the impression that his
final 48 hours may be the happiest he has experienced in years. In the final moments of the
clip, Brault is shown surrounded by his family, looking at old family photos, and presumably
saying goodbye. Such depictions of MAiD as providing an opportunity to approach death
without fear, and to provide certainty enough to enable family rituals of closure emphasize how
MAiD is understood as providing for a ‘good’ death.
Similar to Brault, Nadeau-Whissell also expresses the relief MAiD provides by knowing
her death was coming. She describes a range of emotions but explains that it is ultimately a
lifting of emotional weight. “There’s something surreal about knowing in advance the day and
time of one’s own death! It’s fucked up, even! But what a deliverance, what a relief!”366 In
underscoring the emotions of relief and resolution, Nadeau-Whissell distances the MAiD
experience from associations with trauma and desperation. Although MAiD occurs within the
frame of medicine, such discourses of relief and closure interrupt the logics of medicine. With
regard to ill, and particularly disabled bodies, argues Kafer, the medical model “frames atypical
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bodies and minds as deviant, pathological, and defective.”367 In demonstrating that MAiD offers
a relief that no conventional medical treatment can, Brault and Whissell insist that it was rather
curative medicine’s prolongation of suffering, rather than illness itself that have constrained
their lives. Such a move points to the social and cultural processes that surround death and
dying as the reason for trauma and suffering, rather than the lived experience of illness located
at the level of the individual. At the same time that this gesture reflects on the communal
aspect of dying, it also prioritizes individual experience, allowing Brault and Nadeau-Whissell to
narrate their final days in ways that break with the prognostic language of medicine. In so
doing, this discourse bends the temporal conventions of curative reason. It cuts short the time
afforded to treatment and cure, while extending the time available for dying a good death.

4.5 Conclusion
Those seeking to express discontent with restrictive criteria in the MAiD criteria were
faced with the challenge of articulating their concerns from vastly different circumstances. All
of the arguments made took place within a frame of medicalization and compulsory ablebodiedness. As a result, people justifying the lifting of restrictions made sense of their
situations using language that signals these frames. Those who wanted to express that their
lives had been fully lived used ableist language to detail experiences and activities that affirmed
having lived a good life. In denouncing their exclusion from the existing legislation, they pointed
to unfair criteria restricting their right to make a final decision how to die. Finally, they asserted
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their right to self-determination much in the way that others who pushed for the institution of
a permissive system in the first place did.
Since assistance in dying occurs within the realm of medicine, and is still subject to all of
the prognostic reasoning that accompanies medical care, people seeking the expansion of
permissibility criteria strive to undermine the grip of curative time over their lives and futures.
They argued against the logic of the “reasonably foreseeable clause,” suggesting that it cannot
align with the realities of many people nearing the end of life. They detailed the suffering they
have experienced, regardless of medicine’s best efforts. They articulated the conditions beyond
the direct symptoms of their illnesses that were making their lives unlivable, in a register that
occurs outside the curative frames of medical reason. Finally, for those who did ultimately die
with assistance, they expressed relief at having had the right to die on their own terms.
The statements from Lamb, Moro, Brault and Nadeau-Whissell suggest that for some ill
and disabled people, MAiD represents the same dignity-as-autonomy that it does for other
proponents. Unlike the majority of people who seek access to MAiD, however, those living with
the debilitating effects of illness or disability without the immanence of death fall outside of the
more familiar linearity of a life’s trajectory. Curative imaginings of life under medicalization
obscure all possibilities besides intervention, treatment and cure. Even as the shifting tides of
Canada’s permissive system are moving towards articulating a limit to the totality of curative
medicine’s authority, accounts of disabled experiences during this period of time suggest that
because the discourse took place in the space of compulsory able-bodiedness, at times proMAiD advocates reinforced ableist standards of quality of life.
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The figure of the rational, able-bodied, autonomous liberal subject on which Canada’s
biopolitical order is built is tenuous and unstable. We might say, as McRuer says of able-bodied
heterosexuality’s hegemony, that this subjectivity is “always in danger of collapse.”368 The
continuation of this figure is dependent on the identification of the disabled other, who serves
to represent the inverse of the latter. The continued primacy of medicalization likewise
depends on the figure of disability. In signifying the incurable, disability threatens the reach of
medicine’s power. Under the hegemony of curative medicine’s reach into all stages of life, all
bodies are viewed as sites for continued improvement and intervention. The double bind of
compulsory able-bodiedness is such that even while most able-bodied people move through life
without being called upon to ‘foresee’ their futures, illness and disability engender an urgency
to predict trajectories of living and dying, forcing an impossible balance between their
experience of the present, and a futurity bound to the ideals of curative medicine.
In the context of MAiD debates, disability comes to signify the outer limit of life worth
living. As Canada’s transition to a permissive system demonstrates, access to MAiD is
increasingly viewed as a right inherent to liberal subjectivity. In serving as an additional barrier
to this right, the present legal system reinforces the view that people with impairments and
disabilities lack a capacity for autonomous self-determination that others possess. Such a
distinction serves to make the category of the rational, able-bodied, self-determining liberal
subject possible in the first place. This positioning of disability further illustrates how, as
Garland-Thompson argues, disability is constructed as a “repository” for social anxieties about
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“vulnerability, control and identity.”369 The result is that, in addition to dealing with the
challenges of living in a society ill-adapted to their needs, disabled people are held accountable
for fending off a whole host of broader social fears.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 Key Findings
In the introductory chapter, I provide an overview of scholarly conversations relevant to
examining the end of life from the perspective of critical discourses of health and wellness, and
with regard to Canada’s unique social landscape. Specifically, I provide basic background detail
on how its settler colonial past shapes the social imaginary, and the concept of universal care. I
situate the Canadian context within Western ideals of health and wellness and examine how
this sets the stage for the regimes of “good living” that shape our understandings of health. I
provide an overview of the research design of the project, detail for the research procedures
for each chapter, and a rationale for the choice of critical discourse analysis as research
method. Finally, I provide a conceptual overview of the dissertation as a whole.
Chapter two, the first analytical chapter, considers how the shift toward greater
autonomy from medicine at the end of life took place in Canadian public discourse. Examining
this sampling of data provided a broad snapshot of the state of public discourse on assisted
dying in the months immediately prior to and following the Carter Supreme Court decision and
the legislation that followed. I demonstrate how, even at the time of passing Bill C-14, the
public was divided on the moral permissiveness of the issue. I analyzed these texts with the aim
of isolating and examining assumptions about autonomy within the frame of medicine. I drew
from existing critical studies of the social construction of death to interpret the significance to
shared conceptions of autonomy in Canada. This chapter’s most significant contribution is a
clearer understanding how the politics of dying are changing. Although notable exclusions from
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the law illustrate how discourses surrounding death still problematically favor selfdetermination over dependence, a transition in which death is viewed as something other than
failure should be considered a positive one. My key takeaway from this stage of the research
was that it demonstrated how, despite its focus on death, the question of MAiD is ultimately a
concern about life and living.
Chapter three considers the relationship between the medicalization of death and
barbiturates, the drugs used in medically assisted deaths and in capital punishment. Since these
two very different forms of death are facilitated by barbiturates, I examined the links between
them in an attempt to better understand how MAiD figures in the broader context of the
medicalization of death. I drew on the work of Puar to argue that barbiturates follow the
biopolitical metrics of capacitation and debilitation; they facilitate capacitation for some as a
liberal rationale, while enacting in the same vector the deliberate debilitation of others. By
treating drugs as an entryway into examining the biopolitical construction of a “good death,”
this chapter examines how the means for inducing death are linked to their history for treating
anxiety and sleeplessness. A good death, this historical connection suggests, is one without
fear. While the drugs do work to calm the patients themselves, their popularity both in punitive
and medical applications is also linked to those who must bear witness to someone’s final
moments, to give the appearance that the process is a peaceful and painless one.
Chapter four scrutinizes the rhetorical strategies used to justify the expansion of MAiD
eligibility criteria in Canada. During the process of collecting coverage of this facet of the
debate, four individuals, Julia Lamb, Robyn Moro, Jean Brault, and Suzanne Nadeau-Whissell,
who were directly affected by the legislation, served as representative cases. In order to further
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examine their experiences, and amplify their opinions in my study, I refocused data collected to
media texts by and about these four people. I analysed each case in the context of critical
disability theories of medicalization, with the aim of better understanding how these efforts to
renegotiate MAiD access fit within broader debates about the medicalization of disability. This
chapter directly engages the dispute that MAiD proponents have with curative medicine,
detailing how individuals claim that their lives are made worse by efforts to cure at any cost,
particularly in the final stages of life. The eligibility restrictions seem to have the primary effect
of reassuring the living that no harm will be done, rather than of ensuring fairness for those
who are dying. Likewise, the social history of barbiturates suggests that the drugs used to
induce death are central to calming the anxieties of those who must bear witness. In this sense,
the eligibility restrictions and the drugs share the focus on those the dying leave behind,
sometimes at the expense of people at the end of their lives.

5.2 Discussion
Across these chapters, there emerged multiple, sometimes conflicting accounts of the
social function of MAiD. Encountering such conflict or dissension is typical for critical health
communication scholars, who “consider struggle, conflict and tensions to be the natural state”
of discourse.370 This approach seeks to go beyond description of discourse, towards an “ethical
position with regards to the implications of that communicative activity.” 371 In this sense, the
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tensions between different accounts of MAiD serve as a robust foundation for considering its
implications. In this section, I present these implications as they relate to all chapters.
Specifically, three themes emerged: the relationship between death and identity, the biopolitics
of permission, and the interrelated history of drugs and anxiety. These discussions are intended
to offer new ways of thinking about the investments that the state has in individual health.372 In
the process of teasing out these investments, my analysis exposes connections across multiple
discursive arenas—chiefly legal, pharmaceutical, and medical—which make up the changes
taking place in end of life rituals in Canada. These are relevant to the growing number of
jurisdictions worldwide debating legislation of their own (currently including at least 20 U.S.
states, as well as Australia, Lithuania, and Portugal). At the same time, it also extends the scope
of critical health communication studies, which more often scrutinize regimes of health and
longevity, into examining the care disparities that shape the end of life.

5.2.1 Death and Identity
The debate about MAiD became a matter of national identity. A major underlying
question for opponents and proponents alike was “Is this practice acceptable to Canadians?”,
“Can this happen in Canada?” As such, as the contextual history of bodies under universal care
illustrates, the question of health is bound up in larger concerns about the legacy of the
national body. With MAiD now a legal and viable option, one at least 4000 people have chosen
since 2015, hastening death is now a choice available to those who meet the criteria. On one
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level, the transition to a permissive system suggests that choosing MAiD may become just an
addition to the range of choices that make up the rituals of individualist health and wellness. To
the extent that this choice departs from the view of death as failure, it should be viewed as
positive. Opting for a healthy, timely death might become another designation under neoliberal
subject formation, not unlike those between productivity, deviancy, illness that have also
undergone changes in the transition between waged labor and hypercapitalist surplus
accumulation.373 On another level, however, if MAiD represents an option to some, mostly
white, bodies, then like all other ‘healthy choices’ it is overdetermined by the colonial logics
that already naturalize pain, suffering and injury of impoverished and racialized others. If
choosing the timing and conditions of one’s approaching death grows in popularity, it will be
critical to continue to expose the taken-for-granted ways that healthcare options operate as
vector of the systematic construction and maintenance of inequalities,374 that are linked to
culture and social institutions.

5.2.2 Biopolitics of Permission
As the discussion of autonomy in dying discourse demonstrates, the permission to
access MAiD has been established through a particular set of rhetorical gestures. These
gestures might be understood as a reworking of the conventional ‘make live’ ‘let die’ division
that Foucault identified in contemporary biopolitics. Each of the plaintiffs in the court cases that
have set precedent for the legalization of MAiD have had to demonstrate that they have
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sufficient autonomy to merit access to the procedure. The fact of legalization however, and
much of the discourse surrounding legal deliberation and government legislation, obscures the
reality that many people find ways to die with assistance whether or not it is legal. In this sense,
MAiD resembles the fight for reproductive rights. Sue Rodriguez, the first plaintiff seeking
assisted suicide in the 1990s died with assistance in secret despite losing her Supreme Court
case. Though only a few doctors, such as Dr. Ellen Wiebe in Vancouver, spoke publicly about
willingness to participate in MAiD before legalization, many participated in some form of MAiD
in the years before Bill C-14 passed. The difference between those deaths and the kinds of
deaths with MAiD that will occur now is one of permission. Permission played a key role across
each of the arenas of MAiD examined throughout the dissertation.
Each of the four modes of discourse detailed (moral rejection, medical-rationalist,
medical-revivalist, and autonomy in dying) articulated the permission to die differently. For
moral rejection discourse, authorization is not something a person can request or be granted.
For medical-rationalists, permission to die lies beyond the scope of doctors, whose authority
only encompasses the power to cure. Medical-revivalists, who share a commitment to revising
the limits of medical convention, seek to incorporate the possibility of granting permission to
die into practice. Autonomy in dying discourse goes beyond permission, fixing on the inherent
right of individuals to consent to their own deaths voluntarily. These four distinct views of
permission, however, do not tell the whole story. The afterlife of colonialism deeply influences
the manner in which autonomy and consent are granted; it naturalizes the autonomy of those
white, able-bodied individuals who have historically epitomized the healthy body.
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Beyond the political and subjective expression of permission and autonomy in discourse,
the pharmaceutical dimension of this study also exposes a gulf of permission. Though conceived
as a treatment to common complaints of anxiety, sleeplessness, and stress—symptoms that
are, of course, present across class and demographic boundaries—barbiturates’ therapeutic
and recreational use illustrate how the permission to take the edge off is unevenly granted,
favoring those privileged enough to gain access through legal avenues. In this sense, the history
of barbiturates is a precursor to the contemporary phenomenon of granting privileged
populations access to marijuana to treat anxiety and PTSD, while mass incarcerating others who
do the same. In both cases, the permission and autonomy to take health into one’s own hands
is treated as a right of the privileged few.
In chapter 4, permission is a direct issue of access. Exploring the challenges faced by
those who have been excluded from the new permissive MAiD system exposes how the effort
to protect ‘vulnerable’ people from harm paradoxically strips them of the agency and selfdetermination newly granted to others. This chapter exposes the temporal dimensions of
disability, where permission operates within a double bind. Not only do people with disabilities
face social barriers to living as they choose, but, as the four cases analyzed illustrate, those
seeking greater control over their end-of-life scenarios also face disproportionate barriers. This
stage of the research in particular served as a reminder that those who are most often subject
to the regimes of medicine are probably the most qualified to critique it. This analysis reaffirms
that the field of disability studies is uniquely qualified to contribute to social studies of medicine
and the institutions and practices under which all of us must live.375 Finally, it suggests that
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there is further work to be done in centering disability expertise in discussions of medicalization
at all stages of life.

5.2.3 Drugs, Anxiety and Suffering
Another common theme throughout the project is the tension between physical and
psychological suffering. What distinguishes proponents of MAiD from other positions is the
centrality of the trope of suffering, and, more specifically, that curative medicine is “complicit in
the production of suffering at the end of life.”376 In the discourses of autonomy, the avoidance
of suffering is central to the pursuit of legal MAiD, and yet in the course of lobbying for access
to the procedure, subjects had to perform a particular kind of happiness. As the testimonies of
Gloria Taylor, Julia Lamb, Robyn Moro, Jean Brault and others demonstrate, the question of a
timely death is inextricable from the performance of a particular mode of living that aligns with
the ideals of health and fulfilment. That the path to being granted access to a painless, timely
death is through the rituals of healthy independent living might seem innocuous if it were not
for the fact that the same logic is used to exclude people from access. Taylor and others who
have sought or are seeking MAiD are not doing so because of their past lives, but because of
their present conditions. These patterns that emerged in the work of recasting MAiD as
culturally acceptable is more often about the conscience of those left behind more than it is
about any inherent individual right.
The people excluded from access discussed in the previous chapter illustrate how MAiD
represents more than a swift and painless exit for many people. Lamb and Nadeau-Whissell in
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particular expressed how the right to access MAiD represented to them peace of mind and the
relief from suffering about the worry about their inevitable decline. From this angle, merely the
existence of a truly permissive system—without necessarily making use of the procedure
itself—holds the promise of improving the psychological wellbeing of people with degenerative
neuromuscular disorders in particular, for whom declining conditions present serious anxiety.
This is not to say that MAiD should be rationalized in instances of disability, but rather that we
should consider the possibility that the procedure is being reconceived as a non-curative act of
care. Although there remains a danger that in the future MAiD might grow closer in association
with disability, the present situation suggests that efforts to protect the rights of people with
disabilities should continue to focus on building institutions that support the needs of people
with disabilities on their own terms, rather than fixating on defending vulnerable people.
The drug facet of the story of MAiD also complicates a traditional view of vulnerability at
the end of life. Since the Danish producer of the lethal injection drugs ceased distribution to the
United States, the affected inmates have only faced harsher and more uncertain end-of-life
scenarios. Although it is the drugs that link together such dissimilar practices as lethal injection
and MAiD, the boundary between the two practices exposes deep-seated hopes for what we
expect from a good death: a timely, swift and painless exit, without anxiety or psychological
suffering.

5.3 Implications for Future Research
Within Canada, the findings of this research have critical significance to the ongoing
development of the Lamb v. Canada court case, which will determine if Julia Lamb and others
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with disabling conditions have access to MAiD. Specifically, there is more work to be done in
understanding how people close to the assisted dying process, such as policymakers, hospital
administrators, nurses and physicians, make sense of the challenges relating to ableism and the
end of life. Many well-meaning professionals have never experienced life with a significant
impairment,377 and tend to inaccurately assume that life with impairment is inherently
inferior.378 Close attention to such concerns will be necessary to charting a thorough account of
the cultural impacts of implementing legal assisted dying in Canada. More broadly, critical
health research should continue to engage the shifting terrain of assisted dying practice. Since
the significance of MAiD is so closely bound up in geographical, social, cultural and political
contexts, it will be critical to continue to trace its expansion into disparate social contexts.
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